22227
|
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
|
|
Full Idea:
The two most fundamental modes of being in Sartre's ontology are being in-itself, and being for-itself. ...The in-itself lies beyond our experience of it.
|
|
From:
report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.2
|
|
A reaction:
This appears to be Kant's ding-an-sich, paired with Heidegger's Dasein. If those are the only options, then reality is either subjective or unknown, which seems to make Sartre an idealist, but he asserted that phenomena vindicate the in-itself.
|
9558
|
All scientific tests will verify mathematics, so it is a background, not something being tested [Sober]
|
|
Full Idea:
If mathematical statements are part of every competing hypothesis, then no matter which hypothesis comes out best in the light of observations, they will be part of the best hypothesis. They are not tested, but are a background assumption.
|
|
From:
Elliott Sober (Mathematics and Indispensibility [1993], 45), quoted by Charles Chihara - A Structural Account of Mathematics
|
|
A reaction:
This is a very nice objection to the Quine-Putnam thesis that mathematics is confirmed by the ongoing successes of science.
|
6215
|
'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes]
|
|
Full Idea:
For contingent, men do not mean that which hath no cause, but that which hath not for cause any thing that we perceive, as when a traveller meets a shower, they both had sufficient causes, but they didn't cause one another, so we say it was contingent.
|
|
From:
Thomas Hobbes (Of Liberty and Necessity [1654], §95)
|
|
A reaction:
Contingent nowadays means 'might not have happened', or 'does not happen in all possible worlds'. Personally I share Hobbes' doubts about the concept of contingency, and this is quite a good account of the misunderstanding.
|
6151
|
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
|
|
Full Idea:
Sartre defends a view of consciousness as nothing but a directedness towards objects, insisting that these objects are transcendent with respect to that consciousness; hence Sartre is one of the first genuine externalists.
|
|
From:
report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.1
|
|
A reaction:
An ancestor here is, I think, Schopenhauer (Idea 4166). The idea is attractive, as we are brought up with idea that we have a thing called 'consciousness', but if you removed its contents there would literally be nothing left.
|
6164
|
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
|
|
Full Idea:
Sartre's attack on the idea that consciousness has contents is an attack on the idea that the mental possesses features that are hidden, inner and constituted or revealed by the individual's inwardly directed awareness.
|
|
From:
report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5
|
|
A reaction:
This is part of the move towards 'externalism' about the mind. The notion of 'content' implies a container. It seems slightly ridiculous, though, to try to say that the mind just 'is the world'. How is reasoning possible, and the relation of ideas?
|
22231
|
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
|
|
Full Idea:
We are always ready to take refuge in a belief in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse. Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or a thing.
|
|
From:
Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.82), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.4
|
|
A reaction:
I would have thought we blame social pressures, or biological pressures, rather than metaphysical determinism, but it amounts to the same thing. If we are not free then probably nothing else is.
|