21 ideas
| 17949 | Inquiry is the cause of philosophy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Inquiry is the cause of philosophy. | |
| From: Aristotle (Protrepticus (frags) [c.334 BCE]), quoted by Alexander Nehamas - Eristic,Antilogic,Sophistic,Dialectic p.120 | |
| A reaction: The earlier part of the quote says philosophical thinking is inescapable (even if philosophy is impossible). I suppose we would call it 'curiosity'. |
| 10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Impredicative Definitions are definitions of an object by reference to the totality to which the object itself (and perhaps also things definable only in terms of that object) belong. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], n 13) |
| 21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: In the superior realist and simple theory of types, the place of the axiom of reducibility is not taken by the axiom of classes, Zermelo's Aussonderungsaxiom. | |
| From: report of Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.140-1) by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 6.1 n3 | |
| A reaction: This is Zermelo's Axiom of Separation, but that too is not an axiom of standard ZFC. |
| 10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: 'Mathematical Logic' is a precise and complete formulation of formal logic, and is both a section of mathematics covering classes, relations, symbols etc, and also a science prior to all others, with ideas and principles underlying all sciences. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.447) | |
| A reaction: He cites Leibniz as the ancestor. In this database it is referred to as 'theory of logic', as 'mathematical' seems to be simply misleading. The principles of the subject are standardly applied to mathematical themes. |
| 10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: One may, on good grounds, deny that reference to a totality necessarily implies reference to all single elements of it or, in other words, that 'all' means the same as an infinite logical conjunction. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.455) |
| 10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: In order to be sure that new expression can be translated into expressions not containing them, it is necessary to have a survey of all possible expressions, and this can be furnished only by syntactical considerations. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.448) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: The generalized Continuum Hypothesis says that there exists no cardinal number between the power of any arbitrary set and the power of the set of its subsets. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) |
| 10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: It has turned out that the solution of certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.449) | |
| A reaction: A nice statement of the famous result, from the great man himself, in the plainest possible English. |
| 10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Classes and concepts may be conceived of as real objects, ..and are as necessary to obtain a satisfactory system of mathematics as physical bodies are necessary for a satisfactory theory of our sense perceptions, with neither case being about 'data'. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.456) | |
| A reaction: Note that while he thinks real objects are essential for mathematics, be may not be claiming the same thing for our knowledge of logic. If logic contains no objects, then how could mathematics be reduced to it, as in logicism? |
| 10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
| Full Idea: Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics. | |
| From: Kurt Gödel (Russell's Mathematical Logic [1944], p.464) | |
| A reaction: The issue is at what point in building an account of the foundations of mathematics (if there be such, see Putnam) these impure definitions should be ruled out. |
| 22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| Full Idea: The two most fundamental modes of being in Sartre's ontology are being in-itself, and being for-itself. ...The in-itself lies beyond our experience of it. | |
| From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.2 | |
| A reaction: This appears to be Kant's ding-an-sich, paired with Heidegger's Dasein. If those are the only options, then reality is either subjective or unknown, which seems to make Sartre an idealist, but he asserted that phenomena vindicate the in-itself. |
| 20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: We reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.4-5), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology' | |
| A reaction: This idea, expressed in the language of Hegel and Husserl, strikes me as the same as the analytic phenomenalism of Mill and Ayer. Hence I take it to be wrong. |
| 6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| Full Idea: Sartre defends a view of consciousness as nothing but a directedness towards objects, insisting that these objects are transcendent with respect to that consciousness; hence Sartre is one of the first genuine externalists. | |
| From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: An ancestor here is, I think, Schopenhauer (Idea 4166). The idea is attractive, as we are brought up with idea that we have a thing called 'consciousness', but if you removed its contents there would literally be nothing left. |
| 6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
| Full Idea: Sartre's attack on the idea that consciousness has contents is an attack on the idea that the mental possesses features that are hidden, inner and constituted or revealed by the individual's inwardly directed awareness. | |
| From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: This is part of the move towards 'externalism' about the mind. The notion of 'content' implies a container. It seems slightly ridiculous, though, to try to say that the mind just 'is the world'. How is reasoning possible, and the relation of ideas? |
| 7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: Man is a useless passion. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], IV.2.III) | |
| A reaction: Memorable and neat. Since all of existence is ultimately 'useless', that part of it is not a revelation. The notion that we are essentially a 'passion' chimes nicely with David Hume's view, against the enlightenment rational view, and against Aristotle. |
| 6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: Man fundamentally is the desire to be God. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.556?), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.5 | |
| A reaction: It is better to see man (as seen all the way through the European tradition) as caught between the self-images of being an angel and being a 'quintessence of dust' (Hamlet). |
| 22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
| Full Idea: Readers often confuse Sartre's notion of freedom with the freedom of acting whimsically ....but since there is no God, we must create our own values. Freedom is not merely a licence to act whimsically.; it entails responsibility. | |
| From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.3 | |
| A reaction: The idea that we create our values comes from Nietzsche. Did Sartre want everyone to behave like an übermensch? How can you form a society from individuals who create private values, even if they (somehow) take responsibility for them? |
| 22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: Love is the demand to be loved. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.488), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.5 | |
| A reaction: Is that all love is? Hard to imagine someone loving another person without hoping that the other person will reciprocate. You need high self-esteem to 'demand' it. Low self-esteem merely hopes for it. He says the other person may feel the same. |
| 20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: Anguish is distinguished from fear in that fear is fear of being in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.65), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Radical' | |
| A reaction: I'm guessing that the anguish comes from the horror of the infinite choices available to me. Once you've made major life choices with full commitment (such as marriage), does that mean that existentialism becomes irrelevant? |
| 20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
| Full Idea: Being sincere [in Sartre] has nothing to do with authenticity because, in committing ourselves to a particular identity, we strip away the possibility of transcendence by reducing ourselves to a thing. | |
| From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 6 'Bad' | |
| A reaction: I take this to mean that sincerity says genuinely what role you are playing (such as a waiter), but authenticity is recognition that you don't have to play that role. I think. |
| 22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |
| Full Idea: We are always ready to take refuge in a belief in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse. Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or a thing. | |
| From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.82), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.4 | |
| A reaction: I would have thought we blame social pressures, or biological pressures, rather than metaphysical determinism, but it amounts to the same thing. If we are not free then probably nothing else is. |