Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Being and Nothingness', 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness'' and 'Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II)'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Metaphysics is the lattice which makes incoming material intelligible [Hegel]
     Full Idea: Metaphysics means nothing other than the range of general determinations of thought, the diamond lattice, as it were, into which we bring all material and thereby first make it intelligible.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II) [1817], §3), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - Hegel p.95
     A reaction: This sounds to me like a perfect summary of Kant's transcendental view. Metaphysics is the a priori deconstruction of our conceptual scheme. But for Kant it is fixed, and for Hegel it is dynamic.
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / h. Dasein (being human)
For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle]
     Full Idea: The two most fundamental modes of being in Sartre's ontology are being in-itself, and being for-itself. ...The in-itself lies beyond our experience of it.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.2
     A reaction: This appears to be Kant's ding-an-sich, paired with Heidegger's Dasein. If those are the only options, then reality is either subjective or unknown, which seems to make Sartre an idealist, but he asserted that phenomena vindicate the in-itself.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre]
     Full Idea: We reject the dualism of appearance and essence. The appearance does not hide the essence, it reveals it; it is the essence.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.4-5), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 2 'Phenomenology'
     A reaction: This idea, expressed in the language of Hegel and Husserl, strikes me as the same as the analytic phenomenalism of Mill and Ayer. Hence I take it to be wrong.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Sartre defends a view of consciousness as nothing but a directedness towards objects, insisting that these objects are transcendent with respect to that consciousness; hence Sartre is one of the first genuine externalists.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.1
     A reaction: An ancestor here is, I think, Schopenhauer (Idea 4166). The idea is attractive, as we are brought up with idea that we have a thing called 'consciousness', but if you removed its contents there would literally be nothing left.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
     Full Idea: The two main competitors for reductive theories of consciousness are the representational theory (conscious if it represents in the right way), and higher-order monitoring (conscious if it is represented in the right way).
     From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], Intro)
     A reaction: Presumably there are also neuroscientists hunting for physical functions which might generate consciousness. The two mentioned here are rivals at one level of discourse. Both views may be simplistic, if complex teams of activities are involved.
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
     Full Idea: On the assumption that any environmental feature can be represented either consciously or unconsciously, it is unclear how the mere representation of such a feature can render the representing state conscious.
     From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
     A reaction: The authors are rejecting simple representation as the key, in favour of a distinctive sort of self-representation. I'm inclined to think that consciousness results from multiple co-ordinated layers of representation etc., which has no simple account.
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
     Full Idea: The self-representational theory of consciousness says that when one has a conscious experience as of a red tomato, one is in an internal state that represents both a red tomato and itself.
     From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
     A reaction: This seems to be avoiding the concept of 'higher-order', and yet that seems the only way to describe it - thought steps outside of itself, generating a level of meta-thought. I think that's the way to go. Philosophy is about-fifth level.
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
     Full Idea: The difficulties with a self-representational view of consciousness are how self-representation of mental states could be possible, whether it leads to an infinite regress, and whether it can capture the actual phenomenology of experience.
     From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §3)
     A reaction: [compressed] All of these objections strike me as persuasive, especially the first one. I'm not sure I know what self-representation is. Mirrors externally represent, and they can't represent themselves. Two mirrors together achieve something..
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
     Full Idea: A problem for explaining consciousness by higher-order representations is that, like their first-order counterparts, they can misrepresent; there could be a subjective impression of being in a conscious state without actually being in any conscious state.
     From: U Kriegel / K Williford (Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness' [2006], §1)
     A reaction: It sounds plausible that this is a logical possibility, but how do you assess whether it is an actual or natural possibility? Are we saying that higher-order representations are judgments, which could be true or false? Hm.
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands]
     Full Idea: Sartre's attack on the idea that consciousness has contents is an attack on the idea that the mental possesses features that are hidden, inner and constituted or revealed by the individual's inwardly directed awareness.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Mark Rowlands - Externalism Ch.5
     A reaction: This is part of the move towards 'externalism' about the mind. The notion of 'content' implies a container. It seems slightly ridiculous, though, to try to say that the mind just 'is the world'. How is reasoning possible, and the relation of ideas?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Man is a useless passion [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Man is a useless passion.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], IV.2.III)
     A reaction: Memorable and neat. Since all of existence is ultimately 'useless', that part of it is not a revelation. The notion that we are essentially a 'passion' chimes nicely with David Hume's view, against the enlightenment rational view, and against Aristotle.
Man is the desire to be God [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Man fundamentally is the desire to be God.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.556?), quoted by Gordon Graham - Eight Theories of Ethics Ch.5
     A reaction: It is better to see man (as seen all the way through the European tradition) as caught between the self-images of being an angel and being a 'quintessence of dust' (Hamlet).
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle]
     Full Idea: Readers often confuse Sartre's notion of freedom with the freedom of acting whimsically ....but since there is no God, we must create our own values. Freedom is not merely a licence to act whimsically.; it entails responsibility.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.3
     A reaction: The idea that we create our values comes from Nietzsche. Did Sartre want everyone to behave like an übermensch? How can you form a society from individuals who create private values, even if they (somehow) take responsibility for them?
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Love is the demand to be loved.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.488), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.5
     A reaction: Is that all love is? Hard to imagine someone loving another person without hoping that the other person will reciprocate. You need high self-esteem to 'demand' it. Low self-esteem merely hopes for it. He says the other person may feel the same.
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre]
     Full Idea: Anguish is distinguished from fear in that fear is fear of being in the world whereas anguish is anguish before myself.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.65), quoted by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 5 'Radical'
     A reaction: I'm guessing that the anguish comes from the horror of the infinite choices available to me. Once you've made major life choices with full commitment (such as marriage), does that mean that existentialism becomes irrelevant?
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho]
     Full Idea: Being sincere [in Sartre] has nothing to do with authenticity because, in committing ourselves to a particular identity, we strip away the possibility of transcendence by reducing ourselves to a thing.
     From: report of Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943]) by Kevin Aho - Existentialism: an introduction 6 'Bad'
     A reaction: I take this to mean that sincerity says genuinely what role you are playing (such as a waiter), but authenticity is recognition that you don't have to play that role. I think.
We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre]
     Full Idea: We are always ready to take refuge in a belief in determinism if this freedom weighs upon us or if we need an excuse. Thus we flee from anguish by attempting to apprehend ourselves from without as an Other or a thing.
     From: Jean-Paul Sartre (Being and Nothingness [1943], p.82), quoted by Christine Daigle - Jean-Paul Sartre 2.4
     A reaction: I would have thought we blame social pressures, or biological pressures, rather than metaphysical determinism, but it amounts to the same thing. If we are not free then probably nothing else is.
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
All revolutions result from spirit changing its categories, to achieve a deeper understanding [Hegel]
     Full Idea: All revolutions ...originate solely from the fact that spirit, in order to understand and comprehend itself with a view to possessing itself, has changed its categories, comprehending itself more truly, more deeply, more intimately in unity with itself.
     From: Georg W.F.Hegel (Philosophy of Nature (Encylopedia II) [1817], §246), quoted by Stephen Houlgate - An Introduction to Hegel 01
     A reaction: Some Hegelian waffle here, but it focuses on what seems important, which is how societal thinking has shifted, so that what was previously tolerated now triggers a revolution.