Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', '11: Book of Kings 1' and 'The DhammaPada'

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19 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Our life is the creation of our mind [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: What we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.1)
     A reaction: I may adopt this as a second epigraph for the database. This idea records the subjective view, which now comes up against evolutionary psychology. Maybe philosophy is opposed to science, because it is committed to exploring the subjective view?
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
     Full Idea: A state of 'reflective equilibrium' is when our theory and our intuitions become completely aligned
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.IV)
     A reaction: [Rawls made this concept famous] This is a helpful concept in trying to spell out the ideal which is the dream of believers in 'pure reason' - that there is a goal in which everything comes right. The problem is when people have different intuitions!
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
     Full Idea: In three-valued logic (L3), neither the law of excluded middle (p or not-p), nor the law of non-contradiction (not(p and not-p)) will be tautologies. If p has the value 'indeterminate' then so will not-p.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.I)
     A reaction: I quite accept that the world is full of indeterminate propositions, and that excluded middle and non-contradiction can sometimes be uncertain, but I am reluctant to accept that what is being offered here should be called 'logic'.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
     Full Idea: In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
     A reaction: The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
     Full Idea: For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
     A reaction: [She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
     A reaction: Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / n. Pi
He made a molten sea, which was ten cubits across, and thirty cubits round the edge [Anon (Kings)]
     Full Idea: And he made a molten sea, ten cubits from the one brim to the other; it was round all about, and his height was five cubits: and a line of cubits did compass it round about.
     From: Anon (Kings) (11: Book of Kings 1 [c.550 BCE], 7:23)
     A reaction: In the sixth century BCE, this appears to give 3 as the value of Pi, though perhaps it shouldn't be taken too literally!
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
     Full Idea: We could construct a 1,000,000-valued logic that would allow our intuitions concerning a heap to vary exactly with the amount of sand in the heap.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008])
     A reaction: Presumably only an infinite number of grains of sand would then produce a true heap, and even one grain would count as a bit of a heap, which must both be wrong, so I can't see this helping much.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
     A reaction: The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Explaining 'it is possible that p' by saying p is true in at least one possible world doesn't get me very far. If I don't understand what possibility is, then appealing to possible worlds is not going to do me much good.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 06.III)
     A reaction: This seems so blatant that I assume friends of possible worlds will have addressed the problem. Note that you will also need to understand 'possible' to define necessity as 'true in all possible worlds'. Necessarily-p is not-possibly-not-p.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
     Full Idea: If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then 'if there are no trees in the park then there is no shade' and 'if there are no trees in the park there is plenty of shade' both come out as true. Intuitively, though, the second one is false.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.I)
     A reaction: The rule that a falsehood implies all truths must be the weakest idea in classical logic, if it actually implies a contradiction. This means we must take an interest in relevance logics.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
     Full Idea: A good account of relevance logic suggests that a conditional will be true when the flow of information is such that a conditional is the device that helps information to flow from the antecedent to the consequent.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.III)
     A reaction: Hm. 'If you are going out, you'll need an umbrella'. This passes on information about 'out', but also brings in new information. 'If you are going out, I'm leaving you'. What flows is an interpretation of the antecedent. Tricky.
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
The world is just the illusion of an appearance [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: When a man considers this world as a bubble of froth, and as the illusion of an appearance, then the king of death has no power over him.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §13.170)
     A reaction: Strictly, of course, this says you can 'consider' things this way. Perhaps we could substitute 'pretends', but the world's great religions don't go in for that sort of thing. Berkeley would be shocked to learn he was approaching Buddhism.
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Hate is conquered by love [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Hate is not conquered by hate: hate is conquered by love. This is the law eternal.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §1.5)
     A reaction: [N.B. This thought was not invented by Jesus] The challenge to this view might be the tit-for-tat strategy of game theory, which says that hate is actually conquered by a combination of hate and love, judiciously applied.
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
Even divine pleasure will not satisfy the wise, as it is insatiable, and leads to pain [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Since a shower of gold coins could not satisfy craving desires and the end of all pleasure is pain, how could a wise man find satisfaction even in the pleasures of the gods?
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §14.186)
     A reaction: I'm never sure how so many ancient thinkers arrived at this implausible view. They seem to think that no one knows when to stop, and that every drink leads to hangover. What is actually wrong with moderate sensible pleasure?
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The foolish gradually fill with evil, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the foolish man becomes full of evil, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.121)
     A reaction: This coincides closely with Aristotle's view of moral education. Maybe a wise man can maintain one small vice. Not all slopes are slippery.
The wise gradually fill with good, like a slowly-filled water-jar [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: The falling of drops of water will in time fill a water-jar. Even so the wise man becomes full of good, although he gather it little by little.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §9.122)
     A reaction: Again, this is like Aristotle's proposal of how to educate people in virtue. In my experience, there is no guarantee that small acts of politeness and charity will eventually guarantee goodness of character. Thought is also needed.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Don't befriend fools; either find superior friends, or travel alone [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: If on the great journey of life a man cannot find one who is better or at least as good as himself, let him joyfully travel alone: a fool cannot help him on his journey.
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §5.61)
     A reaction: This is a slightly disturbing aspect of Buddhism, possibly leading to contradiction. It urges friendship and love, but the finest people will have virtually no friends, and solitude is presented as a finer state than friendship.
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks [Anon (Dham)]
     Full Idea: Speak the truth, yield not to anger, give what you can to him who asks: these three steps lead you to the gods
     From: Anon (Dham) (The DhammaPada [c.250 BCE], §17.224)
     A reaction: I don't recall either the Old or New Testament, or the Koran, placing great emphasis on speaking the truth. The injunction to give is not so simple. Give to greedy children, to alcoholics, to criminals, to the rich, to fools, to yourself?