32 ideas
8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
Full Idea: A state of 'reflective equilibrium' is when our theory and our intuitions become completely aligned | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.IV) | |
A reaction: [Rawls made this concept famous] This is a helpful concept in trying to spell out the ideal which is the dream of believers in 'pure reason' - that there is a goal in which everything comes right. The problem is when people have different intuitions! |
8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
Full Idea: In three-valued logic (L3), neither the law of excluded middle (p or not-p), nor the law of non-contradiction (not(p and not-p)) will be tautologies. If p has the value 'indeterminate' then so will not-p. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.I) | |
A reaction: I quite accept that the world is full of indeterminate propositions, and that excluded middle and non-contradiction can sometimes be uncertain, but I am reluctant to accept that what is being offered here should be called 'logic'. |
8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
Full Idea: In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II) | |
A reaction: The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status. |
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
Full Idea: For a set to be 'well-ordered' it is required that every subset of the set has a first element. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The idea of the 'power set' means that it is always possible to generate a bigger one using only the elements of that set, namely the set of all its subsets. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Extension: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong. So you can make a set out of two other sets. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Unions: For every collection of sets there exists a set that contains all the elements that belong to at least one of the sets in the collection. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Infinity: There exists a set containing the empty set and the successor of each of its elements. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This is rather different from the other axioms because it contains the notion of 'successor', though that can be generated by an ordering procedure. |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Powers: For each set there exists a collection of sets that contains amongst its elements all the subsets of the given set. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: Obviously this must include the whole of the base set (i.e. not just 'proper' subsets), otherwise the new set would just be a duplicate of the base set. |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Choice: For every set we can provide a mechanism for choosing one member of any non-empty subset of the set. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: This axiom is unusual because it makes the bold claim that such a 'mechanism' can always be found. Cohen showed that this axiom is separate. The tricky bit is choosing from an infinite subset. |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set. This may be the empty set, but you need to start with something. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Axiom of Specification: For every set and every condition, there corresponds a set whose elements are exactly the same as those elements of the original set for which the condition is true. So the concept 'number is even' produces a set from the integers. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) | |
A reaction: What if the condition won't apply to the set? 'Number is even' presumably won't produce a set if it is applied to a set of non-numbers. |
8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
Full Idea: For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I) | |
A reaction: [She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3! |
8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
Full Idea: Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I) | |
A reaction: Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment. |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Three views of mathematics: 'pure' mathematics, where it doesn't matter if it could ever have any application; 'real' mathematics, where every concept must be physically grounded; and 'applied' mathematics, using the non-real if the results are real. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.17) | |
A reaction: Very helpful. No one can deny the activities of 'pure' mathematics, but I think it is undeniable that the origins of the subject are 'real' (rather than platonic). We do economics by pretending there are concepts like the 'average family'. |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
Full Idea: With ordinary finite numbers ordinals and cardinals are in effect the same, but beyond infinity it is possible for two sets to have the same cardinality but different ordinals. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
Full Idea: You can think of an ordinal number as being defined by the set that comes before it, so, in the non-negative integers, ordinal 5 is defined as {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.13) |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The 'transcendental numbers' are those irrationals that can't be fitted to a suitable finite equation, of which π is far and away the best known. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The realisation that brought 'i' into the toolkit of physicists and engineers was that you could extend the 'number line' into a new dimension, with an imaginary number axis at right angles to it. ...We now have a 'number plane'. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.12) |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
Full Idea: It is a chicken-and-egg problem, whether the lack of zero forced forced classical mathematicians to rely mostly on a geometric approach to mathematics, or the geometric approach made 0 a meaningless concept, but the two remain strongly tied together. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch. 6) |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
Full Idea: As far as Kronecker was concerned, Cantor had built a whole structure on the irrational numbers, and so that structure had no foundation at all. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
Full Idea: Paul Cohen showed that the Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.15) |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
Full Idea: The 'continuum hypothesis' says that aleph-one is the cardinality of the rational and irrational numbers. | |
From: Brian Clegg (Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable [2003], Ch.14) |
8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
Full Idea: We could construct a 1,000,000-valued logic that would allow our intuitions concerning a heap to vary exactly with the amount of sand in the heap. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008]) | |
A reaction: Presumably only an infinite number of grains of sand would then produce a true heap, and even one grain would count as a bit of a heap, which must both be wrong, so I can't see this helping much. |
8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
Full Idea: Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness). | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II) | |
A reaction: The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not. |
8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
Full Idea: Explaining 'it is possible that p' by saying p is true in at least one possible world doesn't get me very far. If I don't understand what possibility is, then appealing to possible worlds is not going to do me much good. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 06.III) | |
A reaction: This seems so blatant that I assume friends of possible worlds will have addressed the problem. Note that you will also need to understand 'possible' to define necessity as 'true in all possible worlds'. Necessarily-p is not-possibly-not-p. |
8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
Full Idea: If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then 'if there are no trees in the park then there is no shade' and 'if there are no trees in the park there is plenty of shade' both come out as true. Intuitively, though, the second one is false. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.I) | |
A reaction: The rule that a falsehood implies all truths must be the weakest idea in classical logic, if it actually implies a contradiction. This means we must take an interest in relevance logics. |
8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
Full Idea: A good account of relevance logic suggests that a conditional will be true when the flow of information is such that a conditional is the device that helps information to flow from the antecedent to the consequent. | |
From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.III) | |
A reaction: Hm. 'If you are going out, you'll need an umbrella'. This passes on information about 'out', but also brings in new information. 'If you are going out, I'm leaving you'. What flows is an interpretation of the antecedent. Tricky. |
20721 | Punctuality and justice in dealings are excellent for raising a man in the world [Franklin] |
Full Idea: After industry and frugality, nothing contributes more to raising a young man in the world than punctuality and justice in all his dealings. | |
From: Benjamin Franklin (Advice to a Young Tradesman [1748], p.87-), quoted by Max Weber - The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 2 | |
A reaction: A perfect illustration of the self-interest that drives morality in the social contract view. |
20720 | Time is money, ..credit is money, ..and money breeds more money [Franklin] |
Full Idea: Remember that time is money, …and that credit is money, …and that money can beget money. | |
From: Benjamin Franklin (Advice to a Young Tradesman [1748], p.87-), quoted by Max Weber - The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 2 | |
A reaction: [snippets] A wonderful quotation rescued by Max Weber, showing that Franklin understood capitalism with crystal clarity, before it had even barely begun |