8945
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Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
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8951
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Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
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A reaction:
[She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
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8950
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Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
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A reaction:
Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
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8944
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Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
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9757
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A person viewed as an agent makes no sense without its own future [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
In forming a particular plan of life, you need to identify with your future in order to be what you are even now. When the person is viewed as an agent, no clear content can be given to the idea of a merely present self.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §2)
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A reaction:
I certainly like the notion that we should treat persons primarily as agents, since I take personhood to be more like a process than an existent entity. If a large brick is about to hit you, you actually have no future, though you think you have.
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9760
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Self-concern may be a source of pain, or a lack of self-respect, or a failure of responsibility [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
For utilitarians, self-concern causes needless pain; for Kantians, it evinces a lack of respect for one's own humanity; for the religious moralist, it is a failure of responsibility for what has been placed in one's special care.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
Worryingly, given my heathenish views, I find the third one the most congenial. If we don't take responsibility for our own selves (e.g. for having a great talent), then no one (even parents) will take responsibility for anything.
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23674
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If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid]
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Full Idea:
If a man should give to his neighbour a potion which he really believes will poison him, but which, in the event, proves salutary, and does much good; in moral estimation, he is a poisoner, and not a benefactor.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
I take Reid to mean that morality concerns how we assess the agent, and not the results of his actions. Mill and Bentham concede that we judge people this way, but don't think morality mainly concerns judging people.
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9761
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Personal concern for one's own self widens out into concern for the impersonal [Korsgaard]
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Full Idea:
The personal concern which begins with one's life in a particular body finds its place in ever-widening spheres of agency and enterprise, developing finally into a personal concern for the impersonal.
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From:
Christine M. Korsgaard (Intro to 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' [1996], §5)
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A reaction:
I am very struck by this nice thought, which comes from a very committed Kantian. It seems to me to capture the modern orthodoxy in ethical thinking - that concern for one's self, rather than altruism, is central, but altruism should follow from it.
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23673
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Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid]
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Full Idea:
I presume it will be granted, that, in every man of real worth, there is a principle of honour, a regard to what is honourable or dishonourable, very distinct from a regard to his interest.
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From:
Thomas Reid (Essays on Active Powers 3: Princs of action [1788], 5)
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A reaction:
Note that there is a 'principle' of honour in a person's character, and there are also actions which are intrinsically honourable or not. I fear that only the worthy are honourable, and only the honourable are worthy!
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