17263
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Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
What is most puzzling about the rationalist tradition is the steadfast certainty with which the Principle of Sufficient Reason was often accepted, since it in effect denies that there are fundamental facts.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 2.2)
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A reaction:
A very simple and interesting observation. The principle implies either a circle of reasons, or an infinite regress of reasons. Nothing can be labelled as 'primitive' or 'foundational' or 'given'. The principle is irrational!
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8945
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Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
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8951
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Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
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A reaction:
[She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
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8950
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Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
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A reaction:
Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
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17270
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Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
We may take existential dependence to be a relation induced by certain cases of grounding, but one may also think that facts about existential dependence are prior to corresponding ground claims, and in fact ground those claims.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 4.3)
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A reaction:
I would vote for grounding, since dependence seems more abstract, and seems to demand explanation, whereas grounding seems more like a feature of reality, and to resist further intrinsic explanation (on the whole).
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17267
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The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]
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Full Idea:
There is a disagreement on the issue of factual identity, concerning the 'granularity' of facts, the question of how fine-grained they are.
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From:
Correia,F/Schnieder,B (Grounding: an opinionated introduction [2012], 3.3)
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A reaction:
If they are very fine-grained, then no two descriptions of a supposed fact will capture the same details. If we go broadbrush, facts become fuzzy and less helpful. 'Fact' was never going to be a clear term.
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8944
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Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
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6866
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It is disturbing if we become unreal when we die, but if time is unreal, then we remain real after death [Le Poidevin]
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Full Idea:
For the A-theorists called 'presentists' the past is as unreal as the future, and reality leaves us behind once we die, which is disturbing; but B-theorists, who see time as unreal, say we are just as real after our deaths as we were beforehand.
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From:
Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
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A reaction:
See Idea 6865 for A and B theories. I wonder if this problem is only superficially 'disturbing'. Becoming unreal may sound more drastic than becoming dead, but they both sound pretty terminal to me.
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6865
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A-theory says past, present, future and flow exist; B-theory says this just reports our perspective [Le Poidevin]
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Full Idea:
The A-theory regards our intuitive distinction of time into past, present and future as objective, and takes seriously the idea that time flows; the B-theory says this just reflects our perspective, like the spatial distinction between here and there.
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From:
Robin Le Poidevin (Interview with Baggini and Stangroom [2001], p.174)
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A reaction:
The distinction comes from McTaggart. Physics seems to be built on an objective view of time, and yet Einstein makes time relative. What possible evidence could decide between the two theories?
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