21 ideas
| 19396 | Wisdom is knowing all of the sciences, and their application [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: Wisdom is a perfect knowledge of the principles of all the sciences and of the art of applying them. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 0) | |
| A reaction: 'Sciences' should be understood fairly broadly here (e.g. of architecture, agriculture, grammar). This is a scholar's vision of wisdom, very different from the notion of the wisest person in a village full of illiterate people. |
| 8952 | We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: A state of 'reflective equilibrium' is when our theory and our intuitions become completely aligned | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.IV) | |
| A reaction: [Rawls made this concept famous] This is a helpful concept in trying to spell out the ideal which is the dream of believers in 'pure reason' - that there is a goal in which everything comes right. The problem is when people have different intuitions! |
| 8943 | Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: In three-valued logic (L3), neither the law of excluded middle (p or not-p), nor the law of non-contradiction (not(p and not-p)) will be tautologies. If p has the value 'indeterminate' then so will not-p. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.I) | |
| A reaction: I quite accept that the world is full of indeterminate propositions, and that excluded middle and non-contradiction can sometimes be uncertain, but I am reluctant to accept that what is being offered here should be called 'logic'. |
| 8945 | Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II) | |
| A reaction: The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status. |
| 8951 | Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I) | |
| A reaction: [She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3! |
| 8950 | Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I) | |
| A reaction: Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment. |
| 21110 | An understanding of the most basic physics should explain all of the subject's mysteries [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: Once we understood the fundamental laws that govern forces of nature at its smallest scales, all of these current mysteries would be revealed as natural consequences of these laws. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 08) | |
| A reaction: This expresses the reductionist view within physics itself. Krauss says the discovery that empty space itself contains energy has led to a revision of this view (because that is not part of the forces and particles studied in basic physics). |
| 21105 | In 1676 it was discovered that water is teeming with life [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: Van Leeuwenhoek first stared at a drop of seemingly empty water with a microscope in 1676 and discovered in was teeming with life. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 04) | |
| A reaction: I am convinced that this had a huge influence on Leibniz's concept of monads. He immediately became convinced that it was some sort of life all the way down. He would be have been disappointed by the subsequent chemical reduction of life. |
| 8946 | We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: We could construct a 1,000,000-valued logic that would allow our intuitions concerning a heap to vary exactly with the amount of sand in the heap. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008]) | |
| A reaction: Presumably only an infinite number of grains of sand would then produce a true heap, and even one grain would count as a bit of a heap, which must both be wrong, so I can't see this helping much. |
| 8944 | Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness). | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II) | |
| A reaction: The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not. |
| 8941 | We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: Explaining 'it is possible that p' by saying p is true in at least one possible world doesn't get me very far. If I don't understand what possibility is, then appealing to possible worlds is not going to do me much good. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 06.III) | |
| A reaction: This seems so blatant that I assume friends of possible worlds will have addressed the problem. Note that you will also need to understand 'possible' to define necessity as 'true in all possible worlds'. Necessarily-p is not-possibly-not-p. |
| 8947 | If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then 'if there are no trees in the park then there is no shade' and 'if there are no trees in the park there is plenty of shade' both come out as true. Intuitively, though, the second one is false. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.I) | |
| A reaction: The rule that a falsehood implies all truths must be the weakest idea in classical logic, if it actually implies a contradiction. This means we must take an interest in relevance logics. |
| 8949 | In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher] |
| Full Idea: A good account of relevance logic suggests that a conditional will be true when the flow of information is such that a conditional is the device that helps information to flow from the antecedent to the consequent. | |
| From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.III) | |
| A reaction: Hm. 'If you are going out, you'll need an umbrella'. This passes on information about 'out', but also brings in new information. 'If you are going out, I'm leaving you'. What flows is an interpretation of the antecedent. Tricky. |
| 19397 | Perfect knowledge implies complete explanations and perfect prediction [Leibniz] |
| Full Idea: The mark of perfect knowledge is that nothing appears in the thing under consideration which cannot be accounted for, and that nothing is encountered whose occurrence cannot be predicted in advance. | |
| From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Wisdom [1693], 1) | |
| A reaction: I would track both of these back to the concept of perfect understanding, which is admittedly a bit vague. Does a finite mind need to predict every speck of dust to have perfect knowledge? Do we have perfect knowledge of triangles? |
| 21109 | Space itself can expand (and separate its contents) at faster than light speeds [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: Special Relativity says nothing can travel 'through space' faster than the speed of light. But space itself can do whatever the heck it wants, at least in general relativity. And it can carry distant objects apart from one another at superluminal speeds | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 06) | |
| A reaction: Another of my misunderstandings corrected. I assumed that the event horizon (limit of observability) was defined by the stuff retreating at (max) light speed. But beyond that it retreats even faster! What about the photons in space? |
| 21104 | General Relativity: the density of energy and matter determines curvature and gravity [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: The left-hand side of the general relativity equations descrbe the curvature of the universe, and the strength of gravitational forces acting on matter and radiation. The right-hand sides reflect the total density of all kinds of energy and matter. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 04) | |
| A reaction: I had assumed that the equations just described the geometry. In fact the matter determines the nature of the universe in which it exists. Presumably only things with mass get a vote. |
| 21107 | Uncertainty says that energy can be very high over very short time periods [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: The Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle says that the uncertainty in the measured energy of a system is inversely proportional to the length of time over which you observe it. (This allow near infinite energy over very short times). | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 04) | |
| A reaction: Apparently this brief energy is 'borrowed', and must be quickly repaid. |
| 21106 | Most of the mass of a proton is the energy in virtual particles (rather than the quarks) [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: The quarks provide very little of the total mass of a proton, and the fields created by the virtual particles contribute most of the energy that goes into the proton's rest energy and, hence, its mass. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 04) | |
| A reaction: He gives an artist's impression of the interior of a proton, which looks like a ship's engine room. |
| 21112 | Empty space contains a continual flux of brief virtual particles [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: Empty space is complicated. It is a boiling brew of virtual particles that pop in and out of existence in a time so short we cannot see them directly. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 10) | |
| A reaction: Apparently the interior of a proton is also like this. This fact gives a foot in the door for explanations of how the Big Bang got started, from these virtual particles. And yet surely space itself only arrives with the Big Bang? |
| 21108 | The universe is precisely 13.72 billion years old [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: We now know the age of the universe to four significant figures. It is 13.72 billion years old! | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 05) | |
| A reaction: It amazes me how many people, especially in philosophy, would be reluctant to accept that this is a know fact. I'm not accepting its certainty, but an assertion like this from a leading figure is good enough for me, and it should be for you. |
| 21111 | It seems likely that cosmic inflation is eternal, and this would make a multiverse inevitable [Krauss] |
| Full Idea: A multiverse is inevitable if inflation is eternal, and eternal inflation is by far the most likely possibility in most, if not all, inflationary scenarios. | |
| From: Lawrence M. Krauss (A Universe from Nothing [2012], 08) |