Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On the Philosophy of Logic', 'On the Conservation of Force' and 'Reality is Not What it Seems'

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We reach 'reflective equilibrium' when intuitions and theory completely align [Fisher]
     Full Idea: A state of 'reflective equilibrium' is when our theory and our intuitions become completely aligned
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.IV)
     A reaction: [Rawls made this concept famous] This is a helpful concept in trying to spell out the ideal which is the dream of believers in 'pure reason' - that there is a goal in which everything comes right. The problem is when people have different intuitions!
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 3. Many-Valued Logic
Three-valued logic says excluded middle and non-contradition are not tautologies [Fisher]
     Full Idea: In three-valued logic (L3), neither the law of excluded middle (p or not-p), nor the law of non-contradiction (not(p and not-p)) will be tautologies. If p has the value 'indeterminate' then so will not-p.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.I)
     A reaction: I quite accept that the world is full of indeterminate propositions, and that excluded middle and non-contradiction can sometimes be uncertain, but I am reluctant to accept that what is being offered here should be called 'logic'.
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
     Full Idea: In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
     A reaction: The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
     Full Idea: For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
     A reaction: [She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 2. Platonism in Logic
Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
     A reaction: Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
Zeno assumes collecting an infinity of things makes an infinite thing [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: One possible answer is that Zeno is wrong because it is not true that by accumulating an infinite number of things one ends up with an infinite thing.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 01)
     A reaction: I do love it when deep and complex ideas are expressed with perfect simplicity. As long as the simple version is correct.
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Quantum mechanics deals with processes, rather than with things [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Quantum mechanics teaches us not to think about the world in terms of 'things' which are in this or that state, but in terms of 'processes' instead.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Quantum mechanics describes the world entirely as events [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world of quantum mechanics is not a world of objects: it is a world of events.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: I presume a philosopher is allowed to ask what an 'event' is. Since, as Rovelli tells it, time is eliminated from the picture, events seem to be unanalysable primitives.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
We could make our intuitions about heaps precise with a million-valued logic [Fisher]
     Full Idea: We could construct a 1,000,000-valued logic that would allow our intuitions concerning a heap to vary exactly with the amount of sand in the heap.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008])
     A reaction: Presumably only an infinite number of grains of sand would then produce a true heap, and even one grain would count as a bit of a heap, which must both be wrong, so I can't see this helping much.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
     A reaction: The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
We can't explain 'possibility' in terms of 'possible' worlds [Fisher]
     Full Idea: Explaining 'it is possible that p' by saying p is true in at least one possible world doesn't get me very far. If I don't understand what possibility is, then appealing to possible worlds is not going to do me much good.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 06.III)
     A reaction: This seems so blatant that I assume friends of possible worlds will have addressed the problem. Note that you will also need to understand 'possible' to define necessity as 'true in all possible worlds'. Necessarily-p is not-possibly-not-p.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then not-p might imply both q and not-q [Fisher]
     Full Idea: If all truths are implied by a falsehood, then 'if there are no trees in the park then there is no shade' and 'if there are no trees in the park there is plenty of shade' both come out as true. Intuitively, though, the second one is false.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.I)
     A reaction: The rule that a falsehood implies all truths must be the weakest idea in classical logic, if it actually implies a contradiction. This means we must take an interest in relevance logics.
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
In relevance logic, conditionals help information to flow from antecedent to consequent [Fisher]
     Full Idea: A good account of relevance logic suggests that a conditional will be true when the flow of information is such that a conditional is the device that helps information to flow from the antecedent to the consequent.
     From: Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 08.III)
     A reaction: Hm. 'If you are going out, you'll need an umbrella'. This passes on information about 'out', but also brings in new information. 'If you are going out, I'm leaving you'. What flows is an interpretation of the antecedent. Tricky.
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
There are probably no infinities, and 'infinite' names what we do not yet know [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: 'Infinite', ultimately, is the name that we give to what we do not yet know. Nature appears to be telling us that there is nothing truly infinite.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 11)
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / d. The unlimited
The basic ideas of fields and particles are merged in quantum mechanics [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The notions of fields and particles, separated by Faraday and Maxwell, end up merging in quantum mechanics.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: This sounds to me just like Anaximander's 'apeiron' - the unlimited [Rovelli agrees! p.168]. Anaximander predicted the wall which enquiry would hit, but we now have more detail.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Helmholtz used 'energy' to mathematically link heat, light, electricity and magnetism [Helmholtz, by Watson]
     Full Idea: Helmholtz provided the requisite mathematical formulation linking heat, light, electricity and magnetism, by treating these phenomena as different manifestations of 'energy'.
     From: report of Hermann von Helmholtz (On the Conservation of Force [1847]) by Peter Watson - Convergence 01 'Human'
     A reaction: I'm increasingly struck by the neglect by philosophers of nature of these amazing developments in 19th century physics, because they prefer the excitement of the latest nuclear physics. There is more philosophical interest in the earlier stages.
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
All forces conserve the sum of kinetic and potential energy [Helmholtz, by Papineau]
     Full Idea: Helmholtz crucially asserted that all forces conserve the sum of kinetic and potential energy; superficially non-conservative forces like friction are simply macroscopic manifestations of more fundamental forces conserving energy at the micro-level.
     From: report of Hermann von Helmholtz (On the Conservation of Force [1847]) by David Papineau - Thinking about Consciousness App 4.3
     A reaction: Friction had been a problem case, because it appeared not to conserve energy when it slowed movement down.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Because it is quantised, a field behaves like a set of packets of energy [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Since the energy of the electromagnetic field can take on only certain values, the field behaves like a set of packets of energy.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
There are about fifteen particles fields, plus a few force fields [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: There are about fifteen fields, whose quanta are elementary particles (electrons, quarks, muons, neutrinos, Higgs, and little else), plus a few fields similar to the electromagnetic one, which describe forces at a nuclear scale, with quanta like photons.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: According to Rovelli, this sentence describes the essence of physical reality.
The world consists of quantum fields, with elementary events happening in spacetime [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world is not made up of fields and particles, but of a single type of entity: the quantum field. There are no longer particles which move in space with the passage of time, but quantum fields whose elementary events happen in spacetime.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: If you are not a scientist, there is (I find) a strong tendency to read and digest stuff like this, and then forget it the next day, because it so far from our experience. Folk like me have to develop two parallel views of the nature of reality.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons are not waves, because their collisions are at a point, and not spread out [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Schrödinger's wave is a bad image for an electron, because when a particle collides with something else, it is always at a point: it is never spread out in space like a wave.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04 note)
     A reaction: And yet there is the diffusion in the two-slit experiment, which Thomas Young discovered for light. I must take Rovelli's word for this.
Electrons only exist when they interact, and their being is their combination of quantum leaps [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Electrons don't always exist. They exist when they interact. They materialize when they collide with something. The quantum leap from one orbit to another constitutes their way of being real. An electron is a combination of leaps between interactions.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: If a philosopher with an Aristotelian interest in the nature of matter wants to grasp the modern view, the electron looks like the thing to focus on. You can feel Rovelli battling here to find formulations that might satisfy a philosopher.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum Theory describes events and possible interactions - not how things are [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: Quantum Theory does not describe things as they are: it describes how things occur and interact with each other. It doesn't describe where there is a particle but how it shows itself to others. The world of existence is reduced to possible interactions.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
     A reaction: Fans of 'process philosophy' should like this, though he is not denying that there may be facts about how things are - it is just that this is not mentioned in the theory. There is not much point in philosophers yearning to know the reality.
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
Nature has three aspects: granularity, indeterminacy, and relations [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: I think that quantum mechanics has revealed three aspects of the nature of things: granularity, indeterminacy, and the relational structure of the world.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 04)
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The world is just particles plus fields; space is the gravitational field [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: The world is made up of particles + fields, and nothing else; there is no need to add space as an extra ingredient. Newton's space is the gravitational field.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 03)
     A reaction: I get the impression that particles are just bumps or waves in the fields [yes! Rovelli p.110], which would mean there are fields and nothing else. And no one seems to know what a field is.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Only heat distinguishes past from future [Rovelli]
     Full Idea: It is always heat and only heat that distinguishes the past from the future.
     From: Carlo Rovelli (Reality is Not What it Seems [2014], 12)
     A reaction: I can remember the past but not the future - so can that fact be reduced to facts about heat?