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8945
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Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
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8951
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Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
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A reaction:
[She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
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8950
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Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
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A reaction:
Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
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17304
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As causation links across time, grounding links the world across levels [Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Grounding is something like metaphysical causation. Just as causation links the world across time, grounding links the world across levels. Grounding connects the more fundamental to the less fundamental, and thereby backs a certain form of explanation.
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From:
Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], Intro)
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A reaction:
Obviously you need 'levels' for this, which we should take to be structural levels.
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8944
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Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
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17308
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Explaining 'Adam ate the apple' depends on emphasis, and thus implies a contrast [Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
Explaining why ADAM ate the apple is a different matter from explaining why he ATE the apple, and from why he ate THE APPLE. ...In my view the best explanations incorporate ....contrastive information.
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From:
Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
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A reaction:
But why are the contrasts Eve, or throwing it, or a pear? It occurs to me that this is wrong! The contrast is with anything else which could have gone in subject, verb or object position. It is a matter of categories, not of contrasts.
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17305
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I take what is fundamental to be the whole spatiotemporal manifold and its fields [Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
I myself would prefer to speak of what is fundamental in terms of the whole spatiotemporal manifold and the fields that permeate it, with parts counting as derivative of the whole.
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From:
Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.1.1)
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A reaction:
Not quite the Parmenidean One, since it has parts, but a nice try at updating the great man. Note the reference to 'fields', suggesting that this view is grounded in the physics rather than metaphysics. How many fields has it got?
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17307
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Nowadays causation is usually understood in terms of equations and variable ranges [Schaffer,J]
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Full Idea:
The leading treatments of causation work within 'structural equation models', with events represented via variables each of which is allotted a range of permitted values, which constitute a 'contrast space'.
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From:
Jonathan Schaffer (Grounding, Transitivity and Contrastivity [2012], 4.3.1)
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A reaction:
Like Woodward's idea that causation is a graph, this seems to be a matter of plotting or formalising correlations between activities, which is a very Humean approach to causation.
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