23766
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Don't be tossed to and fro with every wind of doctrine, by cunning deceptive men [Paul]
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Full Idea:
Henceforth be no more children, tossed to and fro, and carried about with every wind of doctrine, by the sleight of men, and cunning craftiness, whereby they lie in wait to deceive.
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From:
St Paul (10: Ephesians [c.55], 4:14)
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A reaction:
One quoted to me by a learned religious friend, in response to Idea 23767. I sympathise. I find it extraordinary the nonsense that students of philosophy can be led into, when they swallow some specious argument.
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15390
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Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons]
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Full Idea:
Metaphysics, the noblest of philosophic enterprises, is an attempt to give an account of everything. ...Its job is to provide a universal framework (of categories and principles) within which anything whatever can take its place.
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From:
Peter Simons (Whitehead: process and cosmology [2009], 'Speculative')
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A reaction:
Bravo! I take metaphysics to be entirely continuous with science, but operating entirely at the highest level of generality. See Westerhoff on categories, though. The enterprise may not be going too well.
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8945
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Fuzzy logic has many truth values, ranging in fractions from 0 to 1 [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
In fuzzy logic objects have properties to a greater or lesser degree, and truth values are given as fractions or decimals, ranging from 0 to 1. Not-p is defined as 1-p, and other formula are defined in terms of maxima and minima for sets.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The question seems to be whether this is actually logic, or a recasting of probability theory. Susan Haack attacks it. If logic is the study of how truth is preserved as we move between propositions, then 0 and 1 need a special status.
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8951
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Classical logic is: excluded middle, non-contradiction, contradictions imply all, disjunctive syllogism [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
For simplicity, we can say that 'classical logic' amounts to the truth of four sentences: 1) either p or not-p; 2) it is not the case that both p and not-p; 3) from p and not-p, infer q; 4) from p or q and not-p, infer q.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 12.I)
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A reaction:
[She says there are many ways of specifying classical logic] Intuition suggests that 2 and 4 are rather hard to dispute, while 1 is ignoring some grey areas, and 3 is totally ridiculous. There is, of course, plenty of support for 3!
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8950
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Logic formalizes how we should reason, but it shouldn't determine whether we are realists [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Even if one is inclined to be a realist about everything, it is hard to see why our logic should be the determiner. Logic is supposed to formalize how we ought to reason, but whether or not we should be realists is a matter of philosophy, not logic.
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 09.I)
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A reaction:
Nice to hear a logician saying this. I do not see why talk in terms of an object is a commitment to its existence. We can discuss the philosopher's stone, or Arthur's sword, or the Loch Ness monster, or gravitinos, with degrees of commitment.
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8944
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Vagueness can involve components (like baldness), or not (like boredom) [Fisher]
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Full Idea:
Vague terms come in at least two different kinds: those whose constituent parts come in discrete packets (bald, rich, red) and those that don't (beauty, boredom, niceness).
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From:
Jennifer Fisher (On the Philosophy of Logic [2008], 07.II)
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A reaction:
The first group seem to be features of the external world, and the second all occur in the mind. Baldness may be vague, but presumably hairs are (on the whole) not. Nature doesn't care whether someone is actually 'bald' or not.
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