Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mind and the Soul', 'The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic' and 'What's Wrong with Rape?'

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8 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism' [Putnam, by Musgrave]
     Full Idea: Putnam coined the term 'if-thenism'.
     From: report of Hilary Putnam (The Thesis that Mathematics is Logic [1967]) by Alan Musgrave - Logicism Revisited §5 n
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties?
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good.
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 5. Sexual Morality
A rape disregards the status of being a person - but so does all assault [Foa]
     Full Idea: In a rape a person is used without proper regard for her personhood - but this is true of every kind of assault.
     From: Pamela Foa (What's Wrong with Rape? [1977], 1)
     A reaction: This is a good step towards her attempt to pin down what is specifically wrong with rape, which strikes me as an extremely important question, and not merely in order to justify punishments.
Rape of children is dreadful, but no one thinks children should have a right of consent [Foa]
     Full Idea: Rape of children is at least as heinous as rape of adults, though few believe that children have or ought to have the same large domain of consent adults (male and female) ought to have.
     From: Pamela Foa (What's Wrong with Rape? [1977], 1)
     A reaction: A powerful point. She is not quite spelling out the crux, which is that no one thinks children should have a right to consent to sexual intercourse, which means that consent is irrelevant in such a case of rape. So it can't be the key to adult rape?
If men should lust and women shouldn't, that makes rape the prevalent sexual model [Foa]
     Full Idea: We are taught that sexual desires are desires women ought not to have and men must have. This is the model which makes necessary an eternal battle of the sexes. It explains why rape is the prevalent model of sexuality.
     From: Pamela Foa (What's Wrong with Rape? [1977], 3)
     A reaction: A striking thought. See 'The Origins of Sex' by F.Dabhoiwala, which claims that women used to be seen as the sexual predators, and the balance shifted in the 18thC. Are women obliged to exhibit lust, in order to defuse rapacious desires?
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1)
     A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture.
No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition.