Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Mind and the Soul', 'The Impossibility of Superdupervenience' and 'Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols)'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

17 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought
7807 The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra]
     Full Idea: Bolzano said the 'laws of thought' (identity, contradiction, excluded middle) are true, but nothing of interest follows from them. Logic obeys them, but they are not logic's first principles or axioms.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], §3) by George / Van Evra - The Rise of Modern Logic
     A reaction: An interesting and crucial distinction. For samples of proposed axioms of logic, see Ideas 6408, 7798 and 7797.
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
9618 Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR]
     Full Idea: Bolzano if the father of 'arithmetization', which sought to found all of analysis on the concepts of arithmetic and to eliminate geometrical notions entirely (with logicism taking it a step further, by reducing arithmetic to logic).
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by James Robert Brown - Philosophy of Mathematics Ch. 3
     A reaction: Brown's book is a defence of geometrical diagrams against Bolzano's approach. Bolzano sounds like the modern heir of Pythagoras, if he thinks that space is essentially numerical.
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
9830 Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Bolzano began the process of eliminating intuition from analysis, by proving something apparently obvious (that as continuous function must be zero at some point). Proof reveals on what a theorem rests, and that it is not intuition.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - Frege philosophy of mathematics Ch.6
     A reaction: Kant was the target of Bolzano's attack. Two responses might be to say that many other basic ideas are intuited but impossible to prove, or to say that proof itself depends on intuition, if you dig deep enough.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17265 Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: Mathematical proofs are philosophical in method if they do not only demonstrate that a certain mathematical truth holds but if they also disclose why it holds, that is, if they uncover its grounds.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3
     A reaction: I aim to defend the role of explanation in mathematics, but this says that this is only if the proofs are 'philosophical', which may be of no interest to mathematicians. Oh well, that's their loss.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
16062 A necessary relation between fact-levels seems to be a further irreducible fact [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: It seems unavoidable that the facts about logically necessary relations between levels of facts are themselves logically distinct further facts, irreducible to the microphysical facts.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: I'm beginning to think that rejecting every theory of reality that is proposed by carefully exposing some infinite regress hidden in it is a rather lazy way to do philosophy. Almost as bad as rejecting anything if it can't be defined.
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
16061 If some facts 'logically supervene' on some others, they just redescribe them, adding nothing [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Logical supervenience, restricted to individuals, seems to imply strong reduction. It is said that where the B-facts logically supervene on the A-facts, the B-facts simply re-describe what the A-facts describe, and the B-facts come along 'for free'.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], C)
     A reaction: This seems to be taking 'logically' to mean 'analytically'. Presumably an entailment is logically supervenient on its premisses, and may therefore be very revealing, even if some people think such things are analytic.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
16060 Nonreductive materialism says upper 'levels' depend on lower, but don't 'reduce' [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: The root intuition behind nonreductive materialism is that reality is composed of ontologically distinct layers or levels. …The upper levels depend on the physical without reducing to it.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], B)
     A reaction: A nice clear statement of a view which I take to be false. This relationship is the sort of thing that drives people fishing for an account of it to use the word 'supervenience', which just says two things seem to hang out together. Fluffy materialism.
16064 The hallmark of physicalism is that each causal power has a base causal power under it [Lynch/Glasgow]
     Full Idea: Jessica Wilson (1999) says what makes physicalist accounts different from emergentism etc. is that each individual causal power associated with a supervenient property is numerically identical with a causal power associated with its base property.
     From: Lynch,MP/Glasgow,JM (The Impossibility of Superdupervenience [2003], n 11)
     A reaction: Hence the key thought in so-called (serious, rather than self-evident) 'emergentism' is so-called 'downward causation', which I take to be an idle daydream.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
9295 Not only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can have them [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: It is not true that only substances have attributes; events, actions, states and qualities can all be characterized.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: This is why it is so important to distinguish the actual properties in nature from those that can be fancifully hypothesized by a linguistic being. Is there any limit to the possible number of levels of meta-properties?
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9185 Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett]
     Full Idea: Bolzano was determined to expel Kantian intuition from analysis, and to prove from first principles anything that could be proved, no matter how obvious it might seem when thought of in geometrical terms.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Dummett - The Philosophy of Mathematics 2.3
     A reaction: This is characteristic of the Enlightenment Project, well after the Enlightenment. It is a step towards Frege's attack on 'psychologism' in mathematics. The problem is that it led us into a spurious platonism. We live in troubled times.
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
9293 Body-spirit interaction ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: Since the interaction of bodies themselves involves energy-flow, it looks as if interaction between body and spirit ought to result in losses and increases of energy in the material world.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: A nice statement of an important argument. It forces the dualist to go the whole way, asserting that not only is the mind immaterial, but that it can be active without energy, and cover its traces in the physical world. Doesn't look good.
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
22276 Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter]
     Full Idea: Bolzano took the entities of which truth is predicated to be not propositions in the subjective sense but 'propositions-in-themselves' - objective entities existing independent of our apprehension.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Michael Potter - The Rise of Analytic Philosophy 1879-1930 02 'Emp'
     A reaction: A serious mistake. Presumably the objective propositions are all true (or there would be endless infinities of them). So what is assessed in the case of error? Something other than the objective propositions! We assess these other things!
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
17264 Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder]
     Full Idea: Bolzano conceived of propositions as abstract objects which are structured compounds of concepts and potential contents of judgements and assertions.
     From: report of Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837]) by Correia,F/Schnieder,B - Grounding: an opinionated introduction 2.3
     A reaction: Personally I think of propositions as brain events, the constituents of thought about the world, but that needn't contradict the view of them as 'abstract'.
12232 A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: What I mean by 'propositions' is not what the grammarians call a proposition, namely the linguistic expression, but the mere sense of this expression, is what is meant by proposition in itself or object proposition. This sense can be true or false.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref?)
     A reaction: This seems to be the origin of what we understand by 'proposition'. The disputes are over whether such things exists, and whether they are features of minds or features of the world (resembling facts).
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
12233 The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano]
     Full Idea: We can find the ground of a pure conceptual truth only in other conceptual truths.
     From: Bernard Bolzano (Theory of Science (Wissenschaftslehre, 4 vols) [1837], Pref)
     A reaction: Elsewhere he insists that these grounds must be in 'truths', and not just in the attributes of the concepts of involved. This conflicts with Kit Fine's view, that the concepts themselves are the source of conceptual truth and necessity.
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
9292 The Soul has no particular capacity (in the way thinking belongs to the mind) [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: On the whole, the Soul has no capacities which belong to it pre-eminently in the way that thinking 'belongs' to the mind.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.1)
     A reaction: There are no phenomena which have to be saved by postulating a soul. It lacks a function within a human being, but it has a crucial function within a large theological picture.
9294 No individuating marks distinguish between Souls [Teichmann]
     Full Idea: There are no individuating marks which could serve to differentiate one Soul from another.
     From: Jenny Teichmann (The Mind and the Soul [1974], Ch.2)
     A reaction: Presumably they could have at least much identity as two different electrons (if they are in space-time?). It is hard to see why anyone would be interested in their 'own' immortality, if loss of all individuality was a condition.