31 ideas
2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
Full Idea: The traditional conception of philosophy is that it is an a priori enquiry into the most general facts about reality. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xi) | |
A reaction: I think this still defines philosophy, though it also highlights the weakness of the subject, which is over-confidence about asserting necessary truths. How could the most god-like areas of human thought be about anything else? |
2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
Full Idea: Philosophy, or at least one large part of it, is subsequent to science; it begins where science leaves off. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxi) | |
A reaction: In some sense this has to be true. Without metaphysics there couldn't be any science. Rationalists should not forget, though, the huge impact which Darwin's science has (or should have) on fairly abstract philosophy (e.g. epistemology). |
2653 | If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, the whole universe must also be subject to it [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the parts of the universe are subject to the law of nature, then the universe itself must be subject to this law. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.86) |
2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
Full Idea: Three objections to realism in philosophy of mathematics: mathematical objects have no space/time location, and so no causal role; that such objects are determinate, but reference to numbers aren't; and that there is no abstract/concrete distinction. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxix) |
2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
Full Idea: Linguistic meaning is not rich enough to show either that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless or that all alleged synthetic a priori propositions are just analytic a priori propositions. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xx) |
2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
Full Idea: The Leibniz-Kant criticism of empiricism is that experience cannot teach us why mathematical and logical facts couldn't be otherwise than they are. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxxi) |
2628 | Why would mind mix with matter if it didn't need it? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If the gods have no need of the sensible world, why mix up mind with water and water with mind, if mind can exist by itself without any need of matter? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.24) | |
A reaction: This question migrates into our puzzles about why a separate mental substance would be produced by evolution. If it is device physical systems use to promote themselves, mental substance is reduced to an inferior and dependent role. |
2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
Full Idea: In linguistics there are two schools of thought: Bloomfieldian structuralism (favoured by Quine) conceives of sentences acoustically and meanings behaviouristically; and Chomskian generative grammar (which is silent about semantics). | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxiv) | |
A reaction: They both appear to be wrong, so there is (or was) something rotten in the state of linguistics. Are the only options for meaning either behaviourist or eliminativist? |
2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
Full Idea: There is virtually universal acceptance of Frege's definition of sense as the determiner of reference. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: Not any more, since Kripke and Putnam. It is one thing to say sense determines reference, and quite another to say that this is the definition of sense. |
2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
Full Idea: Pace Frege, sense determines sense properties and relations, like meaningfulness and synonymy, rather than determining referential properties, like denotation and truth. | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: This leaves room for Fregean 'sense', after Kripke has demolished the idea that sense determines reference. |
2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
Full Idea: Sentences are types, not utterance tokens or mental/neural tokens, and hence sentences are abstract objects (like musical scores). | |
From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
A reaction: If sentences are abstract types, then two verbally indistinguishable sentences are the same sentence. But if I say 'I am happy', that isn't the same as you saying it. |
20814 | Eloquence educates, exhorts, comforts, distracts and unites us, and raises us from savagery [Cicero] |
Full Idea: How wonderful is the power of eloquence! It enables us to learn and to teach. We use it to exhort and persuade, to comfort the unfortunate, to distract the timid and calm the passionate. It unites us in law and society, and raises us from savagery. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], 2.147) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Cicero would have been well aware of the doubts about rhetoric felt by Socrates (and possibly Plato). Cicero was probably the greatest Roman orator. |
7071 | Life and rationality are pointless if we can only contemplate the freedom of our own ego [Jacobi] |
Full Idea: If the highest upon which I can reflect, what I can contemplate, is my empty and pure, naked and mere ego, with its autonomy and freedom: then rational self-contemplation, then rationality is for me a curse - I deplore my existence. | |
From: Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799], Ch.2), quoted by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro | |
A reaction: This is a rebellion against Fichte's interpretation of Kant. It is a lovely cry from the heart on behalf of everyone who resents lines of philosophical thinking that seem to imprison the mind and cut us off from the ordinary world and real life. |
7072 | Jacobi was the first philosopher to talk of nihilism [Jacobi, by Critchley] |
Full Idea: Jacobi was the first to philosophically employ the concept of nihilism. | |
From: report of Friedrich Jacobi (Letters to Fichte [1799]) by Simon Critchley - Continental Philosophy - V. Short Intro Ch.2 | |
A reaction: Critchley explains that it was Jacobi's fear that Fichte was drawing nihilist conclusions from Kant's philosophy. This fear may be seen as the beginning of what is loosely called 'continental philosophy'. A worthy subject for thinkers... |
2640 | We have the death penalty, but still have thousands of robbers [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We have robbers by the thousand, although they have the penalty of death before their eyes. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.86) |
2652 | Some regard nature simply as an irrational force that imparts movement [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Some regard nature as an irrational force which merely imparts a mechanical motion to material bodies. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.81) |
2645 | Why shouldn't the gods fear their own destruction? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Why should the gods not be apprehensive of their own possible dissolution? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.114) |
2627 | I wonder whether loss of reverence for the gods would mean the end of all virtue [Cicero] |
Full Idea: I do not know whether, if our reverence for the gods were lost, we should not also see the end of good faith, of human brotherhood, and even of justice itself, which is the keystone of all the virtues. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.3) |
2651 | God doesn't obey the laws of nature; they are subject to the law of God [Cicero] |
Full Idea: God is not subject to obey the laws of nature. It is nature that is subject to the laws of God. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.77) |
2634 | It seems clear to me that we have an innate idea of the divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Let us take it as agreed that we have a preconception or "an innate idea" (as I have called it) or a prior knowledge of the divine. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.44) |
2636 | Many primitive people know nothing of the gods [Cicero] |
Full Idea: There must be many wild and primitive peoples who have no idea of the gods at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.62) |
2650 | If a person cannot feel the power of God when looking at the stars, they are probably incapable of feeling [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If any man cannot feel the power of God when he looks upon the stars, then I doubt whether he is capable of any feeling at all. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.55) |
2655 | If the barbarians of Britain saw a complex machine, they would be baffled, but would know it was designed [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone were to take the celestial globe of Posidonius and show it to the people of Britain, would a single one of those barbarians fail to see that it was the product of a conscious intelligence? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.88) |
2656 | Chance is no more likely to create the world than spilling lots of letters is likely to create a famous poem [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If someone thinks chance made the world, he should also think that if an infinite number of the letters of the alphabet were shaken together and poured out on the ground it would be possible for them to spell out the whole 'Annals' of Ennius. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.93) |
2647 | It is obvious from order that someone is in charge, as when we visit a gymnasium [Cicero] |
Full Idea: If one comes into a gymnasium and sees everything properly arranged and carried on in order, one does not imagine these arrangements to be accidental, but infers that there is someone in command whose orders are obeyed. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], II.15) |
2657 | If everything with regular movement and order is divine, then recurrent illnesses must be divine [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are we to find a divinity in every regular movement and in everything which happens in a constant order? If so, we shall have to say that tertian and quartan agues are divine because their course and recurrence is absolutely uniform. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.24) |
2638 | Either the gods are identical, or one is more beautiful than another [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Are the gods all exactly the same? If not, then one must be more beautiful than another. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.80) |
2635 | The gods are happy, so virtuous, so rational, so must have human shape [Cicero] |
Full Idea: We agree the gods are happy, and no happiness is possible without virtue: there is no virtue without reason: and reason is associated only with the human form: then it must follow that the gods themselves have human shape. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.48) |
2641 | Why believe in gods if you have never seen them? [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Did you ever actually see a god? Then why do you believe that gods exist? | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], I.88) |
2659 | The lists of good men who have suffered and bad men who have prospered are endless [Cicero] |
Full Idea: Time would fail me if I tried to list all the good men for whom things have turned out badly. So it would if I tried to mention all the wicked who have prospered. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.80) |
2658 | The gods blame men for having vices, but they could have given us enough reason to avoid them [Cicero] |
Full Idea: You gods say that the fault lies in the vices of mankind. But you could have endowed men with reason in a form which would exclude all vice and crime. | |
From: M. Tullius Cicero (On the Nature of the Gods ('De natura deorum') [c.44 BCE], III.76) |