19 ideas
| 2510 | Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz] |
| Full Idea: The traditional conception of philosophy is that it is an a priori enquiry into the most general facts about reality. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xi) | |
| A reaction: I think this still defines philosophy, though it also highlights the weakness of the subject, which is over-confidence about asserting necessary truths. How could the most god-like areas of human thought be about anything else? |
| 2516 | Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Philosophy, or at least one large part of it, is subsequent to science; it begins where science leaves off. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxi) | |
| A reaction: In some sense this has to be true. Without metaphysics there couldn't be any science. Rationalists should not forget, though, the huge impact which Darwin's science has (or should have) on fairly abstract philosophy (e.g. epistemology). |
| 10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: We cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by describing those circumstance in which we do, and those in which we do not, make use of the relevant word. We explain the point of the concept, what we use the word for. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231) | |
| A reaction: Well said. I am beginning to develop a campaign to make sure that analytical philosophy focuses on understanding concepts (in a full 'logos' sort of way), and doesn't just settle for logical form or definition or rules of usage. |
| 10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.231) | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a rather contentious but very interesting claim. An even stronger claim might be that its value (its normative force) is ALL that the concept of truth contributes to speech, other aspects being analysed into something else. |
| 10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: For a particular bounded language, if it is free of ambiguity and inconsistency, it must be possible to characterize the true sentences of the language; somewhat as, for a given game, we can say which moves are winning moves. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.237) | |
| A reaction: The background of this sounds rather like Tarski, with truth just being a baton passed from one part of the language to another, though Dummett adds the very un-Tarskian notion that truth has a value. |
| 19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Tarski's definition of truth is like giving a definition of what it is to win in various games, without giving a hint as to what winning is (e.g. that it is what one tries to do when playing). | |
| From: report of Michael Dummett (Truth [1959]) by Donald Davidson - Truth and Predication 7 | |
| A reaction: This led Dummett to his 'normative' account of truth. Formally, the fact that speakers usually aim at truth seems irrelevant, but in life you certainly wouldn't have grasped truth if you thought falsehood was just as satisfactory. The world is involved. |
| 2521 | 'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Three objections to realism in philosophy of mathematics: mathematical objects have no space/time location, and so no causal role; that such objects are determinate, but reference to numbers aren't; and that there is no abstract/concrete distinction. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxix) |
| 2513 | We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Linguistic meaning is not rich enough to show either that all metaphysical sentences are meaningless or that all alleged synthetic a priori propositions are just analytic a priori propositions. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xx) |
| 2522 | Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz] |
| Full Idea: The Leibniz-Kant criticism of empiricism is that experience cannot teach us why mathematical and logical facts couldn't be otherwise than they are. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxxi) |
| 10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
| Full Idea: One could train a dog to bark only when a bell rang and a light shone without presupposing that it possessed the concept of conjunction. | |
| From: Michael Dummett (Truth [1959], p.235) |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: Whatever else it embraces, a theory of meaning must include an account of truth - a statement of the conditions under which an arbitrary sentence of the language is true. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.132) | |
| A reaction: It is a moot point whether we can define meaning if we assume truth, or if we can define truth by assuming meaning. Tarski seems to presuppose meaning when he defines truth (Idea 2345). I like Davidson's taking of truth as basic. |
| 2517 | Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz] |
| Full Idea: In linguistics there are two schools of thought: Bloomfieldian structuralism (favoured by Quine) conceives of sentences acoustically and meanings behaviouristically; and Chomskian generative grammar (which is silent about semantics). | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxiv) | |
| A reaction: They both appear to be wrong, so there is (or was) something rotten in the state of linguistics. Are the only options for meaning either behaviourist or eliminativist? |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: A theory of truth lets us answer the underlying question how communication by language is possible. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.137) | |
| A reaction: If, instead, you explain communication by understood intentions (á la Grice), you have to say more about what sort of intentions are meant. If you use reference, you still have more to say about the meaning of sentences. Davidson looks good. |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The essential question is whether reference is the, or at least one, place where there is direct contact between linguistic theory and events, actions, or objects described in nonlinguistic terms. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.134) | |
| A reaction: How do you 'describe objects in nonlinguistic terms'? The causal theory of reference (e.g. Idea 4957) is designed to plug language straight into the world via reference. It simplifies things nicely, but I don't quite believe it. |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: I defend a version of the holistic approach, and urge that we must give up the concept of reference as basic to an empirical theory of language. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.136) | |
| A reaction: He proposes to connect language to the world via the concept of truth, rather than of reference. It is a brilliant idea, and is the key issue in philosophy of language. I go back to animals, which seem to care about situations rather than things. |
| 2519 | It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz] |
| Full Idea: There is virtually universal acceptance of Frege's definition of sense as the determiner of reference. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
| A reaction: Not any more, since Kripke and Putnam. It is one thing to say sense determines reference, and quite another to say that this is the definition of sense. |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: It is inconceivable that one should be able to explain the relationship between 'Kilimanjiro' and Kilimanjiro without first explaining the role of the word in sentences; hence there is no chance of explaining reference directly in nonlinguistic terms. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Reality without Reference [1977], p.135) | |
| A reaction: I point at the mountain, and a local says 'Kilimanjiro'? There is a 'gavagai'-type problem with that. The prior question might be 'what is it about this word that enables it to have a role in sentences?' Unlike whimpering or belching. |
| 2520 | Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Pace Frege, sense determines sense properties and relations, like meaningfulness and synonymy, rather than determining referential properties, like denotation and truth. | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
| A reaction: This leaves room for Fregean 'sense', after Kripke has demolished the idea that sense determines reference. |
| 2518 | Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz] |
| Full Idea: Sentences are types, not utterance tokens or mental/neural tokens, and hence sentences are abstract objects (like musical scores). | |
| From: Jerrold J. Katz (Realistic Rationalism [2000], Int.xxvi) | |
| A reaction: If sentences are abstract types, then two verbally indistinguishable sentences are the same sentence. But if I say 'I am happy', that isn't the same as you saying it. |