78 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: There seems to be an emerging naturalist consensus that is Realist in ontology and epistemology, externalist in semantics, and computationalist in cognitive psychology, which nicely allows us to retain our understanding of ourselves as rational creatures. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 18241 | Sufficient reason is implied by contradiction, of an insufficient possible which exists [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: Wolff believed that the principle of sufficient reason could be derived from the principle of contradiction, for there would be a contradiction in the insufficiently determined existence of a merely possible thing. | |
| From: report of Christian Wolff (works [1730]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to Ethics, Politics, Religion in Kant 'A child' | |
| A reaction: Sounds as if he might be begging to question. You would only protest against the insufficient determination of something if you already believed in the principle of sufficient reason. Nice try. |
| 2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: A psychology that can't make sense of such facts as that mental processes are typically truth-preserving is ipso facto dead in the water. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) |
| 2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §3) |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account of names and definite descriptions was concerned to preserve the law of excluded middle, according to which every sentence is either true or false (but it is not obvious that the law ought to be preserved). | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: That is the strongest form of excluded middle, but things work better if every sentence is either 'true' or 'not true', leaving it open whether 'not true' actually means 'false'. |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: On Russell's view 'Elizabeth II = Queen of England' is only superficially an identity-statement; really it is a predication, and attributes a complex relational property to Elizabeth. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: The original example is 'Scott = author of Waverley'. Why can't such statements be identities, in which the reference of one half of the identity is not yet known? 'The murderer is violent' and 'Smith is violent' suggests 'Smith is the murderer'. |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| Full Idea: I take the notion of the variable as fundamental. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.42) | |
| A reaction: A key idea of twentieth century philosophy, derived from Frege and handed on to Quine. A universal term, such as 'horse', is a variable, for which any particular horse can be its value. You can calculate using x, and generalise about horses. |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that names do not express a Fregean sense, ...but are disguised definite descriptions, of the form 'the F'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: Of course, Russell then has a famous theory about definite descriptions, which turns them into quantifications. |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell (and Frege) thought that Mill was wrong about names: really a proper name, properly used, simply was a definite description abbreviated or disguised. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity lectures Lecture 1 | |
| A reaction: It is tempting to oversimplify this issue, one way or the other, but essentially one has to agree with Kripke that naming does not inherently involve description, but is a 'baptism', without initial content. Connotations and descriptions accrue to a name. |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view of names, understood as a definite description, which is understood as a quantificational phrase, is not to contribute an object to propositions, but to contribute a complex of properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 3 | |
| A reaction: This seems to contradict the role of constants in first-logic, which are the paradigm names, picking out an object in the domain. Kripke says names and definite descriptions have different modal profiles. |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's proposal that a natural name is an abbreviated description invites four objections: not all speakers can produce descriptions; the description could be false; no one description seems special; and descriptions usually contain names. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 8.74 | |
| A reaction: The best reply on behalf of Russell is probably to concede all of these points, but deny that any of them are fatal. Most replies will probably say that they are possible true descriptions, rather than actual limited, confused or false ones. |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| Full Idea: Russell defined a logically proper name to be one the meaning of which is its referent. However, his internalist epistemology led him to deny that the words we ordinarily call names are logically proper. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Scott Soames - Philosophy of Language 1.25 |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| Full Idea: For Russell, a logically proper name introduces its referent into the proposition, whereas a description introduces a certain quantificational structure, not its denotation. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Kent Bach - What Does It Take to Refer? 22.2 L0 | |
| A reaction: I have very strong resistance to the idea that the actual referent could ever become part of a proposition. I am not, and never have been, part of a proposition! Russell depended on narrow 'acquaintance', which meant that few things qualified. |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Though someone just beginning to learn English might take it as one, "nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.1 | |
| A reaction: If someone replies to "nobody's there" with "show him to me!", presumably it IS a singular term - just one that doesn't work very well. If you want to get on in life, treat it as a quantifier; if you just want to have fun... |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory used quantification to eliminate singular terms, which could be meaningful without denoting anything. He reparsed such sentences so they appeared as predicates instead of names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.J. Ayer - The Central Questions of Philosophy IX.A.2 |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's account implies that all sentences composed of an empty name and a predicate are false, including 'Pegasus was a mythical creature'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Sarah Sawyer - Empty Names 4 | |
| A reaction: Russell insists that such sentences contain a concealed existence claim, which they clearly don't. |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: The main objections to Russell's theory of descriptions are to say that definite descriptions sometime are referring expressions, and disputing the claim that definite descriptions embody both uniqueness and existence claims. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: The first one seems particularly correct, as you can successfully refer with a false description. See Colin McGinn (Idea 6067) for criticism of the existence claim made by the so-called 'existential' quantifier. |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| Full Idea: Russell's reasons for saying that definite descriptions are not referring expressions are: some definite descriptions have no referent, and they cannot be referring when used in negative existential truths, or in informative identity sentences. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Mark Sainsbury - The Essence of Reference 18.5 | |
| A reaction: The idea is that by 'parity of form', if they aren't referring in these situations, they aren't really referring in others. Sainsbury notes that if there are two different forms of definite description (referential and attributive) these arguments fail. |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory makes an exciting distinction between logical and grammatical form, but any theory which says that every positive statement, without distinction, about objects which don't exist is false, has to be wrong. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Stephen Read - Thinking About Logic Ch.5 |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| Full Idea: When a statement of being or non-being is analysed by Russell's theory of descriptions it ceases to contain any expression which even purports to name the alleged entity, so the being of such an entity is no longer presupposed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Willard Quine - On What There Is p.6 |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell showed that his theory of definite descriptions affords solutions to each of four vexing logical problems: the Problems of Apparent Reference to Non-existents and Negative existentials, Frege's Puzzle about Identity, and Substitutivity. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language 2.Over | |
| A reaction: You must seek elsewhere for the explanations of the four problems, but this gives some indication of why Russell's theory was famous, and was felt to be a breakthrough in explaining logical forms. |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| Full Idea: With the devices of the Theory of Descriptions at hand, it was no longer necessary to take 'the' as indefinable, and it was possible to diminish greatly the number of entities to which a logical system is ontologically committed. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.13 | |
| A reaction: Illuminating, because it shows that ontology is what drove Russell at this time, and really they were all searching for Quine's 'desert landscapes', which minimalise commitment. |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the notions of predicate logic - specifically, 'some', 'every', and 'same as'. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Paul Horwich - Truth (2nd edn) Ch.2.7 | |
| A reaction: This helpfully clarifies Russell's project - to find the logical form of every sentence, expressed in terms which are strictly defined and consistent. This huge project now looks rather too optimistic. Artificial Intelligence would love to complete it. |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of 'the baby is crying' seems to imply that this can only be true if there is just one baby in the world; ..to dispose of the objection, it seems necessary to appeal implicitly or explicitly to a 'domain of discourse'. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by A.C. Grayling - Russell Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This objection leads to ordinary language philosophy, and the 'pragmatics' of language. It is standard in modern predicate logic to specify the domain over which an expression is quantified. |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| Full Idea: Russell proposed that descriptions be treated along with the quantifiers, which departs from Frege, who treated descriptions as proper names. ...the problem was that names invoke objects, and there is no object in failed descriptions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Gregory McCullogh - The Game of the Name 2.16 | |
| A reaction: Maybe we just allow intentional objects (such as unicorns) into our ontology? Producing a parsimonious ontology seems to be the main motivation of most philosophy of language. Or maybe names are just not committed to actual existence? |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell attempted to avoid Meinong's strategy (of saying 'The present King of France' refers to a 'non-existent object') by denying that definite descriptions are proper names. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.7 | |
| A reaction: Russell claimed that there was a covert existence claim built into a definite description. What about descriptions in known counterfactual situations ('Queen of the Fairies')? |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| Full Idea: Since Russell did not want to introduce non-existent objects, or declare many sentences meaningless, he prevented the problem from getting started, by denying that 'the present King of France is bald' is really a subject-predicate sentence. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Graeme Forbes - The Metaphysics of Modality 4.1 |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory says that sentences which apparently serve to refer to particulars are really assertions about properties. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: Right. Which is why particulars get marginalised in Russell, and universals take centre stage. I can't help suspecting that talk of de re/de dicto reference handles this problem better. |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Some logicians charge that the theory of descriptions as it stands is formally inadequate because it lacks explicit conventions for the scope of quantifiers, and that when these conventions are added the theory becomes unduly complex. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.97 | |
| A reaction: [Especially in modal contexts, apparently] I suppose if the main point is to spell out the existence commitments of the description, then that has to include quantification, for full generality. |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| Full Idea: It is sometimes claimed that the behaviour of definite non-count descriptions shows Russell's Theory of Descriptions itself to be false. ....but it isn't a general theory of descriptions, but precisely a theory of singular descriptions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Henry Laycock - Words without Objects 3.1 |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases are central to mathematics, especially in Russell's 'logicist' theory, in which they are crucial to identifying classes ('the class of all mortal beings', 'the class of natural numbers'). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: This explains the motivation for Russell's theory of definite descriptions, since he thinks reference is achieved by description. Russell nearly achieved an extremely complete philosophical system. |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's analysis of sentences containing definite descriptions has as an immediate consequence the doctrine that molecular sentences containing definite descriptions are syntactically ambiguous as regards the scope of the definite description. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David Kaplan - How to Russell a Frege-Church I | |
| A reaction: Presumably this is a virtue of Russell's account, and an advert for analytic philosophy, because it reveals an ambiguity which was there all the time. |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| Full Idea: Nowadays Russell's position is routinely put by saying that existence is what is expressed by the existential quantifier and only by that. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: We must keep separate how you express existence, and what it is. Quantifiers seem only to be a style of expressing existence; they don't offer any insight into what existence actually is, or what we mean by 'exist'. McGinn dislikes quantifiers. |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions allows us to avoid being ontologically committed to objects simply by virtue of using descriptions which seemingly denote them. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 1.1.2 | |
| A reaction: This I take to be why Russell's theory is a famous landmark. I personally take ontological commitment to be independent of what we specifically say. Others, like Quine, prefer to trim what we say until the commitments seem sound. |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| Full Idea: The real Platonic entities left standing after the Theory of Descriptions were propositions (not classes or numbers), and their constituents did not include denoting concepts or classes, but only individuals (Socrates) and universals (mortality). | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Ray Monk - Bertrand Russell: Spirit of Solitude Ch.6 | |
| A reaction: Propositions look like being the problem here. If we identify them with facts, it is not clear how many facts there are in the universe, independent of human thought. Indeed, how many universals are there? Nay, how many individuals? See Idea 7534. |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell's view makes it impossible to attribute existence to properties, and this would have to be declared ill-formed and meaningless. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Colin McGinn - Logical Properties Ch.2 | |
| A reaction: This strikes me as a powerful criticism, used to support McGinn's view that existence cannot be analysed, using quantifiers or anything else. |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell says one won't find the present King of France on the list of bald things, nor on the list of things that are not bald. It would seem that this gives rise to a violation of the law of excluded middle. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Bernard Linsky - Quantification and Descriptions 2 | |
| A reaction: It's a bit hard to accuse the poor old King of violating a law when he doesn't exist. |
| 2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Premeditated cognitive management is possible if knowing the contents of one's thoughts would tell you what would make them true and what would cause you to have them. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: I love the idea of 'cognitive management'. Since belief is fairly involuntary, I subject myself to the newspapers, books, TV and conversation which will create the style of beliefs to which I aspire. Why? |
| 2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: A creature that knows what makes its thoughts true and what would cause it to have them, could therefore cause itself to have true thoughts. …This would explain why experimentation is so close to the heart of our cognitive style. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: You can put yourself into a situation where you may be caused to believe that P. Putting a question to someone who is in the know is one species of this behaviour, and putting a question to Nature (an experiment) is another. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: To be in the audience for an experiment you have to believe what the experimenter believes about what the outcome would mean, but not necessarily what the outcome will be. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Experimentation is an occasional and more or less self-conscious exercise in what informal thinking does all the time without thinking about it. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Theories function as links in the causal chains that run from environmental outcomes to the beliefs that they cause the inquirer to have. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
| 2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I hold that psychological laws are intentional, that semantics is purely informational, and that thinking is computation (and that it is possible to hold all of these assumptions at once). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: When he puts it baldly like that, it doesn't sound terribly persuasive. Thinking is 'computation'? Raw experience is irrelevant? What is it 'like' to spot an interesting connection between two propositions or concepts? It's not like adding 7 and 5. |
| 2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I think it is likely that we are the only creatures that can think about the contents of our thoughts. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: I think this is a major idea. If you ask me the traditional question - what is the essential difference between us and other animals? - this is my answer (not language, or reason). We are the metathinkers. |
| 2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The question how mental representations could be both semantic, like propositions, and causal, like rocks, trees, and neural firings, is arguably just the interaction problem all over again. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: Interesting way of presenting the problem. If you seem to be confronting the interaction problem, you have probably drifted into a bogus dualist way of thinking. Retreat, and reformulate you questions and conceptual apparatus, till the question vanishes. |
| 2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The Cartesian view is that the interaction problem does arise, but is unsolvable because interaction is miraculous. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: A rather unsympathetic statement of the position. Cartesians might think that God could explain to us how interaction works. Cartesians are not mysterians, I think, but they see no sign of any theory of interaction. |
| 2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Type physicalism is, roughly, the doctrine that psychological kinds are identical to neurological kinds. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App A n.1) | |
| A reaction: This gets my general support, leaving open the nature of 'kinds'. Presumably the identity is strict, as in 'Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus'. It seems unlikely that if you and I think the 'same' thought, that we have strictly identical brain states. |
| 2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: What Hume didn't see was that the causal and representational properties of mental symbols have somehow to be coordinated if the coherence of mental life is to be accounted for. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: Certainly the idea that it all somehow becomes magic at the point where the brain represents the world is incoherent - but it is a bit magical. How can the whole of my garden be in my brain? Weird. |
| 2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Propositional attitudes are really three-place relations, between a creature, a proposition, and a mode of presentation (which are sentences of Mentalese). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure about 'really'! Why do we need a creature? Isn't 'hoping it will rain' a propositional attitude which some creature may or may not have? Fodor wants it to be physical, but it's abstract? |
| 2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Mentalism isn't gratuitous; you need it to explain rationality. Mental causation buys you behaviours that are unlike reflexes in at least three ways: they're autonomous, they're productive, and they're experimental. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: He makes his three ways sound all-or-nothing, which is (I believe) the single biggest danger when thinking about the mind. "Either you are conscious, or you are not..." |
| 2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: There isn't any XYZ, and there couldn't be any, and so we don't have to worry about it. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
| A reaction: Jadeite and Nephrite are real enough, which are virtually indistinguishable variants of jade. You just need Twin Jewellers instead of Twin Earths. We could build them, and employ twins to work there. |
| 2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: We need the idea of broad content to make sense of the fact that thoughts have the truth-conditions that they do. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
| A reaction: There seems to be (as Dummett points out) a potential circularity here, as you can hardly know the truth-conditions of something if you don't already know its content. |
| 3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If the words of 'Swamp Man' (spontaneously created, with concepts) are about XYZ on Twin Earth, it is not because he's causally connected to the stuff, but because XYZ would cause his 'water' tokens (in the absence of H2O). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App B) | |
| A reaction: The sight of the Eiffel tower causes my 'France' tokens, so is my word "France" about the Eiffel Tower? What would cause my 'nothing' tokens? |
| 2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you know quite a lot about what would cause you to have it. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure where this fits into the great jigsaw of the mind, but it strikes me as an acute and important observation. The truth of a thought is not essential to make you have it. Ask Othello. |
| 2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: I assume intentional content reduces (in some way) to information. …The content of a thought depends on its external relations; on the way that the thought is related to the world, not the way that it is related to other thoughts. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2) | |
| A reaction: Does this make Fodor a 'weak' functionalist? The 'strong' version would say a thought is merely a location in a flow diagram, but Fodor's 'mentalism' includes a further 'content' in each diagram box. |
| 2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts). | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
| A reaction: We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though. |
| 2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is the essence of semantic externalism that there is nothing that you have to believe, there are no inferences that you have to accept, to have the concept 'elm'. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
| A reaction: [REMINDER: broad content is filed in 18.C.7, under 'Thought' rather than under language. That is because I am a philospher of thought, rather than of language. |
| 2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: It is the causal connection between the state of the world and the contents of beliefs that the reduction of meaning to information is designed to insure. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: I'm not clear why characterising the contents of a belief in terms of its information has to amount to a 'reduction'. A cup of tea isn't reduced to tea. Connections imply duality. |
| 2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you thereby know what would make the thought true. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: The truthmaker might by physically impossible, and careful thought might show it to be contradictory - but that wouldn't destroy the meaning. |
| 2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: If what you are thinking depends on all of what you believe, then nobody ever thinks the same thing twice. …That is why so many semantic holists (Quine, Putnam, Rorty, Churchland, probably Wittgenstein) end up being semantic eliminativists. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
| A reaction: If linguistic holism is nonsense, this is easily settled. What I say about breakfast is not changed by reading some Gibbon yesterday. |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| Full Idea: Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4 | |
| A reaction: I'm not sure if I understand this. Presumably phrases which appear to refer actually point at other parts of language rather than the world. |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| Full Idea: If I am right, referring is not the same as denoting and the referential use of definite descriptions is not recognised on Russell's view. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Keith Donnellan - Reference and Definite Descriptions §I | |
| A reaction: This introduces a new theory of reference, which goes beyond the mere contents of linguistic experessions. It says reference is an 'external' and 'causal' affair, and so a definite description is not sufficient to make a reference. |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| Full Idea: Denoting phrases never have any meaning in themselves, but every proposition in whose verbal expression they occur has a meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.43) | |
| A reaction: This is the important idea that the sentence is the basic unit of meaning, rather than the word. I'm not convinced that this dispute needs to be settled. Words are pretty pointless outside of propositions, and propositions are impossible without words. |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| Full Idea: If we say 'Scott is the author of Waverley', we assert an identity of denotation with a difference of meaning. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.46) | |
| A reaction: This shows Russell picking up Frege's famous distinction, as shown in 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. To distinguish the meaning from the reference was one of the greatest (and simplest) clarifications ever offered of how language works. |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: In Russell's definition of 'denoting', a definite description denotes an entity if that entity fits the description uniquely. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 17.2 | |
| A reaction: [Recanati cites Donnellan for this] Hence denoting is not the same thing as reference. A description can denote beautifully, but fail to refer. Donnellan says if denoting were reference, someone might refer without realising it. |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| Full Idea: Russell, since he eliminates descriptions from his primitive notation, seems to hold in 'On Denoting' that the notion of 'sense' is illusory. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Saul A. Kripke - Naming and Necessity notes and addenda note 04 | |
| A reaction: Presumably we can eliminate sense from formal languages, but natural languages are rich in connotations (or whatever we choose to call them). |
| 2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: The standard view is that Frege cases [knowing Jocasta but not mother] show that reference doesn't determine sense, and Twin cases [knowing water but not H2O] show that sense doesn't determine reference. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) | |
| A reaction: How about 'references don't contain much information', and 'descriptions may not fix what they are referring to'? Simple really. |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| Full Idea: Russell assumes that it is expressions which refer if anything does, but strictly speaking it is WE who refer with the use of expressions. | |
| From: comment on Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by David E. Cooper - Philosophy and the Nature of Language §4.1 | |
| A reaction: This sounds right. Russell is part of the overemphasis on language which plagued philosophy after Frege. Words are tools, like searchlights or pointing fingers. |
| 2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: Broad semantic theories generally hold that the basic semantic properties of thoughts are truth and denotation. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
| A reaction: I think truth and denotation are the basic semantic properties, but I am dubious about whole-hearted broad semantic theories, so I seem to have gone horribly wrong somewhere. |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| Full Idea: Russell rejected Frege's sense/reference distinction, on the grounds that, if reference is mediated by sense, we lose the idea of direct acquaintance and succumb to Descriptivism. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 1.1 | |
| A reaction: [15,000th IDEA in the DB!! 23/3/2013, Weymouth] Recanati claims Russell made a mistake, because you can retain the sense/reference distinction, and still keep direct acquaintance (by means of 'non-descriptive senses'). |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| Full Idea: Russell does not claim that Frege's notion of sense is incoherent, but rather that it is superfluous. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by Alexander Miller - Philosophy of Language 2.9 | |
| A reaction: My initial reaction to this is that the notion of strict and literal meaning (see Idea 7309) is incredibly useful. Some of the best jokes depend on the gap between implications and strict meaning. How could metaphors be explained without it? |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: Russell's theory of definite descriptions proceeds by sketching the truth conditions of sentences containing descriptions, and arguing on various grounds that they are the correct truth conditions. | |
| From: report of Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905]) by William Lycan - Philosophy of Language Ch.9 | |
| A reaction: It seems important to see both where Russell was going, and where Davidson has come from. The whole project of finding the logical form of sentences (which starts with Frege and Russell) implies that truth conditions is what matters. |
| 2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
| Full Idea: You need an externalist semantics to explain why the contents of beliefs should have anything to do with how the world is. | |
| From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
| A reaction: Since externalist semantics only emerged in the 1970s, that implies that no previous theory had any notion that language had some connection to how the world is. Eh? |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| Full Idea: In every proposition that we can apprehend, ...all the constituents are real entities with which we have immediate acquaintance. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.56), quoted by Bernard Linsky - Russell's Metaphysical Logic 7.2 | |
| A reaction: This is the clearest statement of the 'Russellian' concept of a proposition. It strikes me as entirely wrong. The examples are always nice concrete objects like Mont Blanc, but as an account of sophisticated general propositions it seem hopeless. |
| 18242 | Confucius shows that ethics can rest on reason, rather than on revelation [Wolff, by Korsgaard] |
| Full Idea: Wolff claimed that the moral philosophy of Confucius shows that ethics is accessible to natural reason and independent of revelation. | |
| From: report of Christian Wolff (works [1730]) by Christine M. Korsgaard - Intro to Ethics, Politics, Religion in Kant 'A child' | |
| A reaction: Wolff was banished for proposing this idea. |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| Full Idea: 'There is one and only one entity x which is most perfect; that one has all perfections; existence is a perfection; therefore that one exists' fails as a proof because there is no proof of the first premiss. | |
| From: Bertrand Russell (On Denoting [1905], p.54) | |
| A reaction: This is the modern move of saying that existence (which is 'not a predicate', according to Kant) is actually a quantifier, which isolates the existence claim being made about a variable with a bunch of predicates. McGinn denies Russell's claim. |