81 ideas
2463 | A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There seems to be an emerging naturalist consensus that is Realist in ontology and epistemology, externalist in semantics, and computationalist in cognitive psychology, which nicely allows us to retain our understanding of ourselves as rational creatures. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
18137 | Impredicative definitions are wrong, because they change the set that is being defined? [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Poincaré suggested that what is wrong with an impredicative definition is that it allows the set defined to alter its composition as more sets are added to the theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) |
2435 | Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor] |
Full Idea: A psychology that can't make sense of such facts as that mental processes are typically truth-preserving is ipso facto dead in the water. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) |
18122 | Classical interdefinitions of logical constants and quantifiers is impossible in intuitionism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: None of the classical ways of defining one logical constant in terms of others is available in intuitionist logic (and this includes the two quantifiers). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) |
18114 | There is no single agreed structure for set theory [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is so far no agreed set of axioms for set theory which is categorical, i.e. which does pick just one structure. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: This contrasts with Peano Arithmetic, which is categorical in its second-order version. |
18107 | A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A 'proper class' cannot be a member of anything, neither of a set nor of another proper class. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |
18115 | We could add axioms to make sets either as small or as large as possible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We could add the axiom that all sets are constructible (V = L), making the universe of sets as small as possible, or add the axiom that there is a supercompact cardinal (SC), making the universe as large as we no know how to. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: Bostock says most mathematicians reject the first option, and are undecided about the second option. |
18139 | The Axiom of Choice relies on reference to sets that we are unable to describe [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The usual accounts of ZF are not restricted to subsets that we can describe, and that is what justifies the axiom of choice. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4 n36) | |
A reaction: This contrasts interestingly with predicativism, which says we can only discuss things which we can describe or define. Something like verificationism hovers in the background. |
18105 | Replacement enforces a 'limitation of size' test for the existence of sets [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Axiom of Replacement (or the Axiom of Subsets, 'Aussonderung', Fraenkel 1922) in effect enforces the idea that 'limitation of size' is a crucial factor when deciding whether a proposed set or does not not exist. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) |
19369 | Lull's combinatorial art would articulate all the basic concepts, then show how they combine [Lull, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Lull proposed a combinatorial art. He wanted to reconcile Islam and Christianity by articulating the basic concepts that their belief systems held in common, and then inventing a device that would allow these concepts to be combined. | |
From: report of Ramon (Ars Magna [1305]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 2 Intro | |
A reaction: Leibniz's Universal Characteristic was an attempt at continuing Lull's project. Lull's plan rested on Aristotle's categories. |
2442 | Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §3) |
18108 | First-order logic is not decidable: there is no test of whether any formula is valid [Bostock] |
Full Idea: First-order logic is not decidable. That is, there is no test which can be applied to any arbitrary formula of that logic and which will tell one whether the formula is or is not valid (as proved by Church in 1936). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18109 | The completeness of first-order logic implies its compactness [Bostock] |
Full Idea: From the fact that the usual rules for first-level logic are complete (as proved by Gödel 1930), it follows that this logic is 'compact'. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) | |
A reaction: The point is that the completeness requires finite proofs. |
18123 | Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Substitutional quantification and quantification understood in the usual 'ontological' way will coincide when every object in the (ontological) domain has a name. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.3 n23) |
18120 | The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of natural deduction [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Deduction Theorem is what licenses a system of 'natural deduction' in the first place. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) |
18125 | Berry's Paradox considers the meaning of 'The least number not named by this name' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Berry's Paradox can be put in this form, by considering the alleged name 'The least number not named by this name'. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1) |
18101 | Each addition changes the ordinality but not the cardinality, prior to aleph-1 [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If you add to the ordinals you produce many different ordinals, each measuring the length of the sequence of ordinals less than it. They each have cardinality aleph-0. The cardinality eventually increases, but we can't say where this break comes. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) |
18100 | ω + 1 is a new ordinal, but its cardinality is unchanged [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we add ω onto the end of 0,1,2,3,4..., it then has a different length, of ω+1. It has a different ordinal (since it can't be matched with its first part), but the same cardinal (since adding 1 makes no difference). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: [compressed] The ordinals and cardinals coincide up to ω, but this is the point at which they come apart. |
18102 | A cardinal is the earliest ordinal that has that number of predecessors [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is the usual procedure these days to identify a cardinal number with the earliest ordinal number that has that number of predecessors. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: This sounds circular, since you need to know the cardinal in order to decide which ordinal is the one you want, but, hey, what do I know? |
18106 | Aleph-1 is the first ordinal that exceeds aleph-0 [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The cardinal aleph-1 is identified with the first ordinal to have more than aleph-0 members, and so on. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.4) | |
A reaction: That is, the succeeding infinite ordinals all have the same cardinal number of members (aleph-0), until the new total is triggered (at the number of the reals). This is Continuum Hypothesis territory. |
18095 | Instead of by cuts or series convergence, real numbers could be defined by axioms [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In addition to cuts, or converging series, Cantor suggests we can simply lay down a set of axioms for the real numbers, and this can be done without any explicit mention of the rational numbers [note: the axioms are those for a complete ordered field]. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: It is interesting when axioms are best, and when not. Set theory depends entirely on axioms. Horsten and Halbach are now exploring treating truth as axiomatic. You don't give the 'nature' of the thing - just rules for its operation. |
18099 | The number of reals is the number of subsets of the natural numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is not difficult to show that the number of the real numbers is the same as the number of all the subsets of the natural numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.5) | |
A reaction: The Continuum Hypothesis is that this is the next infinite number after the number of natural numbers. Why can't there be a number which is 'most' of the subsets of the natural numbers? |
18093 | For Eudoxus cuts in rationals are unique, but not every cut makes a real number [Bostock] |
Full Idea: As Eudoxus claimed, two distinct real numbers cannot both make the same cut in the rationals, for any two real numbers must be separated by a rational number. He did not say, though, that for every such cut there is a real number that makes it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4) | |
A reaction: This is in Bostock's discussion of Dedekind's cuts. It seems that every cut is guaranteed to produce a real. Fine challenges the later assumption. |
18110 | Infinitesimals are not actually contradictory, because they can be non-standard real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Non-standard natural numbers will yield non-standard rational and real numbers. These will include reciprocals which will be closer to 0 than any standard real number. These are like 'infinitesimals', so that notion is not actually a contradiction. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18156 | Modern axioms of geometry do not need the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A modern axiomatisation of geometry, such as Hilbert's (1899), does not need to claim the existence of real numbers anywhere in its axioms. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5.ii) | |
A reaction: This is despite the fact that geometry is reduced to algebra, and the real numbers are the equivalent of continuous lines. Bostock votes for a Greek theory of proportion in this role. |
18097 | The Peano Axioms describe a unique structure [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Peano Axioms are categorical, meaning that they describe a unique structure. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 4.4 n20) | |
A reaction: So if you think there is nothing more to the natural numbers than their structure, then the Peano Axioms give the essence of arithmetic. If you think that 'objects' must exist to generate a structure, there must be more to the numbers. |
18148 | Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle will not do as an implicit definition because it makes a positive claim about the size of the universe (which no mere definition can do), and because it does not by itself explain what the numbers are. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18145 | Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Hume's Principle gives a criterion of identity for numbers, but it is obvious that many other things satisfy that criterion. The simplest example is probably the numerals (in any notation, decimal, binary etc.), giving many different interpretations. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18149 | There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is not just one way of giving a criterion of identity for numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The Julius Caesar problem was one reason that led Frege to give an explicit definition of numbers as special sets. He does not appear to notice that the same problem affects his Axiom V for introducing sets (whether Caesar is or is not a set). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: The Julius Caesar problem is a sceptical acid that eats into everything in philosophy of mathematics. You give all sorts of wonderful accounts of numbers, but at what point do you know that you now have a number, and not something else? |
18116 | Numbers can't be positions, if nothing decides what position a given number has [Bostock] |
Full Idea: There is no ground for saying that a number IS a position, if the truth is that there is nothing to determine which number is which position. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.4) | |
A reaction: If numbers lose touch with the empirical ability to count physical objects, they drift off into a mad world where they crumble away. |
18117 | Structuralism falsely assumes relations to other numbers are numbers' only properties [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Structuralism begins from a false premise, namely that numbers have no properties other than their relations to other numbers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 6.5) | |
A reaction: Well said. Describing anything purely relationally strikes me as doomed, because you have to say why those things relate in those ways. |
18141 | Nominalism about mathematics is either reductionist, or fictionalist [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Nominalism has two main versions, one which tries to 'reduce' the objects of mathematics to something simpler (Russell and Wittgenstein), and another which claims that such objects are mere 'fictions' which have no reality (Field). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9) |
18157 | Nominalism as based on application of numbers is no good, because there are too many applications [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The style of nominalism which aims to reduce statements about numbers to statements about their applications does not work for the natural numbers, because they have many applications, and it is arbitrary to choose just one of them. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5.iii) |
18150 | Actual measurement could never require the precision of the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: We all know that in practice no physical measurement can be 100 per cent accurate, and so it cannot require the existence of a genuinely irrational number, rather than some of the rational numbers close to it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.3) |
18158 | Ordinals are mainly used adjectively, as in 'the first', 'the second'... [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The basic use of the ordinal numbers is their use as ordinal adjectives, in phrases such as 'the first', 'the second' and so on. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: That is because ordinals seem to attach to particulars, whereas cardinals seem to attach to groups. Then you say 'three is greater than four', it is not clear which type you are talking about. |
18127 | Simple type theory has 'levels', but ramified type theory has 'orders' [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The simple theory of types distinguishes sets into different 'levels', but this is quite different from the distinction into 'orders' which is imposed by the ramified theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.1) | |
A reaction: The ramified theory has both levels and orders (p.235). Russell's terminology is, apparently, inconsistent. |
18144 | Neo-logicists agree that HP introduces number, but also claim that it suffices for the job [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The neo-logicists take up Frege's claim that Hume's Principle introduces a new concept (of a number), but unlike Frege they go on to claim that it by itself gives a complete account of that concept. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: So the big difference between Frege and neo-logicists is the Julius Caesar problem. |
18147 | Neo-logicists meet the Caesar problem by saying Hume's Principle is unique to number [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The response of neo-logicists to the Julius Caesar problem is to strengthen Hume's Principle in the hope of ensuring that only numbers will satisfy it. They say the criterion of identity provided by HP is essential to number, and not to anything else. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) |
18146 | If Hume's Principle is the whole story, that implies structuralism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If Hume's Principle is all we are given, by way of explanation of what the numbers are, the only conclusion to draw would seem to be the structuralists' conclusion, ...studying all systems that satisfy that principle. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.A.2) | |
A reaction: Any approach that implies a set of matching interpretations will always imply structuralism. To avoid it, you need to pin the target down uniquely. |
18129 | Many crucial logicist definitions are in fact impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Many of the crucial definitions in the logicist programme are in fact impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) |
18111 | Treating numbers as objects doesn't seem like logic, since arithmetic fixes their totality [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If logic is neutral on the number of objects there are, then logicists can't construe numbers as objects, for arithmetic is certainly not neutral on the number of numbers there are. They must be treated in some other way, perhaps as numerical quantifiers. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 5.5) |
18159 | Higher cardinalities in sets are just fairy stories [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In its higher reaches, which posit sets of huge cardinalities, set theory is just a fairy story. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.5.iii) | |
A reaction: You can't say the higher reaches are fairy stories but the lower reaches aren't, if the higher is directly derived from the lower. The empty set and the singleton are fairy stories too. Bostock says the axiom of infinity triggers the fairy stories. |
18155 | A fairy tale may give predictions, but only a true theory can give explanations [Bostock] |
Full Idea: A common view is that although a fairy tale may provide very useful predictions, it cannot provide explanations for why things happen as they do. In order to do that a theory must also be true (or, at least, an approximation to the truth). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 9.B.5) | |
A reaction: Of course, fictionalism offers an explanation of mathematics as a whole, but not of the details (except as the implications of the initial fictional assumptions). |
18140 | The best version of conceptualism is predicativism [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In my personal opinion, predicativism is the best version of conceptualism that we have yet discovered. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: Since conceptualism is a major player in the field, this makes predicativism a very important view. I won't vote Predicativist quite yet, but I'm tempted. |
18138 | Conceptualism fails to grasp mathematical properties, infinity, and objective truth values [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Three simple objections to conceptualism in mathematics are that we do not ascribe mathematical properties to our ideas, that our ideas are presumably finite, and we don't think mathematics lacks truthvalue before we thought of it. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.4) | |
A reaction: [compressed; Bostock refers back to his Ch 2] Plus Idea 18134. On the whole I sympathise with conceptualism, so I will not allow myself to be impressed by any of these objections. (So, what's actually wrong with them.....?). |
18131 | If abstracta only exist if they are expressible, there can only be denumerably many of them [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If an abstract object exists only when there is some suitable way of expressing it, then there are at most denumerably many abstract objects. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.2) | |
A reaction: Fine by me. What an odd view, to think there are uncountably many abstract objects in existence, only a countable portion of which will ever be expressed! [ah! most people agree with me, p.243-4] |
18134 | Predicativism makes theories of huge cardinals impossible [Bostock] |
Full Idea: Classical mathematicians say predicative mathematics omits areas of great interest, all concerning non-denumerable real numbers, such as claims about huge cardinals. There cannot be a predicative version of this theory. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure that anyone will really miss huge cardinals if they are prohibited, though cryptography seems to flirt with such things. Are we ever allowed to say that some entity conjured up by mathematicians is actually impossible? |
18135 | If mathematics rests on science, predicativism may be the best approach [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It has been claimed that only predicative mathematics has a justification through its usefulness to science (an empiricist approach). | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [compressed. Quine is the obvious candidate] I suppose predicativism gives your theory roots, whereas impredicativism is playing an abstract game. |
18136 | If we can only think of what we can describe, predicativism may be implied [Bostock] |
Full Idea: If we accept the initial idea that we can think only of what we ourselves can describe, then something like the theory of predicativism quite naturally results | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: I hate the idea that we can only talk of what falls under a sortal, but 'what we can describe' is much more plausible. Whether or not you agree with this approach (I'm pondering it), this makes predicativism important. |
18133 | The usual definitions of identity and of natural numbers are impredicative [Bostock] |
Full Idea: The predicative approach cannot accept either the usual definition of identity or the usual definition of the natural numbers, for both of these definitions are impredicative. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) | |
A reaction: [Bostock 237-8 gives details] |
18132 | The predicativity restriction makes a difference with the real numbers [Bostock] |
Full Idea: It is with the real numbers that the restrictions imposed by predicativity begin to make a real difference. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 8.3) |
2462 | Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Premeditated cognitive management is possible if knowing the contents of one's thoughts would tell you what would make them true and what would cause you to have them. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I love the idea of 'cognitive management'. Since belief is fairly involuntary, I subject myself to the newspapers, books, TV and conversation which will create the style of beliefs to which I aspire. Why? |
2461 | An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Experimentation is an occasional and more or less self-conscious exercise in what informal thinking does all the time without thinking about it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2454 | We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor] |
Full Idea: A creature that knows what makes its thoughts true and what would cause it to have them, could therefore cause itself to have true thoughts. …This would explain why experimentation is so close to the heart of our cognitive style. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2455 | Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You can put yourself into a situation where you may be caused to believe that P. Putting a question to someone who is in the know is one species of this behaviour, and putting a question to Nature (an experiment) is another. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2460 | Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor] |
Full Idea: To be in the audience for an experiment you have to believe what the experimenter believes about what the outcome would mean, but not necessarily what the outcome will be. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2458 | Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Theories function as links in the causal chains that run from environmental outcomes to the beliefs that they cause the inquirer to have. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) |
2443 | I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I hold that psychological laws are intentional, that semantics is purely informational, and that thinking is computation (and that it is possible to hold all of these assumptions at once). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: When he puts it baldly like that, it doesn't sound terribly persuasive. Thinking is 'computation'? Raw experience is irrelevant? What is it 'like' to spot an interesting connection between two propositions or concepts? It's not like adding 7 and 5. |
2453 | We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I think it is likely that we are the only creatures that can think about the contents of our thoughts. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I think this is a major idea. If you ask me the traditional question - what is the essential difference between us and other animals? - this is my answer (not language, or reason). We are the metathinkers. |
2446 | Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The Cartesian view is that the interaction problem does arise, but is unsolvable because interaction is miraculous. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: A rather unsympathetic statement of the position. Cartesians might think that God could explain to us how interaction works. Cartesians are not mysterians, I think, but they see no sign of any theory of interaction. |
2445 | Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The question how mental representations could be both semantic, like propositions, and causal, like rocks, trees, and neural firings, is arguably just the interaction problem all over again. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Interesting way of presenting the problem. If you seem to be confronting the interaction problem, you have probably drifted into a bogus dualist way of thinking. Retreat, and reformulate you questions and conceptual apparatus, till the question vanishes. |
2464 | Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Type physicalism is, roughly, the doctrine that psychological kinds are identical to neurological kinds. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App A n.1) | |
A reaction: This gets my general support, leaving open the nature of 'kinds'. Presumably the identity is strict, as in 'Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus'. It seems unlikely that if you and I think the 'same' thought, that we have strictly identical brain states. |
2447 | Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor] |
Full Idea: What Hume didn't see was that the causal and representational properties of mental symbols have somehow to be coordinated if the coherence of mental life is to be accounted for. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Certainly the idea that it all somehow becomes magic at the point where the brain represents the world is incoherent - but it is a bit magical. How can the whole of my garden be in my brain? Weird. |
2440 | Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Propositional attitudes are really three-place relations, between a creature, a proposition, and a mode of presentation (which are sentences of Mentalese). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure about 'really'! Why do we need a creature? Isn't 'hoping it will rain' a propositional attitude which some creature may or may not have? Fodor wants it to be physical, but it's abstract? |
2450 | Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Mentalism isn't gratuitous; you need it to explain rationality. Mental causation buys you behaviours that are unlike reflexes in at least three ways: they're autonomous, they're productive, and they're experimental. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: He makes his three ways sound all-or-nothing, which is (I believe) the single biggest danger when thinking about the mind. "Either you are conscious, or you are not..." |
2437 | XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor] |
Full Idea: There isn't any XYZ, and there couldn't be any, and so we don't have to worry about it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: Jadeite and Nephrite are real enough, which are virtually indistinguishable variants of jade. You just need Twin Jewellers instead of Twin Earths. We could build them, and employ twins to work there. |
2441 | Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: We need the idea of broad content to make sense of the fact that thoughts have the truth-conditions that they do. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.II) | |
A reaction: There seems to be (as Dummett points out) a potential circularity here, as you can hardly know the truth-conditions of something if you don't already know its content. |
3114 | Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If the words of 'Swamp Man' (spontaneously created, with concepts) are about XYZ on Twin Earth, it is not because he's causally connected to the stuff, but because XYZ would cause his 'water' tokens (in the absence of H2O). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], App B) | |
A reaction: The sight of the Eiffel tower causes my 'France' tokens, so is my word "France" about the Eiffel Tower? What would cause my 'nothing' tokens? |
2452 | Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you know quite a lot about what would cause you to have it. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm not sure where this fits into the great jigsaw of the mind, but it strikes me as an acute and important observation. The truth of a thought is not essential to make you have it. Ask Othello. |
2432 | Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor] |
Full Idea: I assume intentional content reduces (in some way) to information. …The content of a thought depends on its external relations; on the way that the thought is related to the world, not the way that it is related to other thoughts. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2) | |
A reaction: Does this make Fodor a 'weak' functionalist? The 'strong' version would say a thought is merely a location in a flow diagram, but Fodor's 'mentalism' includes a further 'content' in each diagram box. |
2438 | In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Semantics, according to the informational view, is mostly about counterfactuals; what counts for the identity of my concepts is not what I do distinguish but what I could distinguish if I cared to (even using instruments and experts). | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: We all differ in our discriminations (and awareness of expertise), so our concepts would differ, which is bad news for communication (see Idea 223). The view has some plausibility, though. |
2439 | Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is the essence of semantic externalism that there is nothing that you have to believe, there are no inferences that you have to accept, to have the concept 'elm'. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §2.I) | |
A reaction: [REMINDER: broad content is filed in 18.C.7, under 'Thought' rather than under language. That is because I am a philospher of thought, rather than of language. |
2457 | If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor] |
Full Idea: It is the causal connection between the state of the world and the contents of beliefs that the reduction of meaning to information is designed to insure. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: I'm not clear why characterising the contents of a belief in terms of its information has to amount to a 'reduction'. A cup of tea isn't reduced to tea. Connections imply duality. |
2451 | To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If you know the content of a thought, you thereby know what would make the thought true. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: The truthmaker might by physically impossible, and careful thought might show it to be contradictory - but that wouldn't destroy the meaning. |
2433 | For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor] |
Full Idea: If what you are thinking depends on all of what you believe, then nobody ever thinks the same thing twice. …That is why so many semantic holists (Quine, Putnam, Rorty, Churchland, probably Wittgenstein) end up being semantic eliminativists. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
A reaction: If linguistic holism is nonsense, this is easily settled. What I say about breakfast is not changed by reading some Gibbon yesterday. |
2436 | It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor] |
Full Idea: The standard view is that Frege cases [knowing Jocasta but not mother] show that reference doesn't determine sense, and Twin cases [knowing water but not H2O] show that sense doesn't determine reference. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.3) | |
A reaction: How about 'references don't contain much information', and 'descriptions may not fix what they are referring to'? Simple really. |
2434 | Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor] |
Full Idea: Broad semantic theories generally hold that the basic semantic properties of thoughts are truth and denotation. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §1.2b) | |
A reaction: I think truth and denotation are the basic semantic properties, but I am dubious about whole-hearted broad semantic theories, so I seem to have gone horribly wrong somewhere. |
2459 | Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor] |
Full Idea: You need an externalist semantics to explain why the contents of beliefs should have anything to do with how the world is. | |
From: Jerry A. Fodor (The Elm and the Expert [1993], §4) | |
A reaction: Since externalist semantics only emerged in the 1970s, that implies that no previous theory had any notion that language had some connection to how the world is. Eh? |
18121 | In logic a proposition means the same when it is and when it is not asserted [Bostock] |
Full Idea: In Modus Ponens where the first premise is 'P' and the second 'P→Q', in the first premise P is asserted but in the second it is not. Yet it must mean the same in both premises, or it would be guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. | |
From: David Bostock (Philosophy of Mathematics [2009], 7.2) | |
A reaction: This is Geach's thought (leading to an objection to expressivism in ethics, that P means the same even if it is not expressed). |
19371 | Nine principles of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory [Lull, by Arthur,R] |
Full Idea: Lull restricted himself to only nine 'absolute principles' of God: goodness, greatness, eternity, power, wisdom, will, virtue, truth and glory | |
From: report of Ramon (Ars Magna [1305]) by Richard T.W. Arthur - Leibniz 2 'Combinatorics' | |
A reaction: Leibniz responded that God's perfections are infinite in number, and thus beyond human comprehension. Lull cut them down to nine, because he was designing a sort of conceptual logic that employed them. |