10 ideas
4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The Principle may be stated as 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be', which is a generalisation of the assumption which justifies the question 'Why?', which is the mother of all science. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.I) | |
A reaction: This faith is the core of philosophy, to be maintained against all defeatists like Wittgenstein and Colin McGinn. Reality must be rational, or we wouldn't be here to think about it. (Maybe!) |
22076 | Being is only perceptible to itself as becoming [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Being is only perceptible to itself in the state of becoming. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.403), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.90 | |
A reaction: Is the Enlightenment the era of Being, and the Romantic era that of Becoming? They like process, fluidity, even chaos. |
4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Necessity has no meaning other than the irresistible sequence of the effect where the cause is given. All necessity is thus conditioned, and absolute or unconditioned necessity is a contradiction in terms. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VIII) | |
A reaction: I.e. there is only natural necessity, and no such thing as metaphysical necessity. But what about logical necessity(e.g. 2+3=5)? I think there may be metaphysical necessity, but we can't know much about it, and we are over-confident in assessing it. |
4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV) | |
A reaction: Based, I take it, on Hume. Presumably he means a posteriori understanding, as it hardly fits an understanding of arithmetic. Understanding needs more than just causation. What aspects of causation? |
22074 | We must show that the whole of nature, because it is effective, is grounded in freedom [Schelling] |
Full Idea: What is required is to show that everything that is effective (nature, the world of things) is grounded in activity, life, freedom. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.351), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling | |
A reaction: I take the ancestor of this view of nature to be the monads of Leibniz, as the active principle in nature. Because this is an idealist view, it starts with the absolute freedom of the Self, and presumably sees nature in its own image. |
4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: What we know in ourselves is never what knows, but what wills, the will. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.VII) | |
A reaction: An interesting slant on Hume's scepticism about personal identity. Hume was hunting for a thing-which-experiences. If he had sought his will, he might have spotted it. |
21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: The identity of the subject of willing with that of knowing by virtue whereof ...the word 'I' includes and indicates both, is the knot of the world, and hence inexplicable. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], p.211-2), quoted by Christopher Janaway - Schopenhauer 4 'Self' | |
A reaction: I'm struggling to see this as a deep mystery. If we look objectively at animals and ask 'what is their brain for?' the answer seems obvious. This may be a case of everything looking mysterious after a philosopher has stared at it for a while. |
22075 | Only idealism has given us the genuine concept of freedom [Schelling] |
Full Idea: Until the discovery of idealism, the genuine concept of freedom has been missing from every modern system, whether it be that of Leibniz or of Spinoza. | |
From: Friedrich Schelling (Of Human Freedom [1809], p.345), quoted by Jean-François Courtine - Schelling p.87 | |
A reaction: Spinoza denied free will, and Leibniz fudged it. Evidently more medieval theological accounts were not good enough. I presume Fichte is Schelling's hero, and he seems to see freedom as axiomatic about the Self. |
4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
Full Idea: Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing. | |
From: Arthur Schopenhauer (Abstract of 'The Fourfold Root' [1813], Ch.IV) | |
A reaction: An off-beat philosophical view of the question. Sounds more like a consequence of time than its essential nature. |
14409 | I am a presentist, and all language and common sense supports my view [Bigelow] |
Full Idea: I am a presentist: nothing exists which is not present. Everyone believed this until the nineteenth century; it is writing into the grammar of natural languages; it is still assumed in everyday life, even by philosophers who deny it. | |
From: John Bigelow (Presentism and Properties [1996], p.36), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology | |
A reaction: The most likely deniers of presentism seem to be physicists and cosmologists who have overdosed on Einstein. On the whole I vote for presentism, but what justifies truths about the past and future. Traces existing in the present? |