Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Presentism and Properties', 'The Evolution of Physics' and 'Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier'

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4 ideas

27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces

12719	Clearly, force is that from which action follows, when unimpeded [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The notion of force is as clear as that of action and passion, because it is that from which action follows when nothing prevents it.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: For Leibniz, force seems to be a metaphysical notion, rather than a feature of the physical world. I take it to be the bottom level of explanation, and it equates with Aristotelian form and essence.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields

18202	The concept of a field gradually replaced the substances in explaining relations between charges [Einstein/Infeld]
	Full Idea: In the beginning the field concept was no more than a means of facilitating the understanding of phenomena. ...In the new field language it is the field and not the charges themselves which is essential. The substance was overshadowed by the field.
	From: Einstein,A/Infeld,L (The Evolution of Physics [1938], p.151), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics II.4
	A reaction: This is very important for philosophical metaphysicians, especially those like me who want to explain the universe by the nature of the stuff that composes it. The 'stuff' had better not be simplistic individual 'substances'.

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism

14409	I am a presentist, and all language and common sense supports my view [Bigelow]
	Full Idea: I am a presentist: nothing exists which is not present. Everyone believed this until the nineteenth century; it is writing into the grammar of natural languages; it is still assumed in everyday life, even by philosophers who deny it.
	From: John Bigelow (Presentism and Properties [1996], p.36), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology
	A reaction: The most likely deniers of presentism seem to be physicists and cosmologists who have overdosed on Einstein. On the whole I vote for presentism, but what justifies truths about the past and future. Traces existing in the present?

27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time

12720	Time doesn't exist, since its parts don't coexist [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: Time never exists, since all of its parts never exist together.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Paul Pellison-Fontinier [1691], A1.6.226), quoted by Daniel Garber - Leibniz:Body,Substance,Monad 4
	A reaction: The problem here is that he seems to be admitting that time has 'parts'. Can something have parts and not exist? Events will also fail to exist by this criterion, though we could hardly deny that events (or some such) 'happen'.