Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Presentism and Properties', '67: Platonic Questions' and 'Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction''

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3 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
When the soul is intelligent and harmonious, it is part of god and derives from god [Plutarch]
     Full Idea: The soul, when it has partaken of intelligence and reason and concord, is not merely a work but also a part of god and has come to be not by his agency but both from him as source and out of his substance.
     From: Plutarch (67: Platonic Questions [c.85], II.1001)
     A reaction: A most intriguing shift of view from earlier concepts of the psuché. How did this come about? This man is a pagan. The history is in the evolution of Platonism. See 'The Middle Platonists' by John Dillon. Davidson is also very impressed by reason.
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction theories build mathematics out of second-order equivalence principles [Cook/Ebert]
     Full Idea: A theory of abstraction is any account that reconstructs mathematical theories using second-order abstraction principles of the form: §xFx = §xGx iff E(F,G). We ignore first-order abstraction principles such as Frege's direction abstraction.
     From: R Cook / P Ebert (Notice of Fine's 'Limits of Abstraction' [2004], 1)
     A reaction: Presumably part of the neo-logicist programme, which also uses such principles. The function § (extension operator) 'provides objects corresponding to the argument concepts'. The aim is to build mathematics, rather than the concept of a 'rabbit'.
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
I am a presentist, and all language and common sense supports my view [Bigelow]
     Full Idea: I am a presentist: nothing exists which is not present. Everyone believed this until the nineteenth century; it is writing into the grammar of natural languages; it is still assumed in everyday life, even by philosophers who deny it.
     From: John Bigelow (Presentism and Properties [1996], p.36), quoted by Trenton Merricks - Truth and Ontology
     A reaction: The most likely deniers of presentism seem to be physicists and cosmologists who have overdosed on Einstein. On the whole I vote for presentism, but what justifies truths about the past and future. Traces existing in the present?