Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'talk' and 'Making Things Happen'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
10152 Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski]
     Full Idea: People have asked me, 'How can you, a nominalist, do work in set theory and in logic, which are theories about things you do not believe in?' ...I believe that there is a value even in fairy tales and the study of fairy tales.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic
     A reaction: This is obviously an oversimplification. I don't think for a moment that Tarski literally believed that the study of fairy tales had as much value as the study of logic. Why do we have this particular logic, and not some other?
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10151 I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
     Full Idea: I am a nominalist. This is a very deep conviction of mine. ...I am a tortured nominalist.
     From: Alfred Tarski (talk [1965]), quoted by Feferman / Feferman - Alfred Tarski: life and logic Int I
     A reaction: I too am of the nominalist persuasion, but I don't feel justified in such a strong commitment.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
14367 An explanation is a causal graph [Woodward,J, by Strevens]
     Full Idea: On Woodward's manipulationist view, an explanation would take the form of a causal graph.
     From: report of James Woodward (Making Things Happen [2003]) by Michael Strevens - No Understanding without Explanation 1
     A reaction: The idea is that causation is all to do with how nature responds when you try to manipulate it. I'm certainly in favour of tying explanation closely to causation.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
     From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
     A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.