26 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Organisms come to better understand their worlds by coming to better understand themselves and the ways in which their own structures engage their worlds. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §III) | |
| A reaction: Van Gulick is defending a higher-order theory of consciousness, but this strikes me as a good rationale for the target of philosophy, which has increasingly (since Descartes) focused on understanding our own minds. |
| 23250 | Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: And of responsible actions, some are done through habit, some through desire, and of these some through rational and some through irrational desire. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1369a01) | |
| A reaction: Identified by Michael Frede, to illustrate reason having its own distinctive type of desire ('Boulesis'). I suspect that the rational desires are the morally good desires. |
| 5847 | It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It belongs to dialectic to survey equally all kinds of syllogism. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355a08) | |
| A reaction: Since dialectic is central to philosophy, this implies that philosophers ought to be students of logic. This duty seems to me to be taken more seriously in the analytical tradition than in the 'continental' tradition. |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: In contrast with standard notions of knowledge, the concept of understanding emphasizes the element of practical engagement from the outset. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
| A reaction: This could be the very interesting germ of a huge revolution in our approach to epistemology, which I find rather appealing. Plato's desire that knowledge should have 'logos' seems to me in the same area. It sounds rather internalist, which is good. |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §II) | |
| A reaction: This thought could rather rapidly revive the discredited notion of knowing-how. I think it might slot into an account of the mind in terms of levels, so that my internalist view of knowledge emerges at higher levels, built on more basic responses. |
| 5862 | A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If we have a single counter-instance, the argument is refuted as not necessary, even if more cases are otherwise or more often otherwise. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1403a07) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle (pioneering hero) pointing out what we now tend to think of as Karl Popper's falsification, the certain way to demonstrate the falseness of a supposed law of nature, by finding one anomaly from it. |
| 5854 | Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Nobody is on his guard against a disease that nobody has yet caught. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1372a27) | |
| A reaction: A beautifully simple indication of one problem with induction. In a dangerous situation, you can't wait around for a few experiences in order to learn the regularities and rules. Either you are doomed, or you must explain using related experiences. |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Is consciousness just a special type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a special way of being conscious? | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This is a really good key question, which has hovered over the debate since Locke's definition of a person (as 'self-aware'). I take the self to be a mechanism of most brains, which is prior to consciousness. Maybe the two are inseparable. |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Higher-order thought (HOT) models treat metastates as thought-like, and higher-order perception (HOP) models regard them as at least quasi-perceptual and resulting from some form of inner monitoring or inner sense. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
| A reaction: I would understand 'thought' to at least partially involve judgements. The HOT theory (Carruthers) seems to suit epistemological foundationalists, who want truth to enter on the ground floor. This pushes me towards the HOP model (Lycan) as more plausible. |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Higher-order models would effectively reduce the problem of consciousness to that of intentionality. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I) | |
| A reaction: This gives the bigger picture - that higher-order theories are the cutting edge of attempts to give a naturalistic, reductivist account of consciousness. That seems to be the only way to go, so we should encourage them in the enterprise. |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: Some higher-order theorists say we have qualitative but unconscious mental states of color or pain (qualia), but there is nothing it is like to be in such a state, which needs higher-order awareness. The meta-states are devoid of qualia. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006], §I.5) | |
| A reaction: He calls this the 'stranded qualia' problem. Clearly one begins to sharpen Ockham's Razor at this point, if the higher-level state isn't contributing something. I don't rule out unconscious qualia. The strength of a real pain is distorted in a dream. |
| 5849 | Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Rhetoric is a kind of offshoot of dialectic and of the study of ethics, and is quite properly categorized as political. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1356a25) | |
| A reaction: Aristotle gives a higher status to rhetoric than Socrates and Plato did - and rightly, in my view. We have lost sight of it as a vital part of politics, and philosophers must fight for virtue in rhetoric, which requires right reason and fine principles. |
| 4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume). | |
| From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000]) | |
| A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction. |
| 5851 | Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The pentathletes are the most beautiful, being at the same time naturally suited to both speed and force. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1361b09) | |
| A reaction: This is still true. Watch the Olympics. The bodies we envy most belong to those who do a variety of disciplines. The most beautiful music fulfils a variety of functions (structure, as well as melody, drama, rhythm, harmony, novelty). |
| 5858 | Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The body is in its prime from the ages of thirty to thirty-five, and the soul around the age of forty-nine. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390b09) | |
| A reaction: Wonderfully specific! It is important that Aristotle is interested in these questions. The good for man follows the path laid out by nature, in which a man rises to his highest good in maturity, and then declines from it into old age. |
| 5855 | We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There is something of which we all have an inkling, being a naturally universal right and wrong, even if there should be no community between the parties or contract. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1373b07) | |
| A reaction: This is the strongest assertion I know of in Aristotle of an absolute moral standard, independent of natural function. It makes Aristotle an intuitionist, and is strikingly opposed to contracts as the most basic aspect of morality. |
| 5850 | Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The elements of happiness are: gentle birth, many virtuous friends, wealth, creditable and extensive offspring, a comfortable old age; also health, beauty, strength, size and competitiveness, reputation, status, luck and the virtues. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1360b18) | |
| A reaction: This is Aristotle's pluralism, and his commitment to 'external goods' (rather than the inner good of pure virtue, which the Stoics preferred). 'Gentle birth' might turn out to mean good upbringing and education. Who was the most 'beautiful' philosopher? |
| 5856 | Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: One's own interest is a relative good, nobility a good absolutely. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1389b37) | |
| A reaction: The key idea in the whole of Greek moral theory is the concept of what we can call a 'beautiful' action. Such things, or course, tend to be visible in great actions, such as sparing an enemy, rather than the minutiae of well-mannered daily life. |
| 5853 | The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The greatest virtues must be those most useful to others. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1366b02) | |
| A reaction: I wonder if this applies to the intellectual virtues, as well as to the social virtues? Is this virtue theory's answer to utilitarianism, or utilitarianism's answer to virtue theory? Personally I think good persons are prior to benefits. |
| 5848 | All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: If one used strength, health, wealth and strategic expertise well, one might do the greatest possible good and if badly the greatest possible harm; this is a problem common to all good things, except virtue. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1355b04) | |
| A reaction: Of course, this may just be a tautology about virtue, rather than an empirical observation. However, in 'Ethics' he tries to describe a state of mind (essentially one of harmony) which could never result in misuse. |
| 5857 | The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Old men are prone to pity, but where the young are so from philanthropy, the old are so from weakness, for they think all these things are near for themselves to suffer. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1390a18) | |
| A reaction: I am shocked to find Aristotle being so cynical. I see no reason why the old should not be as philanthropic as anyone else, and they clearly are so, as when they plant trees for future generations to enjoy. |
| 5859 | Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: The character of the rich man is that of the mindlessly happy one. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1391a12) | |
| A reaction: Very nice. It is hard to deny that the rich tend to be happy (in some sense of the word), and recent sociological research has tended to demonstrate this, but the pursuit of wealth must inevitably take the focus away from key intellectual pursuits. Yeh? |
| 5852 | The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: There are four types of constitution: democracy (whose purpose is freedom), oligarchy (for wealth), aristocracy (for education and customs), and monarch or tyranny (for security). | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1365b28-37) | |
| A reaction: An aristocracy seems to be the guardians of tradition and culture (as in an English public school education). The tyranny of Hitler and Stalin did not exactly lead to security. Democracy and aristocracy are the front-runners. Compare Idea 2821. |
| 1660 | It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies and not to come to terms with them. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1367a19), quoted by Gregory Vlastos - Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher p.189 |
| 5861 | People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle] |
| Full Idea: Men take its occurring after as its occurring because. | |
| From: Aristotle (The Art of Rhetoric [c.350 BCE], 1401b30) | |
| A reaction: The Latin is 'post hoc propter hoc' - after this so because of this. It is quite a good inductive rule, but obviously open to abuse, as in legal cases, as when someone happens to acquire a lot of money just after a crime. |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |
| Full Idea: From the teleopragmatic perspective, life itself is largely an informational process. | |
| From: Robert van Gulick (Mirror Mirror - Is That All? [2006]) | |
| A reaction: From the cynical perspective a human is just 'blood and foul smell in a bag', but that may not give you whole story. The point here is that the informational view will cover both the genetic and the mental levels of human life. True but unilluminating? |