40 ideas
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| Full Idea: The pragmatist will say that truth is proper assertion, but different discourses have different standards for proper assertion. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: This remark shows that there is a pragmatic attitude towards truth behind most attempts to analyse the concept of assertion. When and why is assertion legitimate, and what motivates it? |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| Full Idea: For pragmatists there is an unseverable connection between making an assertion and claiming that it is true. ...Were we to get to a belief that is forever assertible...then we would have a true belief. There is nothing higher or better we could ask of it. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 1) | |
| A reaction: She is particularly drawing on Peirce. She says his 'ideal end of enquiry' idea is a small aspect of his view of truth, which is mainly given here. I had taken the pragmatic view of truth to be silly, but I may rethink. |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| Full Idea: If truth is what satisfies our aims in first-order assertion and inquiry (as the pragmatist says), then there is no search for an elusive property, or a metaphysical property, or a property which we cannot grasp. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: This pragmatic approach is much more persuasive than the usual caricature of pragmatic truth (Idea 19097), but I'm beginning to wonder how you distinguish an 'inquiry' (or 'assertion') from other modes of thought. Do I smell a circularity? |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| Full Idea: The role of truth is to make disagreements matter, or to make sense of wanting to resolve disagreements. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: [She cites Huw Price 2003] This suggests that the most important use of 'truth' is forensic. It is hard to make any sense of a law court without a robust sense of truth. Trial by jury, rather than some great personage, shows this value. |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| Full Idea: 'P is true' is used to emphasise p, and avoid logic problems. The pragmatists says there are plenty of other uses: the aim of assertion or deliberation, the improvement of our views, distinguishing objectivity, explaining meaning, negation, consequence... | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: Pragmatism seems to break 'true' down into its many uses, rather than having a specific theory of truth. This might be where ordinary language philosophy (how is the word 'true' used) meets pragmatism (how is the concept [true] used). |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| Full Idea: The pragmatist says 'That's so' or 'that's true' are not just 'pro-sentential', but carry with them the thought that evidence does currently speak in favour of the statement asserted, and the prediction that it will continue to speak in favour. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: This is a very nice point made by a pragmatist against the flimsy view of truth held by various deflationary views. You ought to believe what is true, and stand by what you hold to be true. |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| Full Idea: The disquotational schema entails bivalence. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n10) | |
| A reaction: A simple but interesting observation. Critics of Tarski observe that he depends on a bivalent logic. |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| Full Idea: Disquotationalism is more like a telephone directory than a theory. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2 n7) | |
| A reaction: [She cites Wilfred Sellars 1962:33] The idea is that there is a schema - 'p' is true iff p - and that all the acceptable sentences of a language can be expressed in this way, making a vast but finite list. It seems to replace 'theories'. |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| Full Idea: The point of the disquotational schema is that to say that a sentence is true is to assert it, and to assert a sentence is to say that it is true. We must then ask what it is to assert or endorse a proposition. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: [She is referring to the views of Crispin Wright] Most people would say that we assert something because we think it is true, and truth is obviously prior. Clearly if it has been asserted, that was because someone thought it was true. |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| Full Idea: We must not move seamlessly from the thought that the correspondence theory must be deflated to the thought that any theory of truth must be deflated. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 2) | |
| A reaction: This rather good essay offers the idea that Peircean pragmatic approaches to truth can meet the deflationary desires of the opponents of correspondence, without jettisoning all the crucial naturalistic connections with reality. Interesting. |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| Full Idea: Deflationist theories are not theories of truth, or theories of what truth is. ...They are theories which try to explain the role that 'true' plays in natural languages. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 3) | |
| A reaction: [She cites Dorothy Grover 2001,2002] If so, then the modern axiomatic theory of truth sounds appealing, because it tries to give a fuller and more precise account than a mere list is disquotations could possibly give. |
| 14684 | A world is 'accessible' to another iff the first is possible according to the second [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: A world w' is accessible to a consistent world w if and only if w' is possible in w. Being 'inaccessible to' or 'possible relative to' a consistent world is simply being possible according to that world, nothing more and nothing less. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: More illuminating than just saying that w can 'see' w'. Accessibility is internal to worIds. It gives some connection to why we spend time examining modal logic. There is no more important metaphysical notion than what is possible according to actuality. |
| 14669 | For metaphysics, T may be the only correct system of modal logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Insofar as modal logic is concerned exclusively with the logic of metaphysical modality, ..T may well be the one and only (strongest) correct system of (first-order) propositional logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) | |
| A reaction: This contrasts sharply with the orthodox view, that S5 (or at the very least S4) is the correct system for metaphysics. |
| 14667 | System B has not been justified as fallacy-free for reasoning on what might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Even the conventionally accepted system B, which is weaker than S5 and independent of S4, has not been adequately justified as a fallacy-free system of reasoning about what might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
| 14668 | In B it seems logically possible to have both p true and p is necessarily possibly false [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The characteristic of B has the form φ⊃□◊φ. ...Even if these axioms are necessarily true, it seems logically possible for p to be true while the proposition that p is necessarily possible is at the same time false. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro) |
| 14692 | System B implies that possibly-being-realized is an essential property of the world [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Friends of B modal logic commit themselves to the loaded claim that it is logically true that the property of possibly being realized (or being a way things might have been) is an essential property of the world. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
| A reaction: I think this 'loaded' formulation captures quite nicely the dispositional view I favour, that the possibilities of the actual world are built into the actual world, and define its nature just as much as the 'categorial' facts do. |
| 14671 | What is necessary is not always necessarily necessary, so S4 is fallacious [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: We can say of a wooden table that it would have been possible for it to have originated from some different matter, even though it is not actually possible. So what is necessary fails to be necessarily necessary, and S4 modal logic is fallacious. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] |
| 14686 | S5 modal logic ignores accessibility altogether [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: When we ignore accessibility altogether, we have finally zeroed in on S5 modal logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14691 | S5 believers say that-things-might-have-been-that-way is essential to ways things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Believers in S5 as a correct system of propositional reasoning about what might have been must claim that it is an essential property of any way things might have been that things might have been that way. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V) | |
| A reaction: Salmon is working in a view where you are probably safe to substitute 'necessary' for 'essential' without loss of meaning. |
| 14693 | The unsatisfactory counterpart-theory allows the retention of S5 [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Counterpart-theoretic modal semantics allows for the retention of S5 modal propositional logic, at a considerable cost. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], V n18) | |
| A reaction: See the other ideas in this paper by Salmon for his general attack on S5 as the appropriate system for metaphysical necessity. He favours the very modest System T. |
| 14670 | Metaphysical (alethic) modal logic concerns simple necessity and possibility (not physical, epistemic..) [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Metaphysical modal logic concerns metaphysical (or alethic) necessity and metaphysical (alethic) possibility, or necessity and possibility tout court - as opposed to such other types of modality as physical necessity, epistemic necessity etc. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], Intro n2) |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| Full Idea: If indefeasibility turns out to be something we can't sensibly aim at in a kind of inquiry, then the judgements that arise from that kind of 'inquiry' are not truth-apt. It is here that the realism/anti-realism debate resides. | |
| From: Cheryl Misak (Pragmatism and Deflationism [2007], 4) | |
| A reaction: A very interesting way of presenting the issue, one that makes the debate sound (to me) considerably more interesting than hitherto. I may start using the word 'indefeasible' rather a lot, in my chats with the anti-realist philosophical multitude. |
| 14678 | Any property is attached to anything in some possible world, so I am a radical anti-essentialist [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: By admitting possible worlds of unlimited variation and recombination, I simply abandon true metaphysical essentialism. By my lights, any property is attached to anything in some possible world or other. I am a closet radical anti-essentialist. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: Salmon includes impossible worlds within his scheme of understanding. It strikes me that this is metaphysical system which tells us nothing about how things are: it is sort of 'logical idealist'. Later he talks of 'we essentialists'. |
| 14680 | Logical possibility contains metaphysical possibility, which contains nomological possibility [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Just as nomological possibility is a special kind of metaphysical possibility, so metaphysical possibility is a special kind of logical possibility. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard view of how the three types of necessity are nested. He gives a possible counterexample in footnote 7. |
| 14690 | In the S5 account, nested modalities may be unseen, but they are still there [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The S5 theorist's miscontrual of English (in the meaning of 'possibly possible') makes nested modality unseen, but it does not make nested modality vanish. Inaccessible worlds are still worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14677 | Metaphysical necessity is said to be unrestricted necessity, true in every world whatsoever [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: It is held that it is the hallmark of metaphysical necessity is that it is completely unrestricted, the limiting case of restricted necessity, with no restrictions whatever. A proposition is necessary only if it is true in absolutely every world whatever. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: This is the standard picture which leads to the claim that S5 modal logic is appropriate for metaphysical necessity, because there are no restrictions on accessibility. Salmon raises objections to this conventional view. |
| 14679 | Bizarre identities are logically but not metaphysically possible, so metaphysical modality is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Though there is a way things logically could be according to which I am a credit card account, there is no way things metaphysically might be according to which I am a credit card account. This illustrates the restricted nature of metaphysical modality. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: His drift is that metaphyical modality is restricted, but expressing it in S5 modal logic (where all worlds see one another) makes it unrestricted, so S5 logic is wrong for metaphysics. I'm impressed by his arguments. |
| 14688 | Without impossible worlds, the unrestricted modality that is metaphysical has S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: If one confines one's sights to genuinely possible worlds, disavowing the impossible worlds, then metaphysical modality emerges as the limiting case - the 'unrestricted' modality that takes account of 'every' world - and S5 emerges as its proper logic. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: He observes that this makes metaphysical modality 'restricted' simply because you have restricted what 'all worlds' means. Could there be non-maximal worlds? Are logical and metaphysical modality coextensive? I think I like the S5 view. |
| 14685 | Metaphysical necessity is NOT truth in all (unrestricted) worlds; necessity comes first, and is restricted [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: A mythology gave us the idea that metaphysical necessity is truth in every world whatsoever, without restriction. But the notion of metaphysical modality comes first, and, like every notion of modality, it is restricted. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) |
| 14681 | Logical necessity is free of constraints, and may accommodate all of S5 logic [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: With its freedom from the constraint of metaphysical possibility, logical necessity may be construed as accommodating all the axioms and rules of S5. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: He goes on to raise problems for this simple thought. The big question: what are the limits of what is actually possible? Compare: what are the limits of what is imaginable? what are the limits of what is meaningfully sayable? |
| 14676 | Nomological necessity is expressed with intransitive relations in modal semantics [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Intransitive relations are introduced into modal semantics for the purposes of interpreting various 'real' or restricted types of modalities, such as nomological necessity. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], II) | |
| A reaction: The point here is that the (so-called) 'laws of nature' are held to change from world to world, so necessity in one could peter out in some more remote world, rather than being carried over everywhere. A very Humean view of such things. |
| 14689 | Necessity and possibility are not just necessity and possibility according to the actual world [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: The real meanings of the simple modal terms 'necessary' and 'possible' are not the same as the concepts of actual necessity and actual possibility, necessity and possibility according to the actual world. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: If you were an 'actualist' (who denies everything except the actual world) then you are unlikely to agree with this. In unrestricted possible worlds, being true in one world makes it possible in all worlds. So actual necessity is possible everywhere. |
| 14674 | Impossible worlds are also ways for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Total ways things cannot be are also 'worlds', or maximal ways for things to be. They are impossible worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: This unorthodox view doesn't sound too plausible to me. To think of a circular square as a 'way things could be' sounds pretty empty, and mere playing with words. The number 7 could be the Emperor of China? |
| 14682 | Denial of impossible worlds involves two different confusions [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: Every argument I am aware of against impossible worlds confuses ways for things to be with ways things might have been, or worse, confuses ways things cannot be with ways for things to be that cannot exist - or worse yet, commits both errors. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], III) | |
| A reaction: He is claiming that 'ways for things to be' allows impossible worlds, whereas 'ways things might have been' appears not to. (I think! Read the paragraph yourself!) |
| 14687 | Without impossible worlds, how things might have been is the only way for things to be [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: If one ignores impossible worlds, then ways things might have been are the only ways for things to be that are left. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: Impossible worlds are included in 'ways for things to be', but excluded from 'ways things might have been'. I struggle with a circle being square as a 'way for circles to be'. I suppose being the greatest philosopher is a way for me to be. |
| 14683 | Possible worlds rely on what might have been, so they can' be used to define or analyse modality [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: On my conception, the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility are not defined or analyzed in terms of the apparatus of possible worlds. The order of analysis is just the reverse: possible worlds rely on the notion of what might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], IV) | |
| A reaction: This view seems to be becoming the new orthodoxy, and I certainly agree with it. I have no idea how you can begin to talk about possible worlds if you don't already have some idea of what 'possible' means. |
| 14672 | Possible worlds are maximal abstract ways that things might have been [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: I conceive of possible worlds as certain sorts of maximal abstract entities according to which certain things (facts, states of affairs) obtain and certain other things do not obtain. They are total ways things might have been. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) |
| 14675 | Possible worlds just have to be 'maximal', but they don't have to be consistent [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: As far as I can tell, worlds need not be logically consistent. The only restriction on worlds is that they must be (in some sense) 'maximal' ways for things to be. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I) | |
| A reaction: The normal idea of a maximal model is that it must contain either p or ¬p, and not both, so I don't think I understand this thought, but I pass it on. |
| 14673 | You can't define worlds as sets of propositions, and then define propositions using worlds [Salmon,N] |
| Full Idea: It is not a good idea to think of possible worlds as sets of propositions, and at the same time to think of propositions as sets of possible worlds. | |
| From: Nathan Salmon (The Logic of What Might Have Been [1989], I n3) | |
| A reaction: Salmon favours thinking of worlds as sets of propositions, and hence rejects the account of propositions as sets of worlds. He favours the 'Russellian' view of propositions, which seem to me to be the same as 'facts'. |
| 4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume). | |
| From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000]) | |
| A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction. |