Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Comment on Armstrong and Forrest' and 'Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts'

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4 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals

15453	The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The leading rivals to a theory of universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.110)
	A reaction: If that is the complete menu, I choose resemblance nominalism. All discussion of properties in terms of classes is wildly misguided (because properties come first). Why not 'natural' tropes?

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object

15452	We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis]
	Full Idea: We could not, without structures, uphold the principle that every truth has a truthmaker. If Fa is true, the truthmaker is not F, not a, nor both together; not their mereological sum; not a set-theoretic construction. These would exist just the same.
	From: David Lewis (Comment on Armstrong and Forrest [1986], p.109)
	A reaction: This point ought to trouble Lewis, as well as Armstrong and Forrest. If we assert 'Fa', we must (in any theory) have some idea of what unites them, as well as of their separate existence. It must a fact about 'a', not a fact about 'F'.

18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files

16369	There is a single file per object, memorised, reactivated, consolidated and expanded [Papineau, by Recanati]
	Full Idea: For Papineau there is just one file, which is initialised on the first encounter with the object, stored in memory, reactivated on further encounters, and consolidated with familiarity. Accumulation of information shows it is the same file.
	From: report of David Papineau (Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts [2006]) by François Recanati - Mental Files 7.2
	A reaction: Recanati attempts to refute this view, defending a more complex taxonomy of files. I'm sympathetic to Papineau, as distinct shift in file type doesn't sound very plausible. Simplicity suggests Papineau as a better starting-point.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

4316	Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
	From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
	A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.