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All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Many, but almost one' and 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic

15538	Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about) [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Semantic indecision will suffice to explain the phenomenon of vagueness. [note] Provided that there exist the many precisifications for us to be undecided between. If you deny this, you will indeed have need of vague objects.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'Two solutions')
	A reaction: [He mentions Van Inwagen 1990:213-83] There seem to be three solutions to vague objects: that they really are vague, that they are precise but we can't know precisely, or Lewis's view. I like Lewis's view. Do animals have any problem with vagueness?

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail

15537	If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many [Lewis]
	Full Idea: To deny that there are many cats on the mat (because removal of a few hairs seems to produce a new one), we must either deny that the many are cats, or else deny that the cats are many. ...I think both alternatives lead to successful solutions.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The paradox')
	A reaction: He credits the problem to Geach (and Tibbles), and says it is the same as Unger's 'problem of the many' (Idea 15536).

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects

15536	We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: Many surfaces are equally good candidates to be boundaries of a cloud; therefore many aggregates of droplets are equally good candidates to be the cloud. How is it that we have just one cloud? And yet we do. This is Unger's (1980) 'problem of the many'.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'The problem')
	A reaction: This is the problem of vague objects, as opposed to the problem of vague predicates, or the problem of vague truths, or the problem of vague prepositions (like 'towards').

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities

7401	Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
	Full Idea: Galileo argued that there is no such thing as heat (and hence also as colour) in the external world, so there is no reason to conclude from colour-blindness that we cannot know the truth about the world.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Richard Tuck - Hobbes Ch.1
	A reaction: This key idea, taken up by Gassendi, Descartes and Locke, seems to me to be one of the most important (and, in retrospect, rather obvious) facts ever worked out by the human mind. Why does anyone still doubt it?

5454	Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
	Full Idea: I think tastes, odours, colours, and so on are mere names as far as the objects are concerned, and only reside in consciousness. Hence if the living creature were removed, all these qualities would be wiped away and annihilated.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]), quoted by Brian Ellis - The Philosophy of Nature: new essentialism Ch.3
	A reaction: A nice bold assertion of the primary/secondary distinction from the first great scientist. I agree, and to disagree (and hence side with Berkeley and Hume) is to head for metaphsical and epistemological confusion.

14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism

16560	Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
	Full Idea: The modern idea of explaining with mechanisms became current in the 17th century when Galileo articulated a geometrico-mechanical form of explanation based on Archimedes' simple machines. This became the 'mechanical philosophy'.
	From: report of Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623]) by Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C - Thinking About Mechanisms 5.2
	A reaction: So is Archimedes the source? I would say that mechanical explanation is just commonsense, and is predominant in all human thinking, even in tiny infants.

19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity

15539	Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it [Lewis]
	Full Idea: The cardinal principle of pragmatics is that the right way to take what is said, if at all possible, is the way that makes sense of the message.
	From: David Lewis (Many, but almost one [1993], 'A better solution')
	A reaction: Thus when someone misuses a word, suggesting nonsense, we gloss over it, often without even mentioning it, because the underlying sense is obvious. A good argument for the existence of propositions. Lewis doesn't mention truth.

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

4316	Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
	From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
	A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature

3645	To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]
	Full Idea: The great book of the universe cannot be understood unless one can understand the language in which it is written - the language of mathematics.
	From: Galileo Galilei (Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer') [1623], VI.232)
	A reaction: Nice, though one might say that humans created the language of maths to help them discuss the patterns they perceived in nature. Maybe what is special is order, and all order can be described mathematically.