38 ideas
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: We know too much about thought and behaviour to trust exact and universal statements linking them. Beliefs and desires issue in behaviour only as modified and mediated by further beliefs and desires, attitudes and attendings, without limit. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], p.217) | |
| A reaction: Now seen as a key objection to behaviourism, and rightly so. However, I am not sure about "without limit", which implies an implausible absolute metaphysical freedom. Davidson goes too far in denying any nomological link between thought and brain. |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| Full Idea: Davidson rejects ontological reduction of mental to physical because propositional attitudes are holistic; there must be extensive coherence among someone's attitudes to treat them as a rational person, and this has no counterpart in physical theory. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.5 | |
| A reaction: I don't find this view persuasive. We treat the weather in simple terms, even though it is almost infinitely complex. Davidson has a Kantian overconfidence in our rationality. A coherence among the parts is needed to be a tree. |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says no more about the relationship between the mental and the physical than the claim that all objects with a colour have a shape says about the relationship between colours and shapes. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §1 p.005 | |
| A reaction: Indeed, I find the enthusiasm for property dualism etc. quite baffling, given that we are merely told that mind is 'an anomaly'. I take it to be old fashioned dualism in trendy clothes. |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| Full Idea: For Davidson, mental types are individuated by considerations that are nonscientific, distinctly humanistic, and part normative, so will not coincide with any types that are designated in scientific terms. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by William Lycan - Introduction - Ontology p.8 | |
| A reaction: I just don't believe this, mainly because I don't accept that there is a category called 'nonscientific'. All we are saying is that a brain is a hugely complicated object, and we don't properly understand its operations, though we relate to it very well. |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's anomalous monism says that events are causes, so we can identify mental and physical events without having to identify their properties. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Tim Crane - Elements of Mind 2.18 | |
| A reaction: As Fodor insists, a thing like a mountain has properties at different levels of description. We can have 'property dualism' and full-blown reductive identity. |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Davidson takes mental anomalism (that the mind exhibits normativity and rationality), and in particular his claim that there are no laws connecting mental and physical properties, to undermine mind-body reductionism. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Mind in a Physical World §4 p.092 | |
| A reaction: A nice summary of the core idea of property dualism. Personally I expect the whole lot to be reducible, and to follow laws, but the sheer complexity of the brain permanently bars us from actually doing the reduction. |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's thesis is that if mental events of a particular kind cause physical events of a particular kind, and the two kinds are connected by a law, then they must both be physical kinds. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.137 | |
| A reaction: Davidson would pretty obviously be right. The whole problem here is the idea of a 'law'. You can only have strict law for simple entities, like particles and natural kinds. The brain is a mess, like weather or explosions. |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Since no laws exist connecting mental and physical properties, purely physical laws must do the causal work, which means mental events enter into causal relations only because they possess physical properties that figure in laws. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.138 | |
| A reaction: Surely no such laws exist 'yet'? I can see no plausible argument that psycho-physical laws are impossible. However, the conclusion of this remark seems right. Interaction requires some sort of equality. |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| Full Idea: The supervenience [of mental characteristics on the physical] might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or an object cannot differ mentally without altering physically. | |
| From: Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970], I) | |
| A reaction: This is the first occasion on which Davidson introduced his notion of supervenience. Supervenience is often taken to be one-way. The first implies physical causing mental; his second implies that mental causes physical. |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's version of the identity theory is couched in terms of events rather than states, because he regards causation as a relation between events. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by E.J. Lowe - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Ch.2 n12 | |
| A reaction: I think it may be more to the point that the mind is a dynamic thing, and so it consists of events rather than states, and hence we want to know what those events are made up from. I think my chair is causing me to rest above the floor… |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| Full Idea: Davidson's argument about psychophysical anomalism has not been embraced by everyone; multiple realisability of mental properties has had a much greater impact in undermining reductionism (and hence type physicalism). | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Jaegwon Kim - Philosophy of Mind p.218 | |
| A reaction: My view is that functional states are multiply realisable, but phenomenal states aren't. Fear functions in frogs much as it does in us, but being a frightened frog is nothing like being a frightened human. Their brains are different! |
| 4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume). | |
| From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000]) | |
| A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction. |
| 20547 | We should respect the right of people to live in their own way, even if it is irrational [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Forcing people to do what is rational involves a lack of respect, a failure to respect the value of her living her life in her own (irrational) way. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Resisting' 6) | |
| A reaction: Up to a point. Irrationally eccentric is one thing, and irrationally self-destructive is another. You can sit back and watch your children embrace a life less happy than the one you wanted for them - but not a life of utter misery. |
| 20564 | Anti-colonial movements usually invoke the right of their 'people' to self-determination [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Nationalist movements seeking to throw off the yoke of colonial rule are often motivated by a sense that their 'people' have the right to self-determination. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Intrinsic 1') | |
| A reaction: In 2017, Basques, Catalans and Kurds come to mind. The whole of Africa was an example of this c.1950-80, but there was uncertainty about states, tribes and language groups. |
| 20535 | Isn't it more rational to maximise the average position, but with a safety net? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Wouldn't it be more rational to choose principles that would maximize the average position, perhaps subject to some 'floor' level beneath which they would not want to take the risk of sinking? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: The criticism is that Rawls's prediction is over-cautious, and that people will take mild risks in what they choose, as long as there is no danger of disaster. (Just as you should allow small children to risk injury, but not death). |
| 20537 | Hypothetical contracts have no binding force [Swift] |
| Full Idea: A common objection to Rawls is that hypothetical contracts, unlike real ones, have no binding force. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: [I think Dworkin made this point] 'Contract' may be metaphorical. Perhaps it is just an 'initial agreement' or a 'working arrangement', |
| 20542 | Cosmopolitans reject the right of different states to distribute resources in different ways [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Cosmopolitans who claim that the same distributive principles should apply to all human beings seem to be denying that different states may make different judgements about how they want to allocate resources among their members. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Social') | |
| A reaction: If you want to be a citizen of the world, you have to face up to the pluralistic character of cultures. Do you thereby want to be a citizen of both California and Saudi Arabia? Or are you actually just becoming a citizen of nowhere? |
| 20559 | Democracy is bad, but the other systems are worse [Swift] |
| Full Idea: During WW2 Winston Churchill famously said that democracy is the worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
| A reaction: [Actually a speech in 1947, which began 'it has been said that....'] Aristotle thought an intelligent and benevolent dictatorship was the best form, but held little hope of achieving it. Getting rid of bad rulers is the big virtue. |
| 20561 | Since all opinions are treated as equal in democracy, it implies there are no right answers [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If there were moral knowledge about political matters, democracy would be a very strange way of reaching it. Democratic law-making means treating each person's view as equally good, which only makes sense if there is nothing to be right or wrong about. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Subjectivism') | |
| A reaction: Ah, I suddenly grasp that the modern fad for a rather gormless blanket relativism is rooted in the modern desire to take democracy really seriously. Important to remember Condorcet's point here. |
| 20562 | Design your democracy to treat citizens equally, or to produce better citizens? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If your main reason for being a democrat is that democratic procedures respect citizens equally, then you may want a different kind of democracy from those who favour it because they think it tends to produce better citizens? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
| A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20563] |
| 20563 | Design your democracy to yield political stability, or good decisions? [Swift] |
| Full Idea: If you value democracy because it yields political stability, then you will probably worry about different aspects of the procedure from those who care about its producing good decisions. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Values') | |
| A reaction: [Combine this with Idea 20562] Surely the primary aim must be good decisions? The other three options are the result of pessimism about any method achieving that. Instability, inequality and dud citizens are bars to good decisions. |
| 20560 | Teledemocracy omits debate and deliberation, which are important parts of good decisions [Swift] |
| Full Idea: We are averse to teledemocracy because it misses out some important parts of a good decision-making procedure, such as debate and deliberation. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 5 'Procedures') | |
| A reaction: Perhaps you should be sent a short info pack, and only allowed to vote when you have passed a factual multiple choice test about the topic. Or one pack from each political party. Maybe compulsory online discussion as well. |
| 20554 | Multiculturalism is a barrier to the whole state being a community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: For those wanting to regard the state itself as a community, multiculturalism can be a problem. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
| A reaction: A very important idea. A certain type of aggressive patriot passionately wants the whole country to be a close-bound community, and becomes deeply frustrated by the impossibility of this in a complex and fluid modern world. |
| 20553 | Liberals mistakenly think individuals choose their values, without reference to the community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The two core liberal mistakes (according to communitarians) are that people choose their values, and that they do so in some way detached from their communities. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Correcting') | |
| A reaction: I think I might be a communitarian liberal, meaning that extreme individualism is both incorrect and pernicious, but that communities should only exist to promote the varied lives of individuals within them. |
| 20556 | The best way to build a cohesive community is to be involved in a war [Swift] |
| Full Idea: There is nothing like a war to build a sense of common purpose, of being in the same boat, and to generate the kind of interaction between people that breaks down divisive social boundaries. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014]) | |
| A reaction: A nice warning to those who over-do or simplify communitarianism. Alternatively, the greatest sign of health in a community is that citizens have almost no interest in one another? |
| 20557 | Membership and inclusion in a community implies non-membership and exclusion [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Community is about membership and inclusion. But that means it is also about non-membership and exclusion. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Conc') | |
| A reaction: I'm a fan of communitarianism (focused on Aristotle's life of individual virtue for each citizen), but I'm beginning to see that it has a poisonous cousin travelling under the same name. The cousin's rallying cries focus on aliens and enemies. |
| 20555 | Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Liberals are concerned to protect individuals from too much community - from practices that stifle the individual's freedom to choose for herself how she lives her life. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 4 'Liberalism') | |
| A reaction: The phrase 'too much community' is an excellent warning to communitarians. I'm happy to be enmeshed in a community, as long as it is composed of highly liberal and easy-going individuals. Avoid too much bad community. |
| 20540 | Redistributing wealth treats some people as means, rather than as ends [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Treating people as means seems like a fairly accurate description of what is involved when the state coercively redistributes resources from some to others. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: The objection comes from Nozick, and alludes to Kant's desire to treat everyone as an end in themselves. Personally I don't mind at all being treated as a means, when my wife asks me to make her a cup of tea. Or paying my taxes to help the community. |
| 20551 | Men have had the power to structure all of our social institutions [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The problem for feminists is that men have had the power to structure all our social institutions - family, economy, polity - in ways that suit them. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Gender') | |
| A reaction: An interesting question is whether masculine domination runs even deeper than that, into our value system, our metaphysics, our science, our epistemology, our language. How do you tell? If women take over half the masculine roles, does that solve it? |
| 20545 | Maybe a freedom is from a restraint, and also in order to do something [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Maybe freedom is a triadic relation, involving an agent, freedom from a contraint, and in order to act towards some goal. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Two') | |
| A reaction: [He cites Gerald MacCallum for this thought] The point is that this makes freedom both negative and positive, contrary to Isaiah Berlin's claim. But on the first day of the school holidays you are 'free', with nothing in particular in mind. |
| 20550 | Opportunity should ignore extraneous factors, or foster competence, or ignore all disadvantages [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The minimal conception of equality of opportunity is that race or gender or religion should not affect chances of a good job or education. The conventional conception needs equality in acquiring competences. Radical views ignore inborn disadvantages. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Equality') | |
| A reaction: [my summary of Swift] The strong version only says the less talented should have access to large rewards. The whole idea has strong capitalist assumptions. |
| 20536 | Inequalities are needed, as incentives to do the most important jobs [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Without inequalities, people will have no incentive to do one job rather than another - to do the kind of work which is most useful. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Rawls') | |
| A reaction: The reality is that the lowest pay goes to the jobs that no one wants to do, and all the really nice jobs are usually well paid. Which is a conspiracy, because all the salaries are set by the people with the nice jobs. |
| 20548 | A person can desire redistibution of wealth, without it being for reasons of equality [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Someone who rejects equality can care passionately that resources should be transferred from the rich to the poor. They are just rejecting a particular reason that might be offered to justify the redistribution. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 3 'Intro') | |
| A reaction: For example, it might be for utilitarian reasons, which usually only seek maximised happiness, not equal happiness. And one may love many forms of equality, without economic equality being one of them. |
| 20541 | You can't necessarily sell your legitimate right to something, even if you produced it [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Ownership is a complicated idea. I have a right to the office photocopier, but I can's sell the right to others. If people have absolute rights over what they produce, why can't parents sell their children into slavery? | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Nozick') | |
| A reaction: If I make a car from stolen parts, does constructing it make it mine? Etc. Do birds own their nests? Swift goes on to ask if we 'own' our bodies. |
| 20546 | Libertarians about property ignore the fact that private property is a denial of freedoms [Swift] |
| Full Idea: Libertarians say that they care about freedom, and argue for private property rights on freedom grounds. But they don't sem to care about, or even notice, the unfreedom implied by the existence of private property rights. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 2 'Freedom') | |
| A reaction: When I pass some vast country estate totally surrounded by a high wall, I certainly don't think how wonderful it is that someone has the right to own this property as private land. On the contrary.... |
| 20533 | Justice can be seen as fairness or entitlement or desert [Swift] |
| Full Idea: The three influential conceptions of justice are as fairness (Rawls), as entitlement (Nozick), and as desert. | |
| From: Adam Swift (Political Philosophy (3rd ed) [2014], 1 'Concept') |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| Full Idea: According to Davidson analyses of causality proceed at two different levels: at the lower level it holds between events regardless of how they are described; higher level explanations hold between descriptions of events, which pick out properties. | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4 |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| Full Idea: Davidson says causal explanations hold between descriptions of events and not between the events themselves, so the possibility of events as explanations depends on how they are described (e.g. a wind collapsing a bridge). | |
| From: report of Donald Davidson (Mental Events [1970]) by Keith T. Maslin - Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind 7.4 |