Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism' and 'The iterative conception of Set'

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3 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
18192 Do the Replacement Axioms exceed the iterative conception of sets? [Boolos, by Maddy]
     Full Idea: For Boolos, the Replacement Axioms go beyond the iterative conception.
     From: report of George Boolos (The iterative conception of Set [1971]) by Penelope Maddy - Naturalism in Mathematics I.3
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
17619 We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine]
     Full Idea: We do not believe in abstract entities..... We renounce them altogether.
     From: Goodman,N/Quine,W (Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism [1947], p.105), quoted by Penelope Maddy - Defending the Axioms
     A reaction: Goodman always kept the faith here, but Quine decided to embrace sets, as a minimal commitment to abstracta needed for mathematics, which was needed for science. My sympathies are with Goodman. This is the modern form of 'nominalism'.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
     From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
     A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.