Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Teplitz Fragments' and 'Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic'

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4 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
13639 Quine says higher-order items are intensional, and lack a clearly defined identity relation [Quine, by Shapiro]
     Full Idea: Quine (in 1941) attacked 'Principia Mathematica' because the items in the range of higher-order variables (attributes etc) are intensional and thus do not have a clearly defined identity relation.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic [1941]) by Stewart Shapiro - Foundations without Foundationalism 1.3
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21557 Russell confused use and mention, and reduced classes to properties, not to language [Quine, by Lackey]
     Full Idea: Quine (1941) said that Russell had confused use and mention, and thus thought he had reduced classes to linguistic entities, while in fact he reduced them only to Platonic properties.
     From: report of Willard Quine (Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic [1941]) by Douglas Lackey - Intros to Russell's 'Essays in Analysis' p.133
     A reaction: This is cited as the 'orthodox critical interpretation' of Russell and Whitehead. Confusion of use and mention was a favourite charge of Quine's.
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
19590 Empiricists are passive thinkers, given their philosophy by the external world and fate [Novalis]
     Full Idea: An empiricist is one whose way of thinking is an effect of the external world and of fate - the passive thinker - to whom his philosophy is given.
     From: Novalis (Teplitz Fragments [1798], 33)
     A reaction: Novalis goes on to enthuse about 'magical idealism', so he rejects empiricism. This is an early attack on the Myth of the Given, found in Sellars and McDowell.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
4316 Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
     Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
     From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
     A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.