Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Reason, Emotions and Good Life', 'Particulars in Particular Clothing' and 'On Sufficient Reason'

unexpand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

---

4 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 1. Laws of Thought

19404	Necessities rest on contradiction, and contingencies on sufficient reason [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: The principle of contradiction is the principle of necessity, and the principle that a sufficient reason must be given is the principle of contingency.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: [this paragraph is actually undated] Contradictions occur in concrete actuality, as well as in theories and formal systems. If so, then there are necessities in nature. Are they discoverable a posteriori? Leibniz says not.

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes

18431	Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
	Full Idea: Simons's 'nuclear' option blends features of the substratum and bundle theories. First we have tropes collected by virtue of their internal relations, forming the essential kernel or nucleus. This nucleus then bears the non-essential tropes.
	From: report of Peter Simons (Particulars in Particular Clothing [1994], p.567) by Douglas Edwards - Properties 3.5
	A reaction: [compression of Edwards's summary] This strikes me as being a remarkably good theory. I am not sure of the ontological status of properties, such that they can (unaided) combine to make part of an object. What binds the non-essentials?

20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason

4316	Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume).
	From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000])
	A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction.

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws

19403	Each of the infinite possible worlds has its own laws, and the individuals contain those laws [Leibniz]
	Full Idea: As there are an infinity of possible worlds, there are also an infinity of laws, some proper to one, another to another, and each possible individual of any world contains in its own notion the laws of its world.
	From: Gottfried Leibniz (On Sufficient Reason [1686], p.95)
	A reaction: Hence Leibniz is not really a scientific essentialist, in that he doesn't think the laws arise out of the nature of the matter consituting the world. I wonder if the primitive matter of bodies which attaches to the monads is the same in each world?