10 ideas
| 335 | Do the gods also hold different opinions about what is right and honourable? [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Do the gods too hold different opinions about what is right, and similarly about what is honourable and dishonourable, good and bad? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.389 BCE], 07e) |
| 5952 | Rather than being the whole soul, maybe I am its chief part? [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Is each of us not the soul, but the chief part of the soul, by which we think and reason and act, all the other parts of soul as well as of body being mere instruments of its power? | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1119) | |
| A reaction: Socrates is associated with the idea that I am my whole soul (Idea 1650). Plutarch represents an interesting development, which may lead both to the Christian 'soul' and to the Cartesian 'ego'. I think Plutarch is right, but what is the 'soul'? |
| 5951 | If atoms have no qualities, they cannot possibly produce a mind [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: Perception, mind, intelligence and thought cannot so much as be conceived, even with the best will, as arising among void and atoms, things which taken separately have no quality. | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1112) | |
| A reaction: A nice articulation of the intuition of all anti-physicalists. Plutarch would have to rethink his position carefully if he learned of the sheer number of connections in the brain, and of the theory of natural selection. His challenge remains, though. |
| 20796 | Action needs an affinity for a presentation, and an impulse toward the affinity [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: The sceptics say there are three movements of the soul: presentation, impulse and assent. …And action requires two things: a presentation of something to which one has an affinity, and an impulse toward what is presented as an object of affinity. | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], 1122c) | |
| A reaction: Not much reasoning involved in this account, which the sceptics say is compatible with suspension of judgement. |
| 4316 | Either all action is rational, or reason dominates, or reason is only concerned with means [Cottingham] |
| Full Idea: We can distinguish rational exclusivism (all activity is guided by reason - Plato and Spinoza), rational hegemonism (all action is dominated by reason), and rational instrumentalism (reason assesses means rather than ends - Hume). | |
| From: John Cottingham (Reason, Emotions and Good Life [2000]) | |
| A reaction: The idea that reason is the only cause of actions seems deeply implausible, but I strongly resist Hume's instrumental approach. Action without desire is not a contradiction. |
| 5948 | The good life involves social participation, loyalty, temperance and honesty [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: To live the good life is to live a life of participation in society, of loyalty to friends, of temperance and honest dealing. | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1108) | |
| A reaction: 'Participation in society' is the interesting one. This might translate as 'doing your duty', or as 'leading a well-rounded life'. Solitude is wrong if you are indebted to others, and it is unhealthy if you are not. Is solitude really immoral, though? |
| 5950 | If only atoms exist, how do qualities arise when the atoms come together? [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: If you accept atomism, you must show how bodies without quality have given rise to qualities of every kind by the mere fact of coming together. For example, how has the quality called 'hot' been imposed on the atoms? | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1111) | |
| A reaction: This argument is still significant in current philosophy of mind. If temperature is 'mean kinetic energy', you are left wondering where the energy came from, and why minds experience the heat. This is the 'Hard Question'. |
| 336 | Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? (the 'Euthyphro Question') [Plato] |
| Full Idea: Is what is pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it? | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.389 BCE], 10a) | |
| A reaction: The famous Euthyphro Question, the key question about the supposed religious basis of morality. The answer of Socrates is Idea 337. |
| 337 | It seems that the gods love things because they are pious, rather than making them pious by loving them [Plato] |
| Full Idea: So things are loved by the gods because they are pious, and not pious because they are loved? It seems so. | |
| From: Plato (Euthyphro [c.389 BCE], 10e) | |
| A reaction: Socrates' answer to the Euthyphro Question (see Idea 336). The form of piety precedes the gods. |
| 5955 | No one will ever find a city that lacks religious practices [Plutarch] |
| Full Idea: A city without holy places and gods, without any observance of prayers, oaths, oracles, sacrifices for blessings received or rites to avert evils, no traveller has ever seen or will ever see. | |
| From: Plutarch (74: Reply to Colotes [c.85], §1125) | |
| A reaction: The nearest you might get would be Soviet Moscow, but in 1973 I saw a man there jeering at a woman who was kneeling in the street outside a closed church. Plutarch would be stunned at the decline in religious practices in modern Europe. |