15 ideas
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
Full Idea: A model of a language assigns values to non-logical terms. If a sentence is true in every model, its truth doesn't depend on those non-logical terms. Hence the validity of an argument comes from its logical form. Thus models explain logical validity. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: [compressed] Thus you get a rigorous account of logical validity by only allowing the rigorous input of model theory. This is the modern strategy of analytic philosophy. But is 'it's red so it's coloured' logically valid? |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
Full Idea: Natural language includes connectives that are not truth-functional. In order for 'p because q' to be true, both p and q have to be true, but knowing the simpler sentences are true doesn't determine whether the larger sentence is true. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 2) |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
Full Idea: To get any advantage from moving to second-order logic, we need to assign to second-order variables a role different from merely ranging over collections made up of things the first-order variables range over. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 7) | |
A reaction: Thus it is exciting if they range over genuine properties, but not so exciting if you merely characterise those properties as sets of first-order objects. This idea leads into a discussion of plural quantification. |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
Full Idea: We can get a less ontologically perilous presentation of the semantics of the predicate calculus by using sets instead of concepts. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: The perilous versions rely on Fregean concepts, and notably Russell's 'concept that does not fall under itself'. The sets, of course, have to be ontologically secure, and so will involve the iterative conception, rather than naive set theory. |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
Full Idea: Logically valid sentences are a species of analytic sentence, being true not just in virtue of the meanings of their words, but true in virtue of the meanings of their logical words. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 4) | |
A reaction: A helpful link between logical truths and analytic truths, which had not struck me before. |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
Full Idea: Soundness theorems are seldom very informative, since typically we use informally, in proving the theorem, the very same rules whose soundness we are attempting to establish. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 5) | |
A reaction: [He cites Quine 1935] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
Full Idea: One of the culminating achievements of Euclidean geometry was categorical axiomatisations, that describe the geometric structure so completely that any two models of the axioms are isomorphic. The axioms are second-order. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 7) | |
A reaction: [He cites Veblen 1904 and Hilbert 1903] For most mathematicians, categorical axiomatisation is the best you can ever dream of (rather than a single true axiomatisation). |
16661 | There are two sorts of category - referring to things, and to circumstances of things [Boethius] |
Full Idea: Is it not now clear what the difference is between items in the categories? Some serve to refer to a thing, whereas others serve to refer to the circumstances of a thing. | |
From: Boethius (Concerning the Trinity [c.518], Ch. 4), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 12.5 |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique' | |
A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it. |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts' | |
A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious. |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |
Full Idea: If our linguistic conventions entitle us to assert a sentence, they thereby make it true, because of the maxim that 'truth is the norm of assertion'. | |
From: Vann McGee (Logical Consequence [2014], 8) | |
A reaction: You could only really deny that maxim if you had no belief at all in truth, but then you can assert anything you like (with full entitlement). Maybe you can assert anything you like as long as it doesn't upset anyone? Etc. |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct' | |
A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character. |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me. |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power. |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals' | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts. |