3 ideas
8886 | Being a true justified belief is not a sufficient condition for knowledge [Gettier] |
Full Idea: The claim that someone knows a proposition if it is true, it is believed, and the person is justified in their belief is false, in that the conditions do not state a sufficient condition for the claim. | |
From: Edmund L. Gettier (Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? [1963], p.145) | |
A reaction: This is the beginning of the famous Gettier Problem, which has motivated most epistemology for the last forty years. Gettier implies that justification is necessary, even if it is not sufficient. He gives two counterexamples. |
8478 | Dewey argued long before Wittgenstein that there could not seriously be a private language [Dewey, by Orenstein] |
Full Idea: Dewey argued in the twenties that there could not be, in any serious sense, a private language. Wittgenstein also, years later, came to appreciate this point. | |
From: report of John Dewey (works [1926]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.6 | |
A reaction: A nice historical footnote to perhaps the most famous argument in twentieth century philosophy. Can anyone send me the Dewey reference? |
17993 | Laws are relations of kinds, quantities and qualities, supervening on the essences of a domain [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The laws of a domain are the fundamental, general explanatory relationships between kinds, quantities, and qualities of that domain, that supervene upon the essential natures of those things. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Dispositional Essentialism and the Laws of Nature [2012], 9.3) | |
A reaction: Hm. How small can the domain be? Can it embrace the multiverse? Supervenience is a rather weak relationship. How about 'are necessitated/entailed by'? Are the relationships supposed to do the explaining? I would have thought the natures did that. |