18 ideas
12036 | Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas] |
Full Idea: Xenophanes begins a long concern with knowledge and its grounds. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Intro) | |
A reaction: Having that on his cv ought to make Xenophanes more famous than he is. |
12046 | Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas] |
Full Idea: In the ancient world Plato was seen as a pivotal figure, the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.6) |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique' | |
A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it. |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts' | |
A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious. |
5078 | Kant and Mill both try to explain right and wrong, without a divine lawgiver [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: Kant and Mill were in total agreement in trying to give content to the distinction between moral right and wrong, without recourse to any divine lawgiver. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.14) | |
A reaction: A nice analysis, in tune with MacIntyre and others, who see such attempts as failures. It is hard, however, to deny the claims of rational principles, or of suffering, in our moral framework. I agree with Taylor's move back to virtue, but it ain't simple. |
5067 | Morality based on 'forbid', 'permit' and 'require' implies someone who does these things [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: If morality is based on wrong (meaning 'forbidden'), right ('permitted'), and obligatory ('required'), we are led to ask 'Who is it that thus permits, forbids or requires that certain things be done or not done?' | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: Clear reinforcement for Nietzsche's attack on conventional morals, which Taylor sees as a relic of medieval religious attitudes. Taylor says Kant offered a non-religious version of the same authority. I agree. Back to the Greek pursuit of excellence! |
12037 | Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas] |
Full Idea: Euripides's Medea has remained a key case for discussion of reason and the passions. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.1) |
5079 | Pleasure can have a location, and be momentary, and come and go - but happiness can't [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: Pleasures can be located in a particular part of the body, and can be momentary, and come and go, but this is not the case with happiness. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.16) | |
A reaction: Probably no one ever thought that pleasure and happiness were actually identical - merely that pleasure is the only cause and source of happiness. These are good objections to that hypothesis. Pleasure simply isn't 'the good'. |
5068 | 'Eudaimonia' means 'having a good demon', implying supreme good fortune [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: The word 'eudaimonia' means literally 'having a good demon', which is apt, because it suggests some kind of supreme good fortune, of the sort which might be thought of as a bestowal. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.5) | |
A reaction: Beware of etymology. This implies that eudaimonia is almost entirely beyond a person's control, but Aristotle doesn't think that. A combination of education and effort can build on some natural gifts to create a fully successful life. |
12040 | Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas] |
Full Idea: There is a widespread view in ancient ethics that virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value. | |
From: Julia Annas (Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction [2000], Ch.3) | |
A reaction: In Aristotle's case, this coincides with his apparent view that 'understanding' is the aim of all areas of human thought. See Idea 12038. |
5076 | To Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: To the Greeks it seemed obvious that the virtue of anything is the perfection of its function. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.10) | |
A reaction: A problem case might be a work of art, but one might reply that there is no obvious perfection there because there is no clear function. For artefacts and organisms the principle seems very good. But 'Is the Cosmos good?' |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct' | |
A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character. |
5077 | The modern idea of obligation seems to have lost the idea of an obligation 'to' something [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: In modern moral thinking, obligation is something every responsible person is supposed to have, but it is not an obligation to the state, or society, or humanity, or even to God. It is an obligation standing by itself. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.12) | |
A reaction: This nicely pinpoints how some our moral attitudes are relics of religion. Taylor wants a return to virtue, but one could respond by opting for the social contract (with very clear obligations) or Kantian 'contractualism' (answering to rational beings). |
5066 | If we are made in God's image, pursuit of excellence is replaced by duty to obey God [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: Once people are declared to be images of God, just by virtue of minimal humanity, they have, therefore, no greater individual excellence to aspire to, and their purpose became one of obligation, that is, obedience to God's will. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: An interesting and plausible historical analysis. There is a second motivation for the change, though, in Grotius's desire to develop a more legalistic morality, focusing on actions rather than character. Taylor's point is more interesting, though. |
5065 | The ethics of duty requires a religious framework [Taylor,R] |
Full Idea: The ethics of duty cannot be sustained independently of a religious framework. | |
From: Richard Taylor (Virtue Ethics: an Introduction [2002], Ch.2) | |
A reaction: This is a big challenge to Kant, echoing Nietzsche's jibe that Kant just wanted to be 'obedient'. The only options are either 'natural duties', or 'duties of reason'. Reason may have a pull (like pleasure), but a 'duty'? Difficult. |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me. |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power. |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals' | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts. |