17 ideas
23548 | Indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: I now believe that the existence of indeterminacy is in conflict with classical logic. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: I think that prior to this Fine had defended classical logic. Presumably the difficulty is over Bivalence. Nietzsche spotted this problem, despite not being a logician. Logic has to simplify the world. Hence philosophy is quite different from logic. |
23539 | Classical semantics has referents for names, extensions for predicates, and T or F for sentences [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: A precise language is often assigned a classical semantics, in which the semantic value of a name is its referent, the semantic value of a predicate is its extension (the objects of which it is true), and the value of a sentence is True or False. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Helpful to have this clear statement of how predicates are treated. This extensionalism in logic causes trouble when it creeps into philosophy, and people say that 'red' just means all the red things. No it doesn't. |
23544 | Local indeterminacy concerns a single object, and global indeterminacy covers a range [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Vagueness concerns 'local' indeterminacy, such as whether one man in the lineup is bald, and 'global' indeterminacy, applying to a range of cases, as when it is indeterminate how 'bald' applies to the lineup. But how do these relate? | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: This puts the focus either on objects or on predicates which are vague. |
23540 | Conjoining two indefinites by related sentences seems to produce a contradiction [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: If 'P is red' and 'P is orange' are indefinite, then 'P is red and P is orange' seems false, because red and orange are exclusive. But if two conjoined indefinite sentences are false, that makes 'P is red and P is red' false, when it should be indefinite. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: [compressed] This is the problem of 'penumbral connection', where two indefinite values are still logically related, by excluding one another. Presumably 'P is red and P is of indefinite shape' can be true? Doubtful about this argument. |
23546 | Standardly vagueness involves borderline cases, and a higher standpoint from which they can be seen [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Standard notions of vagueness all accept borderline cases, and presuppose a higher standpoint from which a judgement of being borderline F, rather than simply being F or being not F, can be made. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: He says that the concept of borderline cases is an impediment to understanding vagueness. Proposing a third group when you are struggling to separate two other groups doesn't seem helpful, come to think of it. Limbo cases. |
23542 | Identifying vagueness with ignorance is the common mistake of confusing symptoms with cause [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We can see Epistemicism [vagueness as ignorance] as a common and misguided tendency to identify a cause with its symptoms. We are unsure how to characterise vagueness, and identify it with the resulting ignorance, instead of explaining it. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Love it. This echoes my repeated plea in these reactions to stop identifying features of reality with the functions which embody them or the patterns they create. We need to explain them, and must dig deeper. |
23541 | Supervaluation can give no answer to 'who is the last bald man' [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Under supervaluation there should always be someone who is the last bald man in the sequence, but there is always an acceptable way to make some other man the last bald man. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: Fine seems to take this as a conclusive refutation of the supervaluation approach. Fine says (p.41) that supervaluation says there is a precisification for every instance. |
23545 | We do not have an intelligible concept of a borderline case [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: We simply have no intelligible notion of local indeterminacy or of a borderline case. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 2) | |
A reaction: He mentions cases which are near a borderline, and cases which are hard to decide, but denies that these are intrinsically borderline. If there are borderline cases between red and orange, what are the outer boundaries of the border? |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique' | |
A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it. |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts' | |
A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious. |
23547 | It seems absurd that there is no identity of any kind between two objects which involve survival [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: Pace Parfit and others, it boggles the mind that survival could be independent of any relation of identity between the currently existing object and the objects that subsequently exist. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 3) | |
A reaction: Yes. If the self or mind just consists of a diachronic trail of memories such that the two ends of the trail have no connection at all, that isn't the kind of survival that any of us want. I want to live my life, not a life. |
19413 | If we know what is good or rational, our knowledge is extended, and our free will restricted [Leibniz] |
Full Idea: The more perfect one is, the more one is determined to the good, and so is more free at the same time. ...Our power and knowledge are more extended, and our will much the more limited within the bounds of perfect reason. | |
From: Gottfried Leibniz (Letters to Pierre Bayle [1702], 1702) | |
A reaction: I like this idea, which seems to me to derive from Aquinas. When I choose to eat and drink each day, or agree that 7+5 is 12, I don't complain about my lack of freedom in the choices. Goodness and reason are constraints I welcome. |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct' | |
A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character. |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me. |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power. |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals' | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts. |
23543 | We identify laws with regularities because we mistakenly identify causes with their symptoms [Fine,K] |
Full Idea: There is a common tendency to identify a cause with its symptoms. Hence we are not sure how to characterise a law, and so we identify it with the regularities to which it gives rise. | |
From: Kit Fine (Vagueness: a global approach [2020], 1) | |
A reaction: A lovely clear identification of my pet hate, which is superficial accounts of things, which claim to be the last word, but actually explain nothing. |