Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston)', 'First-Order Modal Logic' and 'reports'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Diogenes said avoidance of philosophy is the lack of a desire to live properly [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: When a man said that he was not suited to philosophy, Diogenes said to him, 'Why then do you live, if you have no desire to live properly.'
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6
     A reaction: Meaning philosophy is already more practice than theory.
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Each line of a truth table is a model [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: Each line of a truth table is, in effect, a model.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
     A reaction: I find this comment illuminating. It is being connected with the more complex models of modal logic. Each line of a truth table is a picture of how the world might be.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / a. Symbols of ML
Modal logic adds □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly) to classical logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: For modal logic we add to the syntax of classical logic two new unary operators □ (necessarily) and ◊ (possibly).
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.3)
We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: We let 'R' be the accessibility relation: xRy is read 'y is accessible from x'.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5)
The symbol ||- is the 'forcing' relation; 'Γ ||- P' means that P is true in world Γ [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The symbol ||- is used for the 'forcing' relation, as in 'Γ ||- P', which means that P is true in world Γ.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
The prefix σ names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: A 'prefix' is a finite sequence of positive integers. A 'prefixed formula' is an expression of the form σ X, where σ is a prefix and X is a formula. A prefix names a possible world, and σ.n names a world accessible from that one.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / b. Terminology of ML
Modern modal logic introduces 'accessibility', saying xRy means 'y is accessible from x' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: Modern modal logic takes into consideration the way the modal relates the possible worlds, called the 'accessibility' relation. .. We let R be the accessibility relation, and xRy reads as 'y is accessible from x.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.5)
     A reaction: There are various types of accessibility, and these define the various modal logics.
A 'model' is a frame plus specification of propositions true at worlds, written < G,R,||- > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: A 'model' is a frame plus a specification of which propositional letters are true at which worlds. It is written as , where ||- is a relation between possible worlds and propositional letters. So Γ ||- P means P is true at world Γ.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
A 'constant' domain is the same for all worlds; 'varying' domains can be entirely separate [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: In 'constant domain' semantics, the domain of each possible world is the same as every other; in 'varying domain' semantics, the domains need not coincide, or even overlap.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5)
A 'frame' is a set G of possible worlds, with an accessibility relation R, written < G,R > [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: A 'frame' consists of a non-empty set G, whose members are generally called possible worlds, and a binary relation R, on G, generally called the accessibility relation. We say the frame is the pair so that a single object can be talked about.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
Accessibility relations can be 'reflexive' (self-referring), 'transitive' (carries over), or 'symmetric' (mutual) [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: A relation R is 'reflexive' if every world is accessible from itself; 'transitive' if the first world is related to the third world (ΓRΔ and ΔRΩ → ΓRΩ); and 'symmetric' if the accessibility relation is mutual.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.7)
     A reaction: The different systems of modal logic largely depend on how these accessibility relations are specified. There is also the 'serial' relation, which just says that any world has another world accessible to it.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 2. Tools of Modal Logic / c. Derivation rules of ML
Conj: a) if σ X∧Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X∧Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for conjunctions: a) if σ X ∧ Y then σ X and σ Y b) if σ ¬(X ∧ Y) then σ ¬X or σ ¬Y
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
Bicon: a)if σ(X↔Y) then σ(X→Y) and σ(Y→X) b) [not biconditional, one or other fails] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for biconditionals: a) if σ (X ↔ Y) then σ (X → Y) and σ (Y → X) b) if σ ¬(X ↔ Y) then σ ¬(X → Y) or σ ¬(Y → X)
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
Disj: a) if σ ¬(X∨Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X∨Y then σ X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for disjunctions: a) if σ ¬(X ∨ Y) then σ ¬X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X ∨ Y then σ X or σ Y
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
Universal: a) if σ ¬◊X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □X then σ.m X [m exists] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for universal modality: a) if σ ¬◊ X then σ.m ¬X b) if σ □ X then σ.m X , where m refers to a world that can be seen (rather than introducing a new world).
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
     A reaction: Note that the universal rule of □, usually read as 'necessary', only refers to worlds which can already be seen, whereas possibility (◊) asserts some thing about a new as yet unseen world.
Existential: a) if σ ◊X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□X then σ.n ¬X [n is new] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for existential modality: a) if σ ◊ X then σ.n X b) if σ ¬□ X then σ.n ¬X , where n introduces some new world (rather than referring to a world that can be seen).
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
     A reaction: Note that the existential rule of ◊, usually read as 'possibly', asserts something about a new as yet unseen world, whereas □ only refers to worlds which can already be seen,
Negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rule for negation: if σ ¬¬X then σ X
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
If a proposition is possibly true in a world, it is true in some world accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: If a proposition is possibly true in a world, then it is also true in some world which is accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- ◊X ↔ for some Δ ∈ G, ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, it is true in all worlds accessible from that world [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: If a proposition is necessarily true in a world, then it is also true in all worlds which are accessible from that world. That is: Γ ||- □X ↔ for every Δ ∈ G, if ΓRΔ then Δ ||- X.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.6)
Implic: a) if σ ¬(X→Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X→Y then σ ¬X or σ Y [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: General tableau rules for implications: a) if σ ¬(X → Y) then σ X and σ ¬Y b) if σ X → Y then σ ¬X or σ Y
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.2)
T reflexive: a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System T reflexive rules (also for B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬X
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
4r rev-trans: a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System 4r reversed-transitive rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ □X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs]
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
4 transitive: a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System 4 transitive rules (also for K4, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ.n □X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ.n ¬◊X [where n is a world which already occurs]
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
B symmetric: a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [n occurs] [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System B symmetric rules (also for S5): a) if σ.n □X then σ X b) if σ.n ¬◊X then σ ¬X [where n is a world which already occurs]
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
D serial: a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System D serial rules (also for T, B, S4, S5): a) if σ □X then σ ◊X b) if σ ¬◊X then σ ¬□X
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
S5: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: Simplified S5 rules: a) if n ◊X then kX b) if n ¬□X then k ¬X c) if n □X then k X d) if n ¬◊X then k ¬X. 'n' picks any world; in a) and b) 'k' asserts a new world; in c) and d) 'k' refers to a known world
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 2.3)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / b. System K
The system K has no accessibility conditions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system K has no frame conditions imposed on its accessibility relation.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
     A reaction: The system is named K in honour of Saul Kripke.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / c. System D
□P → P is not valid in D (Deontic Logic), since an obligatory action may be not performed [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: System D is usually thought of as Deontic Logic, concerning obligations and permissions. □P → P is not valid in D, since just because an action is obligatory, it does not follow that it is performed.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.12.2 Ex)
The system D has the 'serial' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system D has the 'serial' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must have some world which is accessible to it.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
The system T has the 'reflexive' conditon imposed on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system T has the 'reflexive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / e. System K4
The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system K4 has the 'transitive' condition imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, if a relation holds between worlds 1 and 2 and worlds 2 and 3, it must hold between worlds 1 and 3. The relation carries over.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / f. System B
The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system B has the 'reflexive' and 'symmetric' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world must be accessible to itself, and any relation between worlds must be mutual.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system S4 has the 'reflexive' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is accessible to itself, and accessibility carries over a series of worlds.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
System S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions on its accessibility relation [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The system S5 has the 'reflexive', 'symmetric' and 'transitive' conditions imposed on its accessibility relation - that is, every world is self-accessible, and accessibility is mutual, and it carries over a series of worlds.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.8)
     A reaction: S5 has total accessibility, and hence is the most powerful system (though it might be too powerful).
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
Modality affects content, because P→◊P is valid, but ◊P→P isn't [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: P→◊P is usually considered to be valid, but its converse, ◊P→P is not, so (by Frege's own criterion) P and possibly-P differ in conceptual content, and there is no reason why logic should not be widened to accommodate this.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.2)
     A reaction: Frege had denied that modality affected the content of a proposition (1879:p.4). The observation here is the foundation for the need for a modal logic.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 5. Epistemic Logic
Read epistemic box as 'a knows/believes P' and diamond as 'for all a knows/believes, P' [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: In epistemic logic we read Υ as 'KaP: a knows that P', and ◊ as 'PaP: it is possible, for all a knows, that P' (a is an individual). For belief we read them as 'BaP: a believes that P' and 'CaP: compatible with everything a believes that P'.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11)
     A reaction: [scripted capitals and subscripts are involved] Hintikka 1962 is the source of this. Fitting and Mendelsohn prefer □ to read 'a is entitled to know P', rather than 'a knows that P'.
In epistemic logic knowers are logically omniscient, so they know that they know [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: In epistemic logic the knower is treated as logically omniscient. This is puzzling because one then cannot know something and yet fail to know that one knows it (the Principle of Positive Introspection).
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.11)
     A reaction: This is nowadays known as the K-K Problem - to know, must you know that you know. Broadly, we find that externalists say you don't need to know that you know (so animals know things), but internalists say you do need to know that you know.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 6. Temporal Logic
F: will sometime, P: was sometime, G: will always, H: was always [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: We introduce four future and past tense operators: FP: it will sometime be the case that P. PP: it was sometime the case that P. GP: it will always be the case that P. HP: it has always been the case that P. (P itself is untensed).
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 1.10)
     A reaction: Temporal logic begins with A.N. Prior, and starts with □ as 'always', and ◊ as 'sometimes', but then adds these past and future divisions. Two different logics emerge, taking □ and ◊ as either past or as future.
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
The Barcan corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse to monotonicity [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The Barcan formula corresponds to anti-monotonicity, and the Converse Barcan formula corresponds to monotonicity.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 6.3)
The Barcan says nothing comes into existence; the Converse says nothing ceases; the pair imply stability [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The Converse Barcan says nothing passes out of existence in alternative situations. The Barcan says that nothing comes into existence. The two together say the same things exist no matter what the situation.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.9)
     A reaction: I take the big problem to be that these reflect what it is you want to say, and that does not keep stable across a conversation, so ordinary rational discussion sometimes asserts these formulas, and 30 seconds later denies them.
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
'Predicate abstraction' abstracts predicates from formulae, giving scope for constants and functions [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: 'Predicate abstraction' is a key idea. It is a syntactic mechanism for abstracting a predicate from a formula, providing a scoping mechanism for constants and function symbols similar to that provided for variables by quantifiers.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], Pref)
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
The Indiscernibility of Identicals has been a big problem for modal logic [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: Equality has caused much grief for modal logic. Many of the problems, which have struck at the heart of the coherence of modal logic, stem from the apparent violations of the Indiscernibility of Identicals.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.1)
     A reaction: Thus when I say 'I might have been three inches taller', presumably I am referring to someone who is 'identical' to me, but who lacks one of my properties. A simple solution is to say that the person is 'essentially' identical.
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
□ must be sensitive as to whether it picks out an object by essential or by contingent properties [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: If □ is to be sensitive to the quality of the truth of a proposition in its scope, then it must be sensitive as to whether an object is picked out by an essential property or by a contingent one.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.3)
     A reaction: This incredibly simple idea strikes me as being powerful and important. ...However, creating illustrative examples leaves me in a state of confusion. You try it. They cite '9' and 'number of planets'. But is it just nominal essence? '9' must be 9.
Objects retain their possible properties across worlds, so a bundle theory of them seems best [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The property of 'possibly being a Republican' is as much a property of Bill Clinton as is 'being a democrat'. So we don't peel off his properties from world to world. Hence the bundle theory fits our treatment of objects better than bare particulars.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 7.3)
     A reaction: This bundle theory is better described in recent parlance as the 'modal profile'. I am reluctant to talk of a modal truth about something as one of its 'properties'. An objects, then, is a bundle of truths?
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart relations are neither symmetric nor transitive, so there is no logic of equality for them [Fitting/Mendelsohn]
     Full Idea: The main technical problem with counterpart theory is that the being-a-counterpart relation is, in general, neither symmetric nor transitive, so no natural logic of equality is forthcoming.
     From: M Fitting/R Mendelsohn (First-Order Modal Logic [1998], 4.5)
     A reaction: That is, nothing is equal to a counterpart, either directly or indirectly.
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey]
     Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique'
     A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it.
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When someone denied motion, Diogenes got up and walked away [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Diogenes replied to one who asserted that there was no such thing as motion by getting up and walking away.
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
Habits constitute the self [Dewey]
     Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts'
     A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious.
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Cynicism was open to anyone, and needed neither education nor sophistication [Diogenes of Sin., by Grayling]
     Full Idea: An advantage of Cynicism was that it was open to anyone who could grasp its simple teachings. Understanding it required neither education nor sophistication.
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3
     A reaction: This was the source of the well-known opposition of Diogenes to Plato's Academy, and it makes him a key predecessor of the teachings of Jesus. Personally I think the really good life is difficult, and it needs education and careful rational thought.
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Diogenes said a plucked chicken fits Plato's definition of man [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Plato defined man as a two-footed featherless animal, so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into the school, and said, 'This is Plato's man'.
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6
     A reaction: You have to be very serious about your philosophy to enact your counterexamples, rather than just suggest them. Which university will actually reconstruct the Trolley Problem?
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
The Cynics rejected what is conventional as irrational, and aimed to live by nature [Taylor,R on Diogenes of Sin.]
     Full Idea: The Cynics were convinced of the purely conventional foundation of Athenian values, which meant they had no rational foundation at all. They therefore rejected them in favour of what is correct and worthwhile by nature.
     From: comment on Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Richard Taylor - Virtue Ethics: an Introduction Ch.8
     A reaction: This shows how the Cynics are key players in the progress of the nomos-physis debate, which keeps resurfacing as relativism vs absolutism, cognitivism vs non-cognitivism, and even romanticism vs classicism. The trouble is, convention is natural!
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
For peace of mind, you need self-government, indifference and independence [Diogenes of Sin.]
     Full Idea: There are three essential conditions for peace of mind: autarchy, apathy and freedom. Autarchy is self-government and self-sufficiency; apathy is indifference to what the world can do to you; the freedom is from dependence and possessions.
     From: Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]), quoted by A.C. Grayling - What is Good? Ch.3
     A reaction: Quite good advice, but I don't see 'peace of mind' as the highest human ideal. The basic suggestion here is live alone and do nothing. Certainly don't get married, or have children, or try to achieve anything.
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey]
     Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct'
     A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character.
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
Diogenes said he was a citizen of the world [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Diogenes said he was a citizen of no country, but of the world.
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
Diogenes masturbated in public, wishing he could get rid of hunger so easily [Diogenes of Sin., by Plutarch]
     Full Idea: Chrysippus praises Diogenes for saying to bystanders as he masturbated in public, "Would that I could thus rub the hunger too out of my belly".
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Plutarch - 70: Stoic Self-contradictions 1044b
     A reaction: So it is not quite true that people only need corn and water. Diogenes' remark doesn't explain why he did it in public. Was it to defy local convention (as befits a citizen of the world), or was it to teach?
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy'
     A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me.
Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey]
     Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy'
     A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power.
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / b. Liberal individualism
Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey]
     Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality.
     From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals'
     A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts.
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech [Diogenes of Sin., by Diog. Laertius]
     Full Idea: Diogenes said that the most excellent thing among men was freedom of speech.
     From: report of Diogenes (Sin) (reports [c.360 BCE]) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 06.Di.6