52 ideas
| 2930 | The main aim of philosophy must be to determine the order of rank among values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The future task of the philosophers is the solution of the problem of value, the determination of the order of rank among values. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§17 note) | |
| A reaction: 'Determine' is presumably either a power struggle, or needs criteria by which to do the judging. |
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Scholars are usually ingenious enough to find ways of spreading darkness even in things which are obvious by themselves, and which the peasants are not ignorant of. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: Wonderful! I see it everywhere in philosophy. It is usually the result of finding ingenious and surprising grounds for scepticism. The amazing thing is not their lovely arguments, but that fools then take their conclusions seriously. Modus tollens. |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The questions on which scholars argue are almost always questions of word. …If philosophers were agreed on the meaning of words, almost all their controversies would cease. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 13) | |
| A reaction: He has a low opinion of 'scholars'! It isn't that difficult to agree on the meanings of key words, in a given context. The aim isn't to get rid of the problems, but to focus on the real problems. Some words contain problems. |
| 20143 | Scientific knowledge is nothing without a prior philosophical 'faith' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Strictly speaking there is no knowledge [science] without presuppositions; a philosophy, a 'faith', must always be there first of all, for knowledge to win from it a direction, a meaning, a limit, a method, a right to exist. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
| A reaction: He sees philosophers as the creators of this faith, and laughs at anyone who tries to set philosophy on a scientific basis. |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It is necessary, in a series of objects, to recognise which is the simplest thing, and how all the others depart from it. This rule contains the whole secret of the method. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 06) | |
| A reaction: This is an appealing thought, though deciding the criteria for 'simplest' looks tough. Are electrons, for example, simple? Is a person a simple basic thing? |
| 23722 | Objectivity is not disinterestedness (impossible), but the ability to switch perspectives [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: 'Objectivity' should be understood not as 'contemplation without interest' (a non-concept and an absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to engage and disengage our 'pros' and 'cons'; we can use the difference in perspectives for knowledge. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
| A reaction: Note that he will use perspectives to achieve knowledge. The idea that Perspectivalism is mere relativism is labelled as 'extreme' in Idea 4486. He is right that objectivity is a mental capacity and achievement of individuals. |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: One truth discovered helps us to discover another. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 01) | |
| A reaction: I take this to be one of the key ingredients of objectivity. People who know very little have almost no chance of objectivity. A mind full of falsehoods also blocks it. |
| 4417 | Only that which has no history is definable [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Only that which has no history is definable. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§13) | |
| A reaction: Too subtle to evaluate! It sounds as if it could be right, that some things are definable, but when the accretions of human history are interwoven into an identity, we can forget it. |
| 23715 | Psychologists should be brave and proud, and prefer truth to desires, even when it is ugly [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: I hope [psychologists] are actually brave, generous, proud animals, who know how to control their own pleasure and pain and are taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, even a bitter, ugly, unchristian, immoral truth - Because there are such truths. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§01) | |
| A reaction: A nice expression of Nietzsche's values, which makes truth central, contrary to the widespread modern view that he was the high priest of relativism. If you think that, read him more carefully. |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Unity is that common nature in which all things that are compared with each other must participate equally. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
| A reaction: A lovely explanation of the concept of 'units' for counting. Fregeans hate units, but we Grecian thinkers love them. |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I do not recognise what the proportion of magnitude is between two and three, unless I consider a third term, namely unity, which is the common measure of the one and the other. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
| A reaction: A striking defence of the concept of the need for the unit in arithmetic. To say 'three is half as big again', you must be discussing the same size of 'half' in each instance. |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Among the simple things, we must also place their negation and deprivation, insofar as they fall under out intelligence, because the idea of nothingness, of the instant, of rest, is no less true an idea than that of existence, of duration, of motion. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: He sees the 'simple' things as the foundation of all knowledge, because they are self-evident. Not sure about 'no less true', since the specific nothings are parasitic on the somethings. |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: When I say that four and three make seven, this connection is necessary, because one cannot conceive the number seven distinctly without including in it in a confused way the number four and the number three. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: This seems to make the truths of arithmetic conceptual, and hence analytic. |
| 22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique' | |
| A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it. |
| 4421 | Philosophers have never asked why there is a will to truth in the first place [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Both the earliest and most recent philosophers are all oblivious of how much the will to truth itself first requires justification: here there is a gap in every philosophy - how did this come about? | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§24) | |
| A reaction: This seems to me a meta-philosophical question which will lead off into (quite interesting) cultural studies and (trite) evolutionary theory. Truth isn't a value, it is the biological function of brains. |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: It is better never to study than to be unable to distinguish the true from the false, and be obliged to accept as certain what is doubtful. One risks losing the knowledge one already has. Hence we reject all those knowledges which are only probable. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 02) | |
| A reaction: This is usually seen nowadays (and I agree) that this is a false dichotomy. Knowledge can't be all-or-nothing. We should accept probabilities as probable, not as knowledge. Probability became a science after Descartes. |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: By intuition I mean the conception of an attentive mind, so distinct and clear that it has no doubt about what it understands, …a conception that is borne of the sole light of reason. Thus everyone can see intuitively that he exists. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 03) | |
| A reaction: By 'intuition' he means self-evident certainty, whereas my concept is of a judgement of which I am reasonably confident, but without sufficient grounds for certainty. This is an early assertion of the Cogito, with a clear statement of its grounding. |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: If Socrates says he doubts everything, it necessarily follows that he at least understands that he doubts, and that he knows that something can be true or false: for these are notions that necessarily accompany doubt. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: An early commitment to the Cogito. But note that the inescapable commitment is not just to his existence, but also to his own reasoning, and his own commitment, and to the possibility of truth. Many, many things are undeniable. |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: We require two conditions for intuition, namely that the proposition appear clear and distinct, and then that it be understood all at once and not successively. Deduction, on the other hand, implies a certain movement of the mind. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 11) | |
| A reaction: A nice distinction. Presumably with deduction you grasp each step clearly, and then the inference and conclusion, and you can then forget the previous steps because you have something secure. |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The human soul possesses something divine in which are deposited the first seeds of useful knowledge, which, in spite of the negligence and embarrassment of poorly done studies, bear spontaneous fruit. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
| A reaction: This makes clear the religious underpinning which is required for his commitment to such useful innate ideas (such as basic geometry) |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: Let there be a man who has sometimes seen the fundamental colours, and never the intermediate and mixed colours; it may be that by a sort of deduction he will represent those he has not seen, by their resemblance to the others. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 14) | |
| A reaction: Thus Descartes solved Hume's shade of blue problem, by means of 'a sort of deduction' from resemblance, where Hume was paralysed by his need to actually experience it. Dogmatic empiricism is a false doctrine! |
| 23719 | Forgetfulness is a strong positive ability, not mental laziness [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Forgetfulness is not just a vis inertiae, as superficial people believe, but is rather an active ability to suppress, positive in the strongest sense of the word. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§01) | |
| A reaction: It is unimpressive when people remember small slights and grievances for a long time - and even being owed small sums - so the ability to forget such things is admirable. But wilfully forgetting some things is obviously shameful. |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: If the method shows clearly how we must use intuition to avoid mistaking the false for the true, and how deduction must operate to lead us to the knowledge of all things, it will be complete in my opinion. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
| A reaction: A perfect statement of his foundationalist view. It needs a clear and distinct basis, and the steps of building must be strictly logical. Of course, most of our knowledge relies on induction, rather than deduction. |
| 4420 | There is only 'perspective' seeing and knowing, and so the best objectivity is multiple points of view [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: There is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective "knowing", and the more different eyes we can use to observe one thing, the more complete will our "concept" of this thing, our "objectivity", be. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§12) | |
| A reaction: A very perceptive statement of the most plausible and sophisticated version of relativism. It is hard to see how we could distinguish multiple viewpoints from pure objectivity. |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: The motive power or the nerves themselves originate in the brain, which contains the imagination, which moves them in a thousand ways, as the common sense is moved by the external sense. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: This sounds a lot more physicalist than his later explicit dualism in Meditations. Even in that work the famous passage on the ship's pilot acknowledged tight integration of mind and brain. |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: There are four faculties in us which we can use to know: intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: Philosophers have to attribute faculties to the mind, even if the psychologists and neuroscientists won't accept them. We must infer the sources of our modes of understanding. He is cautious about imagination. |
| 22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts' | |
| A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious. |
| 4414 | Philosophers invented "free will" so that our virtues would be permanently interesting to the gods [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The philosophers invented "free will" - absolute human spontaneity in good and evil - to furnish a right to the idea that the interest of the gods in man, in human virtue, could never be exhausted. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§07) | |
| A reaction: Wonderfully outrageous suggestion! If we had true metaphysical 'absolute' free will, we would be much more interesting, and have a much higher status in the cosmos. Nietzsche is probably right. |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: This force by which we properly know objects is purely spiritual, and is no less distinct from the body than is the blood from the bones. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 12) | |
| A reaction: This firmly contradicts any physicalism I thought I detected in Idea 24027! He uses the word 'spiritual' of the mind here, which I don't think he uses in later writings. |
| 4419 | People who think in words are orators rather than thinkers, and think about facts instead of thinking facts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Whoever thinks in words thinks as an orator and not as a thinker (it shows that he does not think facts, but only in relation to facts). | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§08) | |
| A reaction: Good. It is certainly not true that we have to think in words, or else animals wouldn't think. Good thinking should focus on reality, and be too fast for words to keep up. |
| 4411 | It is a delusion to separate the man from the deed, like the flash from the lightning [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for a 'action', so they separate strength from expressions of strength, but there is no such substratum; the deed is everything. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
| A reaction: Of course, there is no reason why an analysis should not separate the doer and the deed (to explain, for example, a well-meaning fool), but it is a blunder to think of a human action as a merely physical event. |
| 3793 | We must question the very value of moral values [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: We need a critique of moral values; the value of these values themselves must just be called in question. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pre f§3) | |
| A reaction: But we must start somewhere with values, to avoid an infinite regress. |
| 4408 | The concept of 'good' was created by aristocrats to describe their own actions [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The judgement 'good' did not first originate with those to whom goodness was shown! Rather it was the 'good' themselves, that is to say the noble, powerful, high-stationed and high-minded who established themselves and their action as good. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
| A reaction: This may be right, but not very profound. Virtually all concepts are created by the most educated classes. The first recipient of charity may not have had the concept, but they would have been gobsmacked by the novelty. |
| 23716 | A strong rounded person soon forgets enemies, misfortunes, and even misdeeds [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: To be unable to take his enemies, his misfortunes and even his misdeeds seriously for long - that is the sign of strong, rounded natures with a superabundance of power. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§10) | |
| A reaction: An aspect of the 'higher man' that I don't recall being mentioned elsewhere. I basically approve of this, if it means not holding grudges, and living for the future rather than for the past. |
| 20129 | All animals strive for the ideal conditions to express their power, and hate any hindrances [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Every animal instinctively strives for an optimum of favourable conditions under which it can expend all its strength and achieve its maximal feeling of power; every animal abhors ...every hindrance that obstructs this path to the optimum. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], III.§07) | |
| A reaction: This became the lynchpin of Nietzsche's account of the source of values. It is a highly naturalistic view, fitting it into evolutionary theory (thought running deeper than that), so I have a lot of sympathy with the view. |
| 4409 | Only the decline of aristocratic morality led to concerns about "egoism" [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: It was only when aristocratic value judgements declined that the whole antithesis of "egoistic" and "unegoistic" obtruded itself more and more on the human conscience. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§02) | |
| A reaction: But Aristotle, who is no aristocrat, has a balanced and sensible view of 'egoism', where it isn't the patronising arrogance that Nietzsche seems to like, but a proper concern with one's own character. |
| 3259 | Nietzsche rejects impersonal morality, and asserts the idea of living well [Nietzsche, by Nagel] |
| Full Idea: Nietzsche's rejection of impersonal morality is an assertion of the dominance of the ideal of living well. | |
| From: report of Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I) by Thomas Nagel - The View from Nowhere X.2 |
| 4416 | Basic justice is the negotiation of agreement among equals, and the imposition of agreement [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Justice on the elementary level is good will among parties of approximately equal power to come to terms with one another, and to compel parties of lesser power to reach a settlement among themselves. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
| A reaction: This pinpoints a key problem with the social contract as a moral theory - that it requires equals, and recognises only terror of superiors, and indifference to useless inferiors who have nothing to offer (paraplegics and animals). |
| 4418 | A masterful and violent person need have nothing to do with contracts [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: He who can command, he who is "master", he who is violent in act and bearing - what has he to do with contracts! | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
| A reaction: The persistent problem with social contract theory is that those much stronger or much weaker seem to have no interest in morality at all, and yet they can all have standards of behaviour. |
| 22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct' | |
| A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character. |
| 4407 | Plato, Spinoza and Kant are very different, but united in their low estimation of pity [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Plato, Spinoza, La Rochefoucauld, and Kant are four spirits very different from one another, but united in one thing: their low estimation of pity. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], Pref §5) | |
| A reaction: Plato is no surprise, as virtually no Greeks value pity. Spinoza and Kant are interesting. Presumably Kant's 'contractualism' places respect far above pity, and is theoretical neglect of animals would fit. Remember Nietzsche embraced a horse in Turin. |
| 4415 | Guilt and obligation originated in the relationship of buying and selling, credit and debt [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, had its origin in the oldest and most primitive personal relationship, that between buyer and seller, between creditor and debtor. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§08) | |
| A reaction: In other words, lofty Kantian ideals started life in the grubby world of the Hobbesian social contract, and self-seeking has been disguised by idealism. Too harsh on Kant, who explains why contracts have force, not just convenience. |
| 23718 | If we say birds of prey could become lambs, that makes them responsible for being birds of prey [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Scientists …do not defend any belief more strongly than that the strong are free to be weak, and the birds of prey are free to be lambs: - in this way, they gain the right to make the birds of prey responsible for being birds of prey. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§13) | |
| A reaction: This is a flat rejection of the Sartrean idea that we can what sort of person we want to be. He cares about birds of prey, but also lambs can't become eagles. I would say that adolescents have a reasonable degree of choice about what they will become. |
| 23717 | Modern nihilism is now feeling tired of mankind [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The sight of man now makes us tired - what is nihilism today if it is not that? …We are tired of man… | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§12) | |
| A reaction: That is close to Hume's nihilist, who would destroy the world to protect his own finger from a scratch. The actor George Sanders committed suicide because he was bored. Don't ever think that Nietzsche was a nihilist, just because he mentions it a lot! |
| 23721 | Old tribes always felt an obligation to the earlier generations, and the founders [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Within the original tribal association the living generation always acknowledged a legal obligation towards the earlier generation, and in particular towards the earliest. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§19) | |
| A reaction: This is still a factor in modern politics, though the people remember are either military heroes or the great figures of a particular political movement. We remember the big artists and personalities, but don't feel obligated to them. |
| 20142 | The state begins with brutal conquest of a disorganised people, not with a 'contract' [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: Some pack of blond beasts of prey, on a war footing, unscrupulously lays its dreadful paws on a populace which is shapeless. In this way the 'state' began on earth. I think I have dispensed with the fantasy which has it begin with a 'contract'. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§17) | |
| A reaction: [compressed] It is certainly likely that a tribe which got itself well organised and focused on some end would achieve total dominance over other tribes that just focus on food. |
| 22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
| A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me. |
| 22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
| A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power. |
| 22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
| Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality. | |
| From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals' | |
| A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts. |
| 23720 | Punishment makes people harder, more alienated, and hostile [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: On the whole, punishment makes men harder and colder, it concentrates, it sharpens the feeling of alienation; it strengthens the power to resist. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], II.§14) | |
| A reaction: If the school system involves routine harsh punishments, that means that the whole population ends up in that state. I would have thought that this was an obvious truth about punishment, but no one seems to want to face up to it. |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
| Full Idea: I have discovered that all the sciences which have as their aim the search for order and measure are related to mathematics. | |
| From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], 04) | |
| A reaction: Note that he sound a more cautious note than Galileo's famous remark. It leaves room for biology to still be a science, even when it fails to be mathematical. |
| 4410 | The truly great haters in world history have always been priests [Nietzsche] |
| Full Idea: The truly great haters in world history have always been priests. | |
| From: Friedrich Nietzsche (On the Genealogy of Morals [1887], I.§07) | |
| A reaction: Wicked, but it has a lot of truth. Priests have a lot to defend, and a lot of reasons for feeling threatened. |