13 ideas
14348 | An 'antidote' allows a manifestation to begin, but then blocks it [Corry] |
Full Idea: An 'antidote' (or 'mask') to a disposition (unlike a 'finkish' one) leaves the disposition intact, but interferes with the causal chain between the disposition and its manifestation so that the manifestation doesn't come about. | |
From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Bird 1997] Thus the disposition of the poison at least begins to manifest, but its disposition to kill is blocked. So what was the disposition of the poison? |
14347 | A 'finkish' disposition is one that is lost immediately after the appropriate stimulus [Corry] |
Full Idea: An object's disposition is said to be 'finkish' if the object loses the disposition after the occurrence of the appropriate stimulus, but before the manifestation has had time to come about. | |
From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Lewis 1997] An example would be some sort of safety device which only cuts in if the disposition seems about to operate (e.g. turns off electricity). It seems to block analyses of dispositions simply in terms of their outcomes. |
14350 | If a disposition is never instantiated, it shouldn't be part of our theory of nature [Corry] |
Full Idea: If we have no good reason to believe that a disposition is instantiated, then the disposition should play no role in our theorizing about the world. | |
From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 3) | |
A reaction: It is part of our theory that a substantial lump of uranium will explode, but also that a galaxy-sized lump of uranium would explode. Surely we are committed to the latter, even though it never happens? |
22868 | The value and truth of knowledge are measured by success in activity [Dewey] |
Full Idea: What measures knowledge's value, its correctness and truth, is the degree of its availability for conducting to a successful issue the activities of living beings. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 4:180), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 2 'Critique' | |
A reaction: Note that this is the measure of truth, not the nature of truth (which James seemed to believe). Dewey gives us a clear and perfect statement of the pragmatic view of knowledge. I don't agree with it. |
19729 | 'Modal epistemology' demands a connection between the belief and facts in possible worlds [Black,T] |
Full Idea: In 'modal epistemologies' a belief counts as knowledge only if there is a modal connection - a connection not only to the actual world, but also to other non-actual possible worlds - between the belief and the facts of the matter. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: [Pritchard 2005 seems to be a source for this] This sounds to me a bit like Nozick's tracking or sensitivity theory. Nozick is, I suppose, diachronic (time must pass, for the tracking), where this theory is synchronic. |
19728 | Gettier and lottery cases seem to involve luck, meaning bad connection of beliefs to facts [Black,T] |
Full Idea: The protagonists in Gettier cases and in lottery cases fail to have knowledge because their beliefs are true simply as a matter of luck, where this means that their beliefs themselves are not appropriately connected to the facts. | |
From: Tim Black (Modal and Anti-Luck Epistemology [2011], 1) | |
A reaction: The lottery problem is you correctly believe 'my ticket won't win the lottery' even though you don't seem to actually know it won't. Is the Gettier problem simply the problem of lucky knowledge? 'Luck' is a rather vague concept. |
14351 | Maybe an experiment unmasks an essential disposition, and reveals its regularities [Corry] |
Full Idea: The dispositional essentialist can argue that what happens in laboratory conditions is that, by controlling external influences, we effectively 'unmask' the relevant dispositions, and thus observe the regularities to which those dispositions give rise. | |
From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 5) | |
A reaction: That seems to me to be exactly right, though Corry dislikes it, and even suggests that dispositional essentialist might not like it. |
22865 | Habits constitute the self [Dewey] |
Full Idea: All habits are demands for certain kinds of activity; and they constitute the self. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 14:22), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 1 'Acts' | |
A reaction: Not an idea I have encountered elsewhere. He emphasises that habits are not repeated actions, but are dispositions. I'm not clear whether these habits must be conscious. |
22871 | The good people are those who improve; the bad are those who deteriorate [Dewey] |
Full Idea: The bad man is the man who no matter how good he has been is beginning to deteriorate, to grow less good. The good man is the man who no matter how morally unworthy he has been is moving to become better. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:181), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 3 'Reconstruct' | |
A reaction: Although a slightly improving rat doesn't sound as good as a slightly deteriorating saint, I have some sympathy with this thought. The desire to improve seems to be right at the heart of what makes good character. |
22876 | Democracy is the development of human nature when it shares in the running of communal activities [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Democracy is but a name for the fact that human nature is developed only when its elements take part in directing things which are common, things for the sake of which men and women form groups. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 12:199), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: It is hard to prove that human nature develops when it particpates in groups. If people are excluded from power, their loyalty tends to switch to sub-groups, such as friends in a pub, or a football team. Powerless nationalists baffle me. |
22875 | Democracy is not just a form of government; it is a mode of shared living [Dewey] |
Full Idea: A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 9:93), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Democracy' | |
A reaction: This precisely pinpoints the heart of the culture wars in 2021. A huge swathe of western populations believe in Dewey's idea, but a core of wealthy right-wingers and their servants only see democracy as the mechanism for obtaining power. |
22874 | Individuality is only developed within groups [Dewey] |
Full Idea: Only in social groups does a person have a chance to develop individuality. | |
From: John Dewey (The Middle Works (15 vols, ed Boydston) [1910], 15:176), quoted by David Hildebrand - Dewey 4 'Individuals' | |
A reaction: This is a criticism of both Rawls and Nozick. Rawls's initial choosers don't consult, or have much social background. Nozick's property owners ignore everything except contracts. |
14346 | Dispositional essentialism says fundamental laws of nature are strict, not ceteris paribus [Corry] |
Full Idea: Dispositional essentialism implies that the fundamental laws of nature must be strict, not ceteris paribus. | |
From: Richard Corry (Dispositional Essentialism Grounds Laws of Nature? [2010], 1) | |
A reaction: I am not keen on the 'laws' of nature, but since essentialism seems to make them necessary, you can't get stricter than that. |