Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Praed.', 'Some Main Problems of Philosophy' and 'Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations''

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3 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / c. Philosophy as generalisation

17992	The main aim of philosophy is to describe the whole Universe. [Moore,GE]
	Full Idea: It seems to me that the most important and interesting thing which philosophers have tried to do ...is to give a general description of the whole of the Universe.
	From: G.E. Moore (Some Main Problems of Philosophy [1911], Ch. 1)
	A reaction: He adds that they aim to show what is in it, and what might be in it, and how the two relate. This sort of big view is the one I favour. I think the hallmark of philosophical thought is a high level of generality. He next proceeds to defend common sense.

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance

16776	Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
	Full Idea: Substance ...is an ens per se. No part of a substance is an ens per se when it is part of a substance, because then it would be a particular thing, and one substance would be a particular thing from many things, which does not seem to be true.
	From: John Duns Scotus (In Praed. [1300], 15.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1
	A reaction: The tricky bit is 'when it is a part of a substance', meaning a substance must cease to be a substance when it is subsumed into some greater substance. Maybe. Drops of water? Molecules? Bricks? Cells?

15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy

14644	If my conception of pain derives from me, it is a contradiction to speak of another's pain [Malcolm]
	Full Idea: If I obtain my conception of pain from pain that I experience, then it will be a part of my conception of pain that I am the only being that can experience it. For me it will be contradiction to speak of another's pain.
	From: Norman Malcolm (Wittgenstein's 'Philosophical Investigations' [1954]), quoted by Alvin Plantinga - De Re and De Dicto p.44
	A reaction: This obviously has the private language argument in the background. It seems to point towards a behaviourist view, that I derive pain from external behaviour in the first instance. So how do I connect the behaviour to the feeling?