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All the ideas for 'Ordinatio', 'Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia' and 'Persistence, Change and Explanation'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 2. Analysis by Division
13099 Analysing right down to primitive concepts seems beyond our powers [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: An analysis of concepts such that we can reach primitive concepts...does not seem to be within human power.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], C513-14), quoted by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz
     A reaction: Leibniz is nevertheless fully committed, I think, to the existence of such primitives, and is in the grip of the rationalist dream that thoughts can become completely clear, and completely well-founded.
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
5022 We hold a proposition true if we are ready to follow it, and can't see any objections [Leibniz]
     Full Idea: A proposition is held to be true by us when our mind is ready to follow it and no reason for doubting it can be found.
     From: Gottfried Leibniz (Introduction to a Secret Encyclopaedia [1679], p.7)
     A reaction: This follows on from Descartes' view, but it now sounds more like psychology than metaphysics. Clearly a false proposition could fit this desciption. Personally I follow propositions to which I can see no objection, without actually holding them true.
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
13931 By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: The Aristotelian method of working form aporia allows one to use as starting points not only what is said by 'the many', but also what is said by 'the wise', including philosophers.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1 n2)
     A reaction: [She mentions Nussbaum 1986:ch 7 for the opposing view] I like this thought a lot. Aristotle's democratic respect for widespread views can be a bit puzzling sometimes.
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13925 Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Disputes over ontology derive from more fundamental disputes over forms of explanation.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1)
     A reaction: It immediately strikes me that Haslanger has stolen my master idea, but unfortunately the dating suggests that she has priority. The tricky part is to combine this view with realism.
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
16648 Accidents must have formal being, if they are principles of real action, and of mental action and thought [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: Accidents are principles of acting and principles of cognizing substance, and are the per se objects of the senses. But it is ridiculous to say that something is a principle of acting (either real or intentional) and yet does not have any formal being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.12.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 10.5
     A reaction: Pasnau cites this as the key scholastic argument for accidental properties having some independent and real existence (as required for Transubstantiation). Rival views say accidents are just 'modes' of a thing's existence. Aquinas compromised.
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
15386 If only the singular exists, science is impossible, as that relies on true generalities [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that if everything is singular, with no objective common feature, science would be impossible, as it proceeds from general concepts. General is the opposite of singular, so it would be inadequate to understand a singular reality.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: [compressed] It is a fact that if you generalise about 'tigers', you are glossing over the individuality of each singular tiger. That is OK for 'electron', if they really are identical, but our general predicates may be imposing identity on electrons.
15387 If things were singular they would only differ numerically, but horse and tulip differ more than that [Duns Scotus, by Panaccio]
     Full Idea: Scotus argued that there must be some non-singular aspects of things, since there are some 'less than numerical differences' among them. A horse and a tulip differ more from each other than do two horses.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Claude Panaccio - Medieval Problem of Universals 'John Duns'
     A reaction: This seems to treat being 'singular' as if it were being a singularity. Presumably he is contemplating a thing being nothing but its Scotist haecceity. A neat argument, but I don't buy it.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
16632 We distinguish one thing from another by contradiction, because this is, and that is not [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it [that establishes distinctness of things]? It is, to be sure, that which is universally the reason for distinguishing one thing from another: namely, a contradiction…..If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 08.2
     A reaction: This is a remarkably intellectualist view of such things. John Wycliff, apparently, enquired about how animals were going to manage all this sort of thing. It should appeal to the modern logical approach to metaphysics.
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
13094 The haecceity is the featureless thing which gives ultimate individuality to a substance [Duns Scotus, by Cover/O'Leary-Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: For Scotus, the haecceity of an individual was a positive non-quidditative entity which, together with a common nature from which it was formally distinct, played the role of the ultimate differentia, thus individuating the substance.
     From: report of John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302]) by Cover,J/O'Leary-Hawthorne,J - Substance and Individuation in Leibniz 6.1.3
     A reaction: Most thinkers seem to agree (with me) that this is a non-starter, an implausible postulate designed to fill a gap in a metaphysic that hasn't been properly worked out. Leibniz is the hero who faces the problem and works around it.
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
16770 It is absurd that there is no difference between a genuinely unified thing, and a mere aggregate [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: It seems absurd …that there should be no difference between a whole that is one thing per se, and a whole that is one thing by aggregation, like a cloud or a heap.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], III.2.2), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.5
     A reaction: Leibniz invented monads because he was driven crazy by the quest for 'true unity' in things. Objective unity may be bogus, but I suspect that imposing plausible unity on things is the only way we can grasp the world.
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
10919 What prevents a stone from being divided into parts which are still the stone? [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: What is it in this stone, by which ...it is absolutely incompatible with the stone for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into its subjective parts?
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], II d3 p1 q2 n48)
     A reaction: This is the origin of the concept of haecceity, when Scotus wants to know what exactly individuates each separate entity. He may have been mistaken in thinking that such a question has an answer.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
13924 The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: The notion that things persist through change is deeply embedded in ideas we have about explanation, and in particular, in the idea that the present is constrained by the past.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 1)
     A reaction: I take this to be both an important and an attractive idea. Deniers of persistence (4D-ists) will presumably have some ability to explain the present, but it is the idea of the present being 'constrained' by the past which is a challenge.
13930 Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Persistence offers intelligibility: the possibility of understanding a change, and of understanding the products of it.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 8)
     A reaction: I think this is exactly right, and it is a powerful idea with wide implications for metaphysics. Haslanger claims that an understanding of 'substance' is needed, which leads towards my defence of essentialism.
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: If the world of time-slices is to be explicable, then it must be possible to provide explanations of change understood as a continual generation and destruction of these 'momentary entities'.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: While fans of time-slices can offer some sort of explanation, in the process of explaining a 'worm', there don't seem to be the sort of causal chains that we traditionally rely on. Maybe there are no explanations of anything?
13928 If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: How is the case in which A exists prior to B, but is distinct from B, different (especially from B's point of view) from the case in which nothing exists prior to B?
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: I sympathise with her view, but this isn't persuasive. For A substitute 'Sally's mother' and for B substitute 'Sally'. A 4D-ist could bite the bullet and say that, indeed, previous parts of my 'worm' need not have existed.
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
16768 Two things are different if something is true of one and not of the other [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: If this is, and that is not, then they are not the same entity in being.
     From: John Duns Scotus (Ordinatio [1302], IV.11.3), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 25.3
     A reaction: This is the contrapositive of the indiscernibility of identicals, expressed in terms of what is true about a thing, rather than what properties pertain to it.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: Natural explanations work by showing the systematic causal interconnections between things.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 7)
     A reaction: On the whole I love this sort of idea, but I am wondering if this one prevents mathematical or logical explanations from being natural.
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
13926 Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
     Full Idea: I am not resting my ontology on a simple 'argument to the best explanation'. ..What I want to say is that there are general demands on a kind of explanation, in particular, natural explanation, which require that there are persisting things.
     From: Sally Haslanger (Persistence, Change and Explanation [1989], 5)
     A reaction: This is a really nice idea - that best explanation is not just about specific cases, but also about best foundations for explanations in general, which brings in our metaphysics. I defend the role of essences in these best explanations.