Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Praed.', 'The Theory of Epistemic Rationality' and 'Rules for the Direction of the Mind'

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3 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
     Full Idea: Substance ...is an ens per se. No part of a substance is an ens per se when it is part of a substance, because then it would be a particular thing, and one substance would be a particular thing from many things, which does not seem to be true.
     From: John Duns Scotus (In Praed. [1300], 15.1), quoted by Robert Pasnau - Metaphysical Themes 1274-1671 26.1
     A reaction: The tricky bit is 'when it is a part of a substance', meaning a substance must cease to be a substance when it is subsumed into some greater substance. Maybe. Drops of water? Molecules? Bricks? Cells?
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes]
     Full Idea: In our search for the direct road towards truth we should busy ourselves with no object about which we cannot attain a certitude equal to that of the demonstrations of Arithmetic and Geometry.
     From: René Descartes (Rules for the Direction of the Mind [1628], Rule II), quoted by Alain Badiou - Mathematics and Philosophy: grand and little p.8
     A reaction: A beautiful statement of the way in which rationalist philosophy was founded on the model of mathematics (esp. Euclid), with all its concomitant problems. The most important concept of the last hundred years may well be fallibilist rationalism.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Rational internal belief is conviction that a proposition enhances a belief system [Foley, by Vahid]
     Full Idea: In Foley's subjective internalist account it is egocentrically rational for an agent to believe a proposition only if he would think on deep reflection that believing it is conducive to having an accurate and comprehensive belief system.
     From: report of Richard Foley (The Theory of Epistemic Rationality [1987], 2.1 B) by Hamid Vahid - Externalism/Internalism
     A reaction: I like this idea, because it indicates the link between internalism and coherence about justification. I don't think you can be an externalist coherence theorist for justification. [Reminder: Paul Thagard is the best writer on coherence].