13 ideas
17954 | Essence is a thing's necessities, but what about its possibilities (which may not be realised)? [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Essence is, as it were, necessity rooted in things, ...but how about possibility rooted in things? ...Having the potential to Φ, unlike being essentially Φ, does not entail being actually Φ. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §2) | |
A reaction: To me this invites the question 'what is it about the entity which endows it with its rooted possibilities?' A thing has possibilities because it has a certain nature (at a given time). |
17953 | Real definition fits abstracta, but not individual concrete objects like Socrates [Vetter] |
Full Idea: I can understand the notion of real definition as applying to (some) abstact entities, but I have no idea how to apply it to a concrete object such as Socrates or myself. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) | |
A reaction: She is objecting to Kit Fine's account of essence, which is meant to be clearer than the normal account of essences based on necessities. Aristotle implies that definitions get fuzzy when you reach the level of the individual. |
17952 | Modal accounts make essence less mysterious, by basing them on the clearer necessity [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The modal account was meant, I take it, to make the notion of essence less mysterious by basing it on the supposedly better understood notion of necessity. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §1) |
17959 | Metaphysical necessity is even more deeply empirical than Kripke has argued [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We support the views of metaphysical modality on which metaphysical necessity is an even more deeply empirical matter than Kripke has argued. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], p.2) | |
A reaction: [co-author E. Viebahn] This seems to pinpoint the spirit of scientific essentialism. She cites Bird and Shoemaker. If it is empirical, doesn't that make it a matter of epistemology, and hence further from absolute necessity? |
17955 | Possible worlds allow us to talk about degrees of possibility [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The apparatus of possible worlds affords greater expressive power than mere talk of possibility and necessity. In particular, possible worlds talk allows us to introduce degrees of possibility. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: A nice feature, but I'm not sure that either the proportion of possible worlds or the closeness of possible worlds captures what we actually mean by a certain degree of possibility. There is 'accidental closeness', or absence of contingency. See Vetter. |
17957 | Maybe possibility is constituted by potentiality [Vetter] |
Full Idea: We should look at the claim that possibility is constituted by potentiality. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A problem that comes to mind is possibilities arising from coincidence. The whole of reality must be described, to capture all the possibilities for a particular thing. So potentialities of what? Nice thought, though. |
17958 | The apparently metaphysically possible may only be epistemically possible [Vetter] |
Full Idea: Some of what metaphysicians take to be metaphysically possible turns out to be only epistemically possible. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §4) | |
A reaction: A nice clear expression of the increasingly common view that conceivability may be a limited way to grasp possibility. |
17956 | Closeness of worlds should be determined by the intrinsic nature of relevant objects [Vetter] |
Full Idea: The closeness of possible worlds should be determined by similarity in the intrinsic constitution of whatever object it is whose potentialities are at issue. | |
From: Barbara Vetter (Essence and Potentiality [2010], §3) | |
A reaction: Nice thought. This seems to be the essentialist approach to possible worlds, but it makes the natures of the objects more fundamental than the framework of the worlds. She demurs because there are also extrinsic potentialities. |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: If I utter 'I know I have a hand' then I can only be reckoned a cooperative conversant by my interlocutors on the assumption that there was a real question as to whether I have a hand. | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to point to the contextualist approach to global scepticism, which concerns whether we are setting the bar high or low for 'knowledge'. |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Those who deny skepticism but accept closure will have to explain how we know the various 'heavyweight' skeptical hypotheses to be false. Do we then twist the concept of knowledge to fit the twin desiderata of closue and anti-skepticism? | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He is giving Dretske's view; Dretske says we do twist knowledge] Thus if I remember yesterday, that has the heavyweight implication that the past is real. Hawthorne nicely summarises why closure produces a philosophical problem. |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Maybe one cannot know the logical consequences of the proposition that one knows, on account of the fact that small risks add up to big risks. | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea of closure is that the new knowledge has the certainty of logic, and each step is accepted. An array of receding propositions can lose reliability, but that shouldn't apply to logic implications. Assuming monotonic logic, of course. |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: How could we know that P and Q but not be in a position to know that P (as deniers of closure must say)? If my glass is full of wine, we know 'g is full of wine, and not full of non-wine'. How can we deny that we know it is not full of non-wine? | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Hawthorne merely raises this doubt. Dretske is concerned with heavyweight implications, but how do you accept lightweight implications like this one, and then suddenly reject them when they become too heavy? [see p.49] |
21996 | Freedom only comes when labour is no longer necessary [Marx] |
Full Idea: The realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases. | |
From: Karl Marx (Capital Vol. 3 [1873], p.496), quoted by Peter Singer - Marx 8 | |
A reaction: This is a bit discouraging fo idealistic dreamers. Modern political thought needs an ecological dimension to this problem. If society always needs a fair degree of labour, there must be a way to maximise freedom in that context. |