55 ideas
354 | Wisdom makes virtue and true goodness possible [Plato] |
Full Idea: It is wisdom that makes possible courage and self-control and integrity or, in a word, true goodness. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 069b) | |
A reaction: Aristotle also says that prudence (phronesis) makes virtue possible. |
14888 | Wisdom prevents us from being ruled by the moment [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The most important thing about wisdom is that it prevents human beings from being ruled by the moment. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [25]) |
14863 | Unlike science, true wisdom involves good taste [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Inherent in wisdom [sophia] is discrimination, the possession of good taste: whereas science, lacking such a refined sense of taste, gobbles up anything that is worth knowing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [086]) | |
A reaction: This is blatantly unfair to science, which may lack 'taste', but at least prefers deep theories with wide-ranging explanatory power to narrow local theories. Maybe the line across the philosophical community is the one picking out those with taste? |
14890 | Suffering is the meaning of existence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Suffering is the meaning of existence. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 32 [67]) | |
A reaction: This doesn't mean that he is advocating suffering. The context of his remark is that the pursuit of truth involves suffering. |
14861 | Philosophy ennobles the world, by producing an artistic conception of our knowledge [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Philosophy is indispensable for education because it draws knowledge into an artistic conception of the world, and thereby ennobles it. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [052]) | |
A reaction: I take this to be an unusual way of saying that philosophy aims at the unification of knowledge, which is roughly my own view. It has hard for us to keep believing that life could be 'ennobled'. |
14885 | The first aim of a philosopher is a life, not some works [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The philosopher's product is his life (first, before his works). It is his work of art. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [205]) |
14887 | You should only develop a philosophy if you are willing to live by it [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: One should have a philosophy only to the extent that one is capable of living according to this philosophy: so that everything does not become mere words. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [17]) |
370 | Philosophy is a purification of the soul ready for the afterlife [Plato] |
Full Idea: Souls which have purified themselves sufficiently by philosophy will live after death without bodies. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 114b) | |
A reaction: Purifying it of what? Error, or desire, or narrow-mindedness, or the physical? |
14889 | Philosophy is pointless if it does not advocate, and live, a new way of life [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: As long as philosophers do not muster the courage to advocate a lifestyle structured in an entirely different way and demonstrate it by their own example, they will come to nothing. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 31 [10]) | |
A reaction: This is a pretty tough requirement for the leading logicians and metaphysicians of our day, but they must face their marginality. The public will only be interested in philosophers who advocate new ways of living. |
14862 | Philosophy is more valuable than much of science, because of its beauty [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The reason why unprovable philosophizing still has some value - more value, in fact, than many a scientific proposition - lies in the aesthetic value of such philosophizing, that is, in its beauty and sublimity. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [076]) | |
A reaction: I am increasingly inclined to agree. I love wide-ranging and ambitious works of metaphysics, each of which is a unique creation of the human intellect (and with which no other individual will ever entirely agree). A great short paper is also beautiful. |
14876 | Philosophy is always secondary, because it cannot support a popular culture [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It is not possible to base a popular culture on philosophy. Thus, with regard to culture, philosophy never can have primary, but always only secondary, significance. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 23 [14]) | |
A reaction: It is the brilliance of Christianity as a set of ideas that it is simple enough to found a popular culture. A complex theology would make that impossible. Luther brought it back to its roots, when the priesthood lost touch with the people. |
14878 | It would better if there was no thought [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: It would be better if thought did not exist at all. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [004]) |
14881 | Why do people want philosophers? [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Why do human beings even want philosophers? | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [019]) | |
A reaction: It is not clear, of course, that they do want philosophers. The standard attitude to them seems to be a mixture of contempt and fear. |
14860 | Kant has undermined our belief in metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: In a certain sense, Kant's influence was detrimental; for the belief in metaphysics has been lost. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [028]) | |
A reaction: As I understand it, there are two interpretations of Kant, one of which is fairly thoroughly anti-metaphysical, and another which is less so. Also one path leads to idealism and the other doesn't, but I need to research that. |
14859 | If philosophy controls science, then it has to determine its scope, and its value [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The philosophy that is in control of science must also consider the extent to which science should be allowed to develop; it must determine its value! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [024]) |
350 | In investigation the body leads us astray, but the soul gets a clear view of the facts [Plato] |
Full Idea: When philosophers investigate with the help of the body they are led astray, but through reflection the soul gets a clear view of the facts. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 065c) |
362 | The greatest misfortune for a person is to develop a dislike for argument [Plato] |
Full Idea: No greater misfortune could happen to anyone than developing a dislike for argument. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 089d) |
14880 | Logic is just slavery to language [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Logic is merely slavery in the fetters of language. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [008]) | |
A reaction: I don't think I agree with this, but I still like it. |
13155 | If you add one to one, which one becomes two, or do they both become two? [Plato] |
Full Idea: I cannot convince myself that when you add one to one either the first or the second one becomes two, or they both become two by the addition of the one to the other, ...or that when you divide one, the cause of becoming two is now the division. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: Lovely questions, all leading to the conclusion that two consists of partaking in duality, to which you can come by several different routes. |
14869 | If some sort of experience is at the root of matter, then human knowledge is close to its essence [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If pleasure, displeasure, sensation, memory, reflex movements are all part of the essence of matter, then human knowledge penetrates far more deeply into the essence of things. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [161]) | |
A reaction: I don't think Nietzsche is thinking of monads at this point, but his idea certainly applies to them. Leibniz rested his whole theory on the close analogy between how minds work and how matter must also work. |
21347 | If Simmias is taller than Socrates, that isn't a feature that is just in Simmias [Plato] |
Full Idea: When you say Simmias is taller than Socrates but shorter than Phaedo, so you mean there is in Simmias both tallness and shortness? - I do. ...But surely he is not taller than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the tallness he happens to have? | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102b-c) | |
A reaction: He adds that both people must be cited. This appears to be what we now call a rejection relative height as an 'internal' relation, which is it would presumably be if it was a feature of one or of both men. |
360 | We must have a prior knowledge of equality, if we see 'equal' things and realise they fall short of it [Plato] |
Full Idea: We must have some previous knowledge of equality, before the time when we saw equal things, but realised that they fell short of it. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 075a) |
1 | There is only one source for all beauty [Plato] |
Full Idea: If anything is beautiful other than beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other reason but because it participates in that beautiful. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 100c) | |
A reaction: The Greek word will be 'kalon' (beautiful, fine, noble). Like Aristotle, I find it baffling that such diversity could have a single source. Beautiful things have diverse aims. |
368 | Other things are named after the Forms because they participate in them [Plato] |
Full Idea: The reason why other things are called after the forms is that they participate in the forms. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 102a) |
16516 | The ship which Theseus took to Crete is now sent to Delos crowned with flowers [Plato] |
Full Idea: The day before the trial the prow of the ship that the Athenians send to Delos had been crowned with garlands. - Which ship is that? - It is the ship in which, the Athenians say, Theseus once sailed to Crete, taking the victims. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 058a) | |
A reaction: Not philosophical, but this is the Ship of Theseus whose subsequent identity, Plutarch tells us, became a matter of dispute. |
14875 | Belief matters more than knowledge, and only begins when knowledge ceases [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The human being starts to believe when he ceases to know. …Knowledge is not as important for the welfare of human beings as is belief. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 21 [13]) | |
A reaction: The first idea is now associated with Williamson (and Hossack). The second is something like the pragmatic view of belief espoused by Ramsey. |
19553 | Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: If I utter 'I know I have a hand' then I can only be reckoned a cooperative conversant by my interlocutors on the assumption that there was a real question as to whether I have a hand. | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: This seems to point to the contextualist approach to global scepticism, which concerns whether we are setting the bar high or low for 'knowledge'. |
14866 | It always remains possible that the world just is the way it appears [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Against Kant we can still object, even if we accept all his propositions, that it is still possible that the world is as it appears to us. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [125]) | |
A reaction: This little thought at least seems to be enough to block the slide from phenomenalism into total idealism. The idea that direct realism can never be ruled out, even if it is false, is very striking. |
359 | If we feel the inadequacy of a resemblance, we must recollect the original [Plato] |
Full Idea: If someone sees a resemblance, but feels that it falls far short of the original, they must therefore have a recollection of the original. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 074e) |
357 | People are obviously recollecting when they react to a geometrical diagram [Plato] |
Full Idea: The way in which people react to a geometrical diagram or anything like that is unmistakable proof of the theory of recollection. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 073a) |
9343 | To achieve pure knowledge, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things with the soul [Plato] |
Full Idea: We are convinced that if we are ever to have pure knowledge of anything, we must get rid of the body and contemplate things by themselves with the soul by itself. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) | |
A reaction: This seems to be the original ideal which motivates the devotion to a priori knowledge - that it will lead to a 'pure' knowledge, which in Plato's case will be eternal and necessary knowledge, like taking lessons from the gods. Wrong. |
19551 | How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Those who deny skepticism but accept closure will have to explain how we know the various 'heavyweight' skeptical hypotheses to be false. Do we then twist the concept of knowledge to fit the twin desiderata of closue and anti-skepticism? | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], Intro) | |
A reaction: [He is giving Dretske's view; Dretske says we do twist knowledge] Thus if I remember yesterday, that has the heavyweight implication that the past is real. Hawthorne nicely summarises why closure produces a philosophical problem. |
19552 | We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: Maybe one cannot know the logical consequences of the proposition that one knows, on account of the fact that small risks add up to big risks. | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 1) | |
A reaction: The idea of closure is that the new knowledge has the certainty of logic, and each step is accepted. An array of receding propositions can lose reliability, but that shouldn't apply to logic implications. Assuming monotonic logic, of course. |
19554 | Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne] |
Full Idea: How could we know that P and Q but not be in a position to know that P (as deniers of closure must say)? If my glass is full of wine, we know 'g is full of wine, and not full of non-wine'. How can we deny that we know it is not full of non-wine? | |
From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2) | |
A reaction: Hawthorne merely raises this doubt. Dretske is concerned with heavyweight implications, but how do you accept lightweight implications like this one, and then suddenly reject them when they become too heavy? [see p.49] |
14872 | Our knowledge is illogical, because it rests on false identities between things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Every piece of knowledge that is beneficial to us involves an identification of nonidentical things, of things that are similar, which means that it is essentially illogical. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [236]) | |
A reaction: I take the thought to be that no two tigers are alike, but we call them all 'tigers' and merge them into a type, and then all our knowledge is based on this distortion. A wonderful idea. I love particulars You should love particulars. |
14879 | The most extreme scepticism is when you even give up logic [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Even skepticism contains a belief: the belief in logic. The most extreme position is hence the abandoning of logic. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [008]) | |
A reaction: Some might say that flirting with non-classical logic (as in Graham Priest) is precisely travelling down this road. You could also be sceptical about meaning in language, so you couldn't articulate your abandonment of logic. |
15859 | To investigate the causes of things, study what is best for them [Plato] |
Full Idea: If one wished to know the cause of each thing, why it comes to be or perishes or exists, one had to find what was the best way for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. Then it befitted a man to investigate only ...what is best. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097d) | |
A reaction: A reversal of the modern idea of 'best explanation'. Socrates is citing Anaxagoras's proposal to understand things by interpreting the workings of a supreme Mind. It is the religious version of best explanation. |
14873 | If we find a hypothesis that explains many things, we conclude that it explains everything [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The feeling of certainty is the most difficult to develop. Initially one seeks explanation: if a hypothesis explains many things, we draw the conclusion that it explains everything. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [238]) | |
A reaction: As so often, a wonderful warning from Nietzsche to other philosophers. They love to latch onto a Big Idea, and offer it as the answer to everything (especially, dare I say it, continental philosophers). |
13154 | Do we think and experience with blood, air or fire, or could it be our brain? [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is it with the blood that we think, or with the air or the fire that is in us? Or is it none of these, but the brain that supplies our senses of hearing and sight and smell. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 097a) | |
A reaction: In retrospect it seems surprising that such clever people hadn't worked this one out, given the evidence of anatomy, in animals and people, and given brain injuries. By the time of Galen they appear to have got the answer. |
14868 | Our primary faculty is perception of structure, as when looking in a mirror [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The primary faculty seems to me to be the perception of structure, that is, based upon the mirror. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [153]) | |
A reaction: The point about the mirror makes this such an intriguingly original idea. Personally I like very much the idea that structure is our prime perception. See Sider 2011 on structure. |
14870 | We experience causation between willing and acting, and thereby explain conjunctions of changes [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The only form of causality of which we are aware is that between willing and acting - we transfer this to all things, and thereby explain the relationship between two changes that always occur together. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [209]) | |
A reaction: This is a rather Humean view, of projecting our experience onto the world, but it may be that we really are experiencing real causation, just as it occurs between insentiate things. |
364 | One soul can't be more or less of a soul than another [Plato] |
Full Idea: Is one soul, even minutely, more or less of a soul than another? Not in the least. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 093b) | |
A reaction: This idea is attractive because unconsciousness and death seem to be abrupt procedures, and so appear to be all-or-nothing, but I would personally view extreme Alzheimer's as an erasing of the soul, though a minimum level of it seems all-or-nothing. |
14867 | It is just madness to think that the mind is supernatural (or even divine!) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: To view 'spirit', the product of the brain, as supernatural. Even to deify it. What madness! | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [127]) | |
A reaction: When I started philolosophy I was obliged to take mind-body dualism very seriously, but I have finally managed to drag myself to the shores of this lake of madness, where Nietzsche awaited with a helping hand. |
14884 | The shortest path to happiness is forgetfulness, the path of animals (but of little value) [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: If happiness were the goal, then animals would be the highest creatures. Their cynicism is grounded in forgetfulness: that is the shortest path to happiness, even if it is a happiness with little value. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [143]) | |
A reaction: I would be reluctant to describe an apparently contented cow as 'happy'. Is a comatose person happy? Maybe happiness is fulfilling one's nature, like a monkey swinging through trees? |
361 | It is a mistake to think that the most violent pleasure or pain is therefore the truest reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent emotion is the plainest and truest reality - which it is not. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 084c) | |
A reaction: Do people think that? Most people distinguish subjective from objective. Wounded soldiers are also aware of victory or defeat. |
351 | War aims at the acquisition of wealth, because we are enslaved to the body [Plato] |
Full Idea: All wars are undertaken for the acquisition of wealth, and we want this because of the body, to which we are slave. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 066c) |
14886 | Education is contrary to human nature [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Education runs contrary to the nature of a human being. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 30 [06]) | |
A reaction: Tell me about it! |
14883 | We should evaluate the past morally [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: For the past I desire above all a moral evaluation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [096]) | |
A reaction: There is a bit of a contradiction with Idea 14819, of only a few years later. He was always interested in a historical approach to morality, but I'm not sure if his ethics gives a decent basis for moral assessments of remote historical eras. |
14882 | Protest against vivisection - living things should not become objects of scientific investigation [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: Protest against vivisection of living things, that is, those things that are not yet dead should be allowed to live and not immediately be treated as an object for scientific investigation. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 29 [027]) | |
A reaction: Wow. How many other people had come up with this idea in 1873? |
13156 | Fancy being unable to distinguish a cause from its necessary background conditions! [Plato] |
Full Idea: Fancy being unable to distinguish between the cause of a thing, and the condition without which it could not be a cause. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 099c) | |
A reaction: Not as simple as he thinks. It seems fairly easy to construct a case where the immediately impacting event remains constant, and the background condition is changed. Even worse when negligence is held to be the cause. |
14865 | We do not know the nature of one single causality [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: We do not know the nature of one single causality. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [121]) |
14871 | Laws of nature are merely complex networks of relations [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: All laws of nature are only relations between x, y and z. We define laws of nature as relations to an x, y, and z, each of which in turn, is known to us only in relation to other x's, y's and z's. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [235]) | |
A reaction: This could be interpreted in Armstrong's terms, as only identifying the x's, y's and z's by their universals, and then seeing laws as how those universal relate. I suspect, though, that Nietzsche has a Humean regularity pattern in mind. |
369 | If the Earth is spherical and in the centre, it is kept in place by universal symmetry, not by force [Plato] |
Full Idea: If the earth is spherical and in the middle of the heavens, it needs neither air nor force to keep it from falling. The uniformity of heaven and equilibrium of earth are sufficient support. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 108e) |
14864 | The Greeks lack a normative theology: each person has their own poetic view of things [Nietzsche] |
Full Idea: The Greeks lack a normative theology: everyone has the right to deal with it in a poetic manner and he can believe whatever he wants. | |
From: Friedrich Nietzsche (Unpublished Notebooks 1872-74 [1873], 19 [110]) | |
A reaction: There is quite a lot of record of harshness towards atheists, and the trial of Socrates seems to have been partly over theology. However, no proper theological texts have come down, or records of the teachings of the priests. |
363 | Whether the soul pre-exists our body depends on whether it contains the ultimate standard of reality [Plato] |
Full Idea: The theory that our soul exists even before it enters the body surely stands or falls with the soul's possession of the ultimate standard of reality. | |
From: Plato (Phaedo [c.382 BCE], 092d) |