Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Theological and other works' and 'fragments/reports'

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9 ideas

7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being

18933	Not-Being obviously doesn't exist, and the five modes of Being are all impossible [Gorgias, by Diog. Laertius]
	Full Idea: I. Nothing exists. a) Not-Being does not exist. b) Being does not exist as everlasting, as created, as both, as One, or as Many. II. If anything does exist, it is incomprehensible. III. If existence is comprehensible, it is incommunicable.
	From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE], B03) by Diogenes Laertius - Lives of Eminent Philosophers 09
	A reaction: [Also Sextus Empiricus, Against Logicians I.65-] For Part I he works through all the possible modes of being he can think of, and explains why none of them are possible. It is worth remembering that Gorgias loved rhetoric, not philosophy!

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers

15312	We get the idea of power by abstracting from ropes, magnets and electric shocks [Priestley]
	Full Idea: A rope sustains weight, a magnet attracts iron, a charged electrical jar gives a shock, and from these and other similar observations, we get the idea of power, universally and abstractly considered.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.191), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: I agree with this, in that we appear to be observing powers directly, and are not observing something which can then be reduced to non-powers. Nature just can't be a set of inert structures, with forces 'imposed' on them.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty

19553	Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: If I utter 'I know I have a hand' then I can only be reckoned a cooperative conversant by my interlocutors on the assumption that there was a real question as to whether I have a hand.
	From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2)
	A reaction: This seems to point to the contextualist approach to global scepticism, which concerns whether we are setting the bar high or low for 'knowledge'.

13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure

19551	How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: Those who deny skepticism but accept closure will have to explain how we know the various 'heavyweight' skeptical hypotheses to be false. Do we then twist the concept of knowledge to fit the twin desiderata of closue and anti-skepticism?
	From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], Intro)
	A reaction: [He is giving Dretske's view; Dretske says we do twist knowledge] Thus if I remember yesterday, that has the heavyweight implication that the past is real. Hawthorne nicely summarises why closure produces a philosophical problem.

19552	We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: Maybe one cannot know the logical consequences of the proposition that one knows, on account of the fact that small risks add up to big risks.
	From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 1)
	A reaction: The idea of closure is that the new knowledge has the certainty of logic, and each step is accepted. An array of receding propositions can lose reliability, but that shouldn't apply to logic implications. Assuming monotonic logic, of course.

19554	Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
	Full Idea: How could we know that P and Q but not be in a position to know that P (as deniers of closure must say)? If my glass is full of wine, we know 'g is full of wine, and not full of non-wine'. How can we deny that we know it is not full of non-wine?
	From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2)
	A reaction: Hawthorne merely raises this doubt. Dretske is concerned with heavyweight implications, but how do you accept lightweight implications like this one, and then suddenly reject them when they become too heavy? [see p.49]

19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric

9866	Gorgias says rhetoric is the best of arts, because it enslaves without using force [Gorgias, by Plato]
	Full Idea: Gorgias insists that the art of persuasion is superior to all others because it enslaves all the rest, with their own consent, not by force, and is therefore by far the best of all the arts.
	From: report of Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]) by Plato - Philebus 58a
	A reaction: A nice point, and it is not unreasonable to rank the arts in order of their power. To enchant, without achieving agreement, and to speak truth without persuading, are both very fine, but there is something about success that cannot be gainsaid.

5864	Destroy seriousness with laughter, and laughter with seriousness [Gorgias]
	Full Idea: Destroy the seriousness of others with laughter, and their laughter with seriousness.
	From: Gorgias (fragments/reports [c.443 BCE]), quoted by Aristotle - The Art of Rhetoric 1419b
	A reaction: This sounds like brilliant tactical advice, which should be on the wall of every barrister's chambers. This is a case of rhetoric having something to teach us which is nothing at all to do with truth. It is more like learning karate.

27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter

15311	Attraction or repulsion are not imparted to matter, but actually constitute it [Priestley]
	Full Idea: Attraction or repulsion appear to me not to be properly what is imparted to matter, but what really makes it what it is, in so much that, without it, it would be nothing at all.
	From: Joseph Priestley (Theological and other works [1790], p.237), quoted by Harré,R./Madden,E.H. - Causal Powers 9.II.B
	A reaction: This is music to the ears of anyone who thinks that powers are the fundamentals of nature (like me).