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All the ideas for 'The Case for Closure', 'Philosophy' and 'The Artworld'

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7 ideas

11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Knowledge is beyond question, as an unavoidable component of thinking [Weil]
     Full Idea: The speaker refuses to pose the question of knowledge, since knowledge is a given that is mixed with thought, and that no thinking being can get away from.
     From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.42)
     A reaction: On the whole I favour belief-first, but I take the primary purpose of minds to be navigation, and that needs facts, not hopeful beliefs. Weil's thought pushes me a bit towards the knowledge first view.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Commitment to 'I have a hand' only makes sense in a context where it has been doubted [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: If I utter 'I know I have a hand' then I can only be reckoned a cooperative conversant by my interlocutors on the assumption that there was a real question as to whether I have a hand.
     From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2)
     A reaction: This seems to point to the contextualist approach to global scepticism, which concerns whether we are setting the bar high or low for 'knowledge'.
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
How can we know the heavyweight implications of normal knowledge? Must we distort 'knowledge'? [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Those who deny skepticism but accept closure will have to explain how we know the various 'heavyweight' skeptical hypotheses to be false. Do we then twist the concept of knowledge to fit the twin desiderata of closue and anti-skepticism?
     From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], Intro)
     A reaction: [He is giving Dretske's view; Dretske says we do twist knowledge] Thus if I remember yesterday, that has the heavyweight implication that the past is real. Hawthorne nicely summarises why closure produces a philosophical problem.
We wouldn't know the logical implications of our knowledge if small risks added up to big risks [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: Maybe one cannot know the logical consequences of the proposition that one knows, on account of the fact that small risks add up to big risks.
     From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 1)
     A reaction: The idea of closure is that the new knowledge has the certainty of logic, and each step is accepted. An array of receding propositions can lose reliability, but that shouldn't apply to logic implications. Assuming monotonic logic, of course.
Denying closure is denying we know P when we know P and Q, which is absurd in simple cases [Hawthorne]
     Full Idea: How could we know that P and Q but not be in a position to know that P (as deniers of closure must say)? If my glass is full of wine, we know 'g is full of wine, and not full of non-wine'. How can we deny that we know it is not full of non-wine?
     From: John Hawthorne (The Case for Closure [2005], 2)
     A reaction: Hawthorne merely raises this doubt. Dretske is concerned with heavyweight implications, but how do you accept lightweight implications like this one, and then suddenly reject them when they become too heavy? [see p.49]
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 1. Defining Art
Art (like philosophy) establishes a relation between world and self, and between oneself and others [Weil]
     Full Idea: Isn't true art a method for establishing a certain relation between the world and the self, and between oneself and others, and isn't that the equivalent of philosophy?
     From: Simone Weil (Philosophy [1941], p.38)
     A reaction: I hope the definition of 'true' art doesn't have to conform to achieving this relation. I suppose each good work of art shows you a distinctive way of relating to the world. An interesting thought (as so often with this thinker).
21. Aesthetics / B. Nature of Art / 6. Art as Institution
A thing is only seen as art in an 'artworld', which has a theory and a history [Danto]
     Full Idea: To see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry - an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld.
     From: Arthur C. Danto (The Artworld [1964], II)
     A reaction: The editors of the volume call this a revolutionary remark, followed up by Danto and George Dickie with a social and institutional account of art. Danto's key example is Warhol's Brillo pads - art in a gallery, cleaning material in a shop.