Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', '17: Epistle to Titus' and 'There is no a Priori'

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6 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / a. The Liar paradox
9464 One of their own prophets said that Cretans are always liars [Anon (Titus)]
     Full Idea: One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, said, the Cretians are always liars, evil beasts, slow bellies. This witness is true.
     From: Anon (Titus) (17: Epistle to Titus [c.115], I.12)
     A reaction: The classic statement of the paradox, the word 'always' being the source of the problem.
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15990 Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
     Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
15994 If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
     Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
     From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
     A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
     Full Idea: Why should we accept that necessities can only be known a priori? Prima facie, some necessities are known empirically; for example, that water is necessarily H2O, and that Hesperus is necessarily Phosphorus.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
     A reaction: An important question, whatever your view. If the only thing we can know a priori is necessities, it doesn't follow that necessities can only be known a priori. It gets interesting if we say that some necessities can never be known a priori.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
     Full Idea: We have no need to turn to an a priori explanation of our knowledge of mathematics and logic. Our intuitions that this knowledge is not justified in some direct empirical way is preserved. It is justified in an indirect holistic way.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §2)
     A reaction: I think this is roughly the right story, but the only way it will work is if we have some sort of theory of abstraction, which gets us up the ladder of generalisations to the ones which, it appears, are necessarily true.
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
     Full Idea: The whole idea of the a priori is too obscure for it to feature in a good explanation of our knowledge of anything.
     From: Michael Devitt (There is no a Priori [2005], §3)
     A reaction: I never like this style of argument. It would be nice if all the components of all our our explanations were crystal clear. Total clarity about anything is probably a hopeless dream, and we may have to settle for murky corners in all explanations.