15990
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Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
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Full Idea:
I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.
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15994
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If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
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Full Idea:
What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
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From:
John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
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A reaction:
I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.
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7946
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The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
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Full Idea:
The memory criterion for personal identity permits 'branching' (where two things can later meet the criteria of persistence of a single earlier thing), which presents it with serious problems.
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From:
report of Bernard Williams (Personal Identity and Individuation [1956]) by Cynthia Macdonald - Varieties of Things Ch.4
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A reaction:
Of course, any notion of personal identity would have serious problem if people could branch into two, like fissioning amoeba. If that happened, we probably wouldn't have had a strong notion of personal identity in the first place. See Parfit.
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21746
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Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell]
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Full Idea:
If harmonious desires are what we should seek, love is better than hate, since, when two people love each other, both can be satisfied, whereas when they hate each other one at most can achieve the object of his desire.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22)
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A reaction:
A wonderful example of cool philosophical objectivity! Of course it is not true, because the fact that two people love one another doesn't not prevent them from having some incompatible desires, as every couple knows.
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21742
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Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell]
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Full Idea:
Historically, virtue consisted at first of obedience to authority, whether that of the gods, the government, or custom.
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From:
Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927], Ch 22)
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A reaction:
Russell proceeds to demolish such a theory, which he finds it fairly easy to do. In Nietzsche's terms, he is only describing slave virtue. Each role in the world has its own virtues (and functions). Which gods are the most virtuous?
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22891
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We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon]
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Full Idea:
Russell suggested, in defence of an empiricist theory of time-awareness, that a sense organ goes on vibrating, like a piano string, for while after the stimulation. Thus we can see the movement of a second hand, seen in several places at once.
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From:
report of Bertrand Russell (An Outline of Philosophy [1927]) by Adrian Bardon - Brief History of the Philosophy of Time 2 'Realism'
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A reaction:
Hm. If they were vibrating the last experience, they couldn't pick up the new one. When something fast happens the brain resonates fortissimo! If your eyes are moving it will be different neurons that get fired at each instant.
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