Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia' and 'Plural Quantification'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 12. Paraphrase

10633	'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: The Geach-Kaplan sentence 'Some critics admire only one another' provably has no singular first-order paraphrase using only its predicates.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1)
	A reaction: There seems to be a choice of either going second-order (picking out a property), or going plural (collectively quantifying), or maybe both.

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic

10638	A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: The defining features of a pure logic are its absolute generality (the objects of discourse are irrelevant), and its formality (logical truths depend on form, not matter), and its cognitive primacy (no extra-logical understanding is needed to grasp it).
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 3)
	A reaction: [compressed] This strikes me as very important. The above description seems to contain no ontological commitment at all, either to the existence of something, or to two things, or to numbers, or to a property. Pure logic seems to be 'if-thenism'.

5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification

10635	Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Second-order quantification and plural quantification are generally regarded as different forms of quantification.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2)

10641	Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: The traditional view in analytic philosophy has been that all plural locutions should be paraphrased away by quantifying over sets, though Boolos and other objected that this is unnatural and unnecessary.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5)

10640	Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Plural quantification can be used to eliminate the commitment of science and common sense to complex objects. We can use plural quantification over mereological atoms arranged tablewise or chairwise.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.5)
	A reaction: [He cites Hossack and van Ingwagen]

10636	Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Higher-order plural quantification (plural plurals) is often rejected because plural quantification is supposedly ontological innocent, with no plural things to be plural, and because it is not found in ordinary English.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
	A reaction: [Summary; he cites Boolos as a notable rejector] Linnebo observes that Icelandic contains a word 'tvennir' which means 'two pairs of'.

10639	Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Plural quantification seems to offer ontological economy. We can pay the price of a mere first-order theory and then use plural quantification to get for free the corresponding monadic second-order theory, which would be an ontological bargain.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 4.4)
	A reaction: [He mentions Hellman's modal structuralism in mathematics]

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment

10643	We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Some philosophers speak about a theory's 'ideological commitments' and not just about its 'ontological commitments'.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 5.4)
	A reaction: This is a third strategy for possibly evading one's ontological duty, along with fiddling with the words 'exist' or 'object'. An ideological commitment to something to which one is not actually ontologically committed conjures up stupidity and dogma.

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems

10637	Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: Maybe ordinary speakers aren't very concerned about their ontological commitments, and sometimes find it convenient to posit objects.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 2.4)
	A reaction: I think this is the whole truth about the ontological commitment of ordinary language. We bring abstraction under control by pretending it is a world of physical objects. The 'left wing' in politics, 'dark deeds', a 'huge difference'.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

10634	Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo]
	Full Idea: The predicate 'is on the table' is 'distributive', since some things are on the table if each one is, whereas the predicate 'form a circle' is 'non-distributive', since it is not analytic that when some things form a circle, each one forms a circle.
	From: Øystein Linnebo (Plural Quantification [2008], 1.1)
	A reaction: The first predicate can have singular or plural subjects, but the second requires a plural subject? Hm. 'The rope forms a circle'. The second is example is not true, as well as not analytic.

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure

20883	Modern utilitarians value knowledge, friendship, autonomy, and achievement, as well as pleasure [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Most utilitarians now think that pleasure, even if construed widely, is not the only thing desirable in itself. ...Goods also include important knowledge, friendship, autonomy, achievement and so on.
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 2)
	A reaction: That pleasure is desired is empirically verifiable, which certainly motivated Bentham. A string of other desirables each needs to be justified - but how? What would be the value of a 'friendship' if neither party got pleasure from it?

23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism

20884	Rule-utilitarians prevent things like torture, even on rare occasions when it seems best [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: For rule-utilitarians acts of murder, torture and so on, can be impermissible even in rare cases where they really would produce better consequences than any alternative act.
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 4)
	A reaction: It is basic to rule-utilitarianism that it trumps act-ulitilarianism, even when a particular act wins the utilitarian calculation. But that is hard to understand. Only long-term benefit could justify the rule - but that should win the calculation.

25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia

20885	Euthanasia is active or passive, and voluntary, non-voluntary or involuntary [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Six types of euthanasia: 1) Active voluntary (knowing my wishes), 2) Active non-voluntary (not knowing my wishes), 3) Active involuntary (against my wishes), 4) Passive voluntary, 5) Passive non-voluntary, 6) Passive involuntary.
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 5)
	A reaction: 'Active' is intervening, and 'passive' is not intervening. A helpful framework.

20882	Euthanasia may not involve killing, so it is 'killing or not saving, out of concern for that person' [Hooker,B]
	Full Idea: Passive euthanasia is arguably not killing, and the death involved is often painful, so let us take the term 'euthanasia' to mean 'either killing or passing up opportunities to save someone, out of concern for that person'.
	From: Brad W. Hooker (Rule Utilitarianism and Euthanasia [1997], 1)
	A reaction: This sounds good, and easily settled, until you think concern for that person could have two different outcomes, depending on whether the criteria are those of the decider or of the patient. Think of religious decider and atheist patient, or vice versa.