Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'talk' and 'Introduction - Ontology'

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8 ideas

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality

5500	Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Biologists don't split living things into a 'structural' level and an 'abstract' level; ..rather, they are organised at many levels, each level 'abstract' with respect to those beneath it, but 'structural' as it realises those levels above it.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
	A reaction: This is a very helpful distinction. Compare Idea 4601. It seems to fit well with the 'homuncular' picture of a hierarchical mind, and explains why there are so many levels of description available for mental life.

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects

5494	'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan]
	Full Idea: There is such a thing as synthetic and a posteriori identity that is nonetheless genuine identity, as in lightning being electrical discharge, and the Morning Star being Venus.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.5)
	A reaction: It is important to note that although these identities are synthetic a posteriori, that doesn't make them contingent. The early identity theorists like Smart seemed to think that it did. Kripke must be right that they are necessary identities.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism

18988	Behind the bare phenomenal facts there is nothing [Wright,Ch]
	Full Idea: Behind the bare phenomenal facts, as my tough-minded old friend Chauncey Wright, the great Harvard empiricist of my youth, used to say, there is nothing.
	From: Chauncey Wright (talk [1870]), quoted by William James - Pragmatism - eight lectures Lec 7
	A reaction: This is the best slogan for strong phenomenalism ever coined! It also seems to fit David Lewis's approach to philosophy, as the pure study of the mosaic of experiences.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism

5496	Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Functionalism has three distinct levels of description: a neurophysiological description, a functional description (relative to a program which the brain is realising), and it may have a further mental description.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.6)
	A reaction: I have always thought that the 'levels of description' idea was very helpful in describing the mind/brain. I feel certain that we are dealing with a single thing, so this is the only way we can account for the diverse ways in which we discuss it.

17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism

5499	A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan]
	Full Idea: Some theorists have said that the one-to-one correspondence between the organism and parts of its 'program' is too liberal, and suggest that the state and its functional role are seen teleologically, as functioning 'for' the organism.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.9)
	A reaction: This seems an inevitable development, once the notion of a 'function' is considered. It has to be fitted into some sort of Aristotelian teleological picture, even if the functions are seen subjectively (by what?). Purpose is usually seen as evolutionary.

26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied

5501	People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan]
	Full Idea: There is now a small but vigorous industry whose purpose is to explicate biological teleology in naturalistic terms, typically in terms of causes.
	From: William Lycan (Introduction - Ontology [1999], p.10)
	A reaction: This looks like a good strategy. In some sense, it seems clear that the moon has no purpose, but an eyeball has one. Via evolution, one would expect to reduce this to causation. Purposes are real (not subjective), but they are reducible.