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All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'Nominalism and Realism' and 'The Rationalists'

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6 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals

4032	The problem of universals is how many particulars can all be of the same 'type' [Armstrong]
	Full Idea: The problem of universals is the problem of how numerically different particulars can nevertheless be identical in nature, all be of the same 'type'.
	From: David M. Armstrong (Nominalism and Realism [1978], p.41), quoted by DH Mellor / A Oliver - Introduction to 'Properties' §7
	A reaction: A nice statement of the problem. As usual, the question is whether the 'sameness' is a feature of nature, or a product of human thought

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance

4304	Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: Descartes was a dualist about substance, Spinoza was a monist, and Leibniz was a pluralist (an infinity of substances).
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.76)
	A reaction: Spinoza is appealing. We posit a substance, as the necessary basis for existence, but it is unclear how more than one substance can be differentiated. If mind is a separate substance, why isn't iron? Why aren't numbers?

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism

4303	The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.75)
	A reaction: The idea of 'substance' has had an interesting revival in modern philosophy (though not, obviously, in physics). Maybe physics and philosophy have views of reality which are not complementary, but are rivals.

26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity

4306	For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham]
	Full Idea: The rationalist view of causation takes it that to make effects intelligible, it must be shown that they are in principle deducible from their causes.
	From: John Cottingham (The Rationalists [1988], p.92)
	A reaction: This has intuitive appeal, but deduction is only possible with further premises, such as the laws of physics. The effects of human behaviour look a bit tricky, even if we cause them.