Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Letters to Edward Stillingfleet', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'Reply to Professor Frankena'

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7 ideas

9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences

15990	Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke]
	Full Idea: I take essences to be in everything that internal constitution or frame for the modification of substance, which God in his wisdom gives to every particular creature, when he gives it a being; and such essences I grant there are in all things that exist.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 1), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: This is the clearest statement I have found of Locke's commitment to essences, for all his doubts about whether we can know such things. Alexander says (ch.13) Locke was reacting against scholastic essence, as pertaining to species.

11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty

15994	If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke]
	Full Idea: What reaches to knowledge, I think may be called certainty; and what comes short of certainty, I think cannot be knowledge.
	From: John Locke (Letters to Edward Stillingfleet [1695], Letter 2), quoted by Simon Blackburn - Quasi-Realism no Fictionalism
	A reaction: I much prefer that fallibilist approach offered by the pragmatists. Knowledge is well-supported belief which seems (and is agreed) to be true, but there is a small shadow of doubt hanging over all of it.

22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature

23366	We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The will of nature may be learned from those things in which we do not differ from one another.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 26)
	A reaction: There you go! This is the rule for anthropologists on field trips. And it guides us towards a core of essential human nature. But it neglects the way that nature is expressed in different cultures, which is also important.

23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion

4022	Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
	Full Idea: The injunction of Epictetus is well known, that in commiserating with another for his misfortune, we ought to talk consolingly, but not be moved by pity.
	From: report of Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], §16) by Charles Taylor - Sources of the Self §15.1
	A reaction: This goes strongly against the grain of the Christian tradition, but strikes me as an appealing attitude (even if I am the sufferer).

23365	If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: When you see someone weeping is sorrow …do not shrink from sympathising with him, and even groaning with him, but be careful not to groan inwardly too.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 16)
	A reaction: The point is that the person's suffering is an 'indifferent' because nothing can be done about it, and we should only really care about what we are able to choose. He is not opposed to the man's suffering, or his need for support.

23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative

22395	Moral judgements are hypothetical, because they depend on interests and desires [Foot]
	Full Idea: Moral judgements are hypothetical imperatives in the sense that they give reasons for acting only in conjunction with interests and desires.
	From: Philippa Foot (Reply to Professor Frankena [1975], p.177)
	A reaction: This is a splendid claim, which points to a more sensibly naturalistic ethics. There seem to be occasions for moral behaviour where I have no interests or desires, such as when a stranger asks me for a favour and I'm feeling tired.

25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish

23368	Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
	Full Idea: The governor Agrippinus would try to persuade those whom he sentenced that it was proper for them to be sentenced, …just as the physician persuades a patient to accept their treatment.
	From: Epictetus (The Handbook [Encheiridion] [c.58], 22)
	A reaction: This resembles the Contractualism of T.H. Scanlon (that actions are good if you can justify them to those involved). It may be possible to persuade people by the use of sophistry and lies. Nevertheless, a fairly civilise proposal.